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Abstract
This thesis consists of three self-contained essays that are aimed towards contributing
to the understanding of the emerging of the public and private welfare states in devel-
oping economies. Three chapters, specifically, focus on how the public policies affect
individuals labour market participation and what affects the private provision of the
social safety-net in the context of China.
The first chapter provides novel empirical evidence for a question: how is the norm
of providing old-age support transmitted inter-generationally in China? Intergenera-
tional old-age support within families is an important norm in developing countries,
which typically lack comprehensive pension coverage. The transmission mechanism
for this norm is potentially influenced by socioeconomic factors internal and external
to the family, which the norm may in turn influence. This chapter studies the inter-
generational transmission of this social norm in China, focusing on the role of gender.
The suggested mechanism behind this transmission is that parents, by their provi-
sion of support to their own parents, shape their same-gender children’s preference
for old-age support. Given that the gender ratio of Chinese children is not random, I
develop an instrumental variable strategy using an interaction term of the timing of
the ban on sex-selective abortions in China and the gender of the first-born child as
the instrumental variable for the gender of the children to alleviate the possible en-
dogeneity. The empirical results, using two Chinese datasets, show that parents with
more same-gender children provide more support to their ageing parents than parents
with cross-gender ones, controlling for their household size. The father effect is more
significant in rural subsamples, and the mother effect mainly exists in urban areas.
The urban-rural difference in the results may indicate a normative shift accompanying
economic and demographic changes.
The second chapter presents a theoretical framework for understanding the empir-
ical evidence in Chapter 1. Based on the model of the “demonstration effect” by Cox
and Stark (1996), I construct a model describing the intergenerational transmission
of social norms in old-age support. The model combines the “demonstration effect”
and the same-gender transmission channel. The parents are more likely to influence
their same-gender children in terms of providing old-age support, thus they provide
more old-age support if there are more same-gender children in the household. The
key parameter distinguishing my model from the existing literature is the gender of
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the future generation. The baseline model concludes that fathers with more sons in
their households provide more old-age support to their parents than fathers with more
daughters, assuming the number of children are exogenous. Mothers provide more sup-
port to their parents with more daughters in their household. The conclusions from
the baseline model are shown to be valid under models with generalised assumptions.
The last chapter studies how misallocation in labour markets in China can be caused
by the provision of public welfare programmes. Providing health insurance with certain
geographical restrictions may lead to possible misallocations in the labour market by
hindering migration. This chapter tests whether the new rural health insurance intro-
duced in 2003, the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS), had unintended and
negative effects on rural-to-urban migration mobility in China. The NCMS only offers
health insurance to people with rural household registration, and rural residents can
only benefit from the NCMS if they visit the hospitals near their registered location
in the household registration system. Utilising a new dataset collected from provin-
cial yearbooks in China, the results of the event-study approach show that the NCMS
does not reduce the percentage of rural residents who are rural-to-urban migrants and
working outside their home counties at the county level but does have negative effects
on its growth rate. Using the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), my instru-
mental variable results find that being enrolled in the NCMS decreases the probability
of being a migrant at the individual level. The IV is a time-variant dummy indicating
the counties that has relative early NCMS implementations. I also used the CHNS to
construct a county-level dataset and replicate the county-level results. Together, the
results suggest that the NCMS gradually locks the rural labour force into rural areas
and further hinders geographical job mobility in China.
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Chapter 1
The Role of Social Norms in
Old-age Support: Evidence from
China
Intergenerational old-age support within families is an important norm in develop-
ing countries, which typically lack comprehensive pension coverage. The transmission
mechanism for this norm is potentially influenced by socioeconomic factors internal
and external to the family, which the norm may in turn influence. This chapter studies
the inter-generational transmission of this social norm in China, focusing on the role
of gender. The mechanism behind this transmission is that parents, by their provi-
sion of support to their own parents, shape their same-gender children’s preference for
old-age support. Given that the gender ratio of Chinese children is not random, I use
an interaction term of the timing of the ban on sex-selective abortions in China and
the gender of the first-born child as the instrumental variable for the gender of the
children to alleviate the possible endogeneity. The empirical results, using two Chinese
datasets, show that parents with more same-gender children provide more support to
their ageing parents than parents with cross-gender ones, controlling for their house-
hold size. The father effect is more significant in rural subsamples, and the mother
effect is seen mainly in the urban ones. The urban-rural difference in the results may
indicate a normative shift accompanying economic and demographic changes.
1
1.1 Introduction
Family support provided by adult children acts as a major income source for ageing
parents in developing countries. This social norm of providing support to the elderly
is traditional and common, especially in China.1 Usually, the norm is gender-specific:
sons provide more support than daughters (Lee et al., 1993). It helps to offset possible
risks and expected income drops for the elderly in countries with underdeveloped public
pension systems and incomplete financial markets. As a large developing country
with an estimated share of the elderly population due to reach 25% in 2030, China is
feeling the weight on its public finances of sustaining, improving, and complementing its
current pension schemes.2 Family old-age support has served as the complement for the
incomplete public pension system in sustaining the welfare of the elderly in China. A
major topic of debate here, with possibly unsustainable pay-as-you-go pension schemes
in the future, has been how the norm of providing old-age support can be transmitted to
future generations. Given the decline in population growth and the potential problem
of ageing in other developing countries, a study of the transmission of social norms
of support for the elderly in China may help many developing countries understand
better how to encourage such support in the future.
This chapter studies the inter-generational transmission of the social norm of old-
age support provision in China, focusing on the same-gender channel. Parents convey
the social norm of old-age support provision to their same-gender children, in the way
that they provide support to their own parents. The hypothesised mechanism behind
this norm transmission is the same-gender “demonstration effect”. It is based on the
demonstration effect established by Cox and Stark (1996). The demonstration effect
means that parents treat their parents well if they have “their own children to whom to
demonstrate the appropriate behaviour” (Cox and Stark, 2005). This inter-generational
demonstration meets the anthropologists’ description of an upward and positive indi-
rect reciprocity (Arrondel and Massaon, 2006). Anthropologists believe the indirect
reciprocity is an important channel of cultural norm transmission (Mauss, 1950, 1968).
I improve Cox and Stark’s demonstration effect by adding the same-gender transmis-
sion channel for two reasons. First, there is good evidence in sociology and psychology
that children are largely influenced by their same-sex parent in their learning of gender
norms in society (Lytton and Romney, 1991; Bussey and Bandura, 1999; McHale et al.,
1999). Economists have recently found empirical evidence for same-gender intergener-
1In the Chinese Household Finance Survey, 74% of the respondents believed that their children
should be fully or at least partly responsible for their care in old age.
2United Nations (2015) estimated that, in 2030, the share of the population in China aged
60 and older will be 25%. The current share of the population aged 60 and older in the U.K.
is 23.9% and in China is 16.2% (United Nations, 2017). The total number of people aged 60
or above is 222 million, which is around 4 times the current population of the United Kingdom.
WSJ coverage: https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/03/10/china-sets-timeline-for-first-change-
to-retirement-agesince-1950s/. In 2017 China raised the retirement age, set in the 1950s, to alleviate
pressures on its public finances.
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ational transmissions in individual preferences and social norms (Alesina et al., 2013;
Kleven et al., 2018). The second reason is that the gender difference is prominent in
the norm of old-age support provision in China and other developing cultures (Gupta
et al., 2003). Traditionally, sons are responsible for supporting their elderly parents in
China (Lee et al., 1993; Chan et al., 2002).
In my proposed mechanism, parents provide old-age support to their parents, and
they expect to be recompensed by their same-gender children. A key assumption in this
mechanism is that parents internalise the fact that their behaviours regarding old-age
support provision may affect their same-gender children (Eccles et al., 1990; Bussey and
Bandura, 1999). Under this mechanism, a parent should provide more old-age support
when the household includes more same-gender children than a parent with more cross-
gender children. This channel of inter-generational transmission of the norm does not
only exist in the theoretical framework created by academic researchers, but there are
also real-world examples for it. Public service announcement posters in China in Figure
1.1 show the same-gender demonstration effect described. These posters also show the
government’s efforts to promote the norm of providing family support in old age, which
indicates the importance of this norm in Chinese society. By studying the same-gender
inter-generational transmission of the norm in old-age support provision, this chapter
seeks to demonstrate how changes in economic and demographic conditions affect the
norm and its transmission in China, both financially and non-financially.
I provide novel evidence for the same-gender transmission of this social norm of
support in old age and show that the decision-making regarding old-age support pro-
vision involves three generations. Most of the family old-age support studies assume
by default that the children will provide old-age support when their parents retire
because of altruism or direct reciprocity (Becker and Lewis, 1973; Guttman, 2001).
These channels limit the effect of old-age support to two generations, the parents and
the children.3 However, there is a gap in the literature: only a few researchers focus
on the way in which the social norm of providing old-age support is transmitted to the
next generation. Cox and Stark (1996, 2005) provide a theoretical framework for the
inter-generational transmission of the norm of providing support in old age. The only
empirical evidence for this inter-generational transmission has been collected by Wolff
(2001) and Mitrut and Wolff (2009). The present chapter helps to fill this gap by pro-
viding empirical evidence for the gender-specific effect demonstrated in support for the
elderly in China. The empirical results show the importance of the future generation
in the process of transmitting the social norm of old-age support. The chapter also
contributes to the literature by first documenting a normative shift with economic and
demographic changes during China’s transformation into a modern nation, thanks to
the wide urban-rural differences.
When studying the effects of the gender of children on the support for the elderly
3Some of the relevant literature evaluates the “manipulation” of children by their parents to ensure
more old-age support in the future (Becker et al., 2016).
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provided by their parents in China, an empirical difficulty is that the gender of the
children is endogenous. The increasing gender ratio of newborns in China corresponds
to the imbalance in the gender ratio of the children in the datasets. The gender ratio of
new-borns has been increasing since 1990 (China Population and Employment Statis-
tics Yearbooks, Figure 2). For this, sex-selective abortion is one of the main reasons
(Chen et al., 2014). The non-random gender ratio of the children could positively or
negatively affect the support for the elderly provided by parents.4 To address this
problem, I utilise two facts: the gender of the first child in households and the timing
of a policy ban on sex-selective abortions.
I use the interaction term of the gender of the first child in a household and whether
or not a household is affected by the policy ban as the instrumental variable (IV) for
the gender ratio of the children. This IV exploits two facts. First, the gender of
the first child is closer to the natural rate than the gender ratio for all new-borns in
China (Ebenstein, 2010; Wei and Zhang, 2011). Scholars usually regard the gender
of the first child as random (Jayachandran and Pande, 2017; Heath and Tan, 2018).
However, given the highly skewed gender ratio of newborns in China, it is difficult
to concede that the gender of first-born children is fully exogenous. Second, a policy
was introduced to reduce the gender ratio to its natural level, so the gender of first-
born children who were born in or after the year of the policy ban is approximately
close to the natural rate. The policy banned the use of ultrasound for prenatal sex
determination and imposed fines on those who conduct sex-selective abortions. It was
initiated by the National Family Planning Commission (NFPC) in 2003 affecting all
households that have at least one child born in or after 2003.
The timing of the policy change is plausibly exogenous at household-level.5 I find
that the policy, as intended, negatively affects the household-level gender ratio of chil-
dren. The compliers are those who have not conducted sex-selective abortions since
the policy ban. Usually, they prefer sons to daughters. There are two different types of
complier: affected and unaffected. The affected compliers are those who have children
of the opposite sex to their wishes. They capture the time variation of the policy. For
example, after 2003, the affected compliers who would have been willing, had no ban
existed, to conduct sex-selective abortions, have daughters, and this decreases the gen-
der ratio of their children. Unaffected compliers who have sons after 2003 by natural
chance provide no variation. The gender ratio of the children of people who would not
conduct a sex-selective abortion in any circumstances cannot be affected by this policy,
and the gender ratio in their households should be close to the natural rate. The IV
thus captures the differences for the affected compliers before and after the policy ban.
The main empirical findings indicate that parents increase probabilities of providing
financial and non-financial support in old age with more same-gender children, con-
4This will be further elaborated in the empirical results section.
5The law-making processes of most Chinese policies are quite exogenous, as far as members of the
public are concerned (Hu, 1998; Shen, 2008).
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trolling for the household size. I only compare the difference within parents’ gender
for the old-age support provided by them. In the datasets, the father and the mother
both show gender-specific demonstration behaviours. The results from the robustness
check and the heterogeneity analysis are mostly consistent with the expected results
under the demonstration effect channel. The ‘father’ demonstration effect is generally
more significant in low-income and rural subsamples, and also in households with more
than one child. The ‘mother’ effect is most significant for the outcome variables in low-
income and urban subsamples. The empirical evidence implies that support for the
elderly is closely linked to the composition of the gender of parents and their children,
which suits the assumption that the norm of providing support for the elderly is likely
to be transmitted to offspring of the same gender.
However, the two datasets exhibit different gender-dominated demonstration be-
haviours. The CHARLS (the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study) mainly
presents the father demonstration effect. The mother effect has a more substantial role
in the urban subsample and also in the whole sample of the CHFS (the China House-
hold Finance Survey). One explanation for this difference is because the CHARLS
contains more rural samples than the CHFS. It is consistent with results from the
urban-rural heterogeneity analysis and subsample check. The discrepancy between the
urban and rural subsample results has implications for the norm-shift of providing sup-
port for the elderly together with the development of China. Urban areas in China are
more developed than rural areas: they have higher pension/insurance coverage, better
public infrastructure, and, in particular, fewer gender inequalities and higher female
bargaining powers (Fong, 2002; Lee, 2012). The results may suggest that higher female
household bargaining power may lead to more significant mother demonstration effects.
The mechanism checks also show that the existence of other possible mechanisms, such
as altruism and direct reciprocity, is not likely to affect the demonstration effect mech-
anism in the results. I also calculate the correlation between the “missing girls” and
the demand for support for the elderly in a patrilineal society, using a method from
Oster’s 2005 paper. Using this method, I calculate the adjusted sex-ratio based only
on the correlation between the unbalanced gender ratio and the demand for support
for the elderly from sons. The demand for old-age support accounts for 12-18% of the
unbalanced gender ratio in the data.
The chapter proceeds as follows. More background information on support for the
elderly from children in China is in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 provides the theoretical
background for the same-gender social norm transmission and the model. This is
followed by Section 1.3, which provides the identification strategy and the empirical
findings. Section 1.4 also provides the robustness check for the key empirical findings.
Section 1.6 offers some concluding thoughts.
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1.2 Background
1.2.1 Old-age support in China
The provision of financial and non-financial support to ageing parents is a pro-social
norm in China and other countries that are influenced by Confucianism. This family
support for the elderly has been acting as an alternative way of sustaining the welfare
of elderly to the incomplete public pension system. Table 1.1 shows that in 2005
less than 50% of the urban elderly viewed public pensions as their major source of
income. In rural areas, the percentage was only around 5%. More than 50% of the
rural elderly and around 40% of their urban counterparts believed their major source
of income to be family support. Even with the development of the public pension in
both urban and rural areas in China, the percentage of rural elderly choosing pensions
as their main income source in 2010 was unchanged, although the percentage of those
who chose family support declined to 47%. The pension schemes in urban areas have
been improved since 2005: around 70% of the urban elderly in 2010 relied on a public
pension while only around 20% of them lived mainly on family support. Inferring from
the statistics, the public pension coverage shows a wide urban-rural difference. Rural
areas in China do not seem to have had an effective pension scheme before 2011, so
the elderly there were still depending on the norm of private support for the elderly.
A large proportion of the elderly in China live on support from their family mem-
bers, especially from their adult children. The social norm of providing support for the
elderly is then important to those who try to secure their income after their retirement.
First, they have to know which characteristics affect the amount of support that they
can depend on in old age. The number and the gender of the adult children are two
major aspects studied in the relevant literature on China. In the standard old-age
support literature, such as Becker and Lewis (1973), people believe that more children
in a household will lead to more support for the elderly in the future. Cai et al. (2006)
and Oliveira (2016) both verify this common belief among Chinese people. As regards
the gender of the children, traditionally, males are responsible for providing support to
their parents in their old age. Hence the early literature assumed that males provide
more than females due to cultural and labour market restrictions (Lee et al., 1993;
Chan et al., 2002). The value of male offspring in providing support for the elderly is
one of the reasons behind the persistent preference for sons in China and other devel-
oping countries (Gupta et al., 2003). It was common in China for households to have
at least one son, right up to the implementation of the “One-Child” Policy (OCP)
(Milwertz, 1997; Ebenstein and Leung, 2010). However, in the recent literature, Xie
and Zhu (2009) find that females were providing more support to elderly parents in
urban areas, and Oliveira (2016) finds no gender differences in the provision of support
in old age. But given the rising gender ratio for newborns in China, especially in rural
areas, it is reasonable to assume that this gender difference still exists, though it may
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vary between rural and urban areas.
Once those who rely on family support for income in old age know the factors af-
fecting their future income, it is highly likely that they will try to manipulate these
characteristics. For most families in China, the number of children is difficult to ma-
nipulate. With the strict implementation and high fines of the OCP, Ebenstein (2010)
has found that the policy reduced fertility. Gender, however, was a characteristic that
was easier for people to manipulate, with the help of advanced technologies. Chen et al.
(2013) have inferred that the increasing gender ratio could be attributed to increased
gender selection before birth, thanks to gender-selection technology. For example, B-
mode ultrasound allowed people to know the sex of a foetus and was in common use
all over the world after 1980 (White, 2001). Qian (2008) has discovered that an in-
creased future income for females also improved the female survival rate. In addition,
Ebenstein and Leung (2010) have studied the effects of having a public pension system
on the sex ratio at birth in China. They find that when a region is covered by a public
pension scheme, its gender ratio is more balanced than it is in regions without such
coverage. From the literature, it seems that in China, gender is a key factor in the
norm of family support in old age. Support for the elderly is also, important enough
to affect fertility decisions, such as the number and gender of people’s future children.
Parents internalise future support that they will receive from their children when they
are old and try to alter the characteristics that might affect their own future support.
1.2.2 Indirect reciprocity
It is important to learn how to best support the elderly, given their situation. First, we
should understand the possible mechanisms for doing so. Altruism and exchange are
the two main motives in the standard theoretical models analysing intergenerational
transfer. Altruism, in the context of, support for the elderly means that people are
generally willing to support their ageing and retired parents. The theoretical framework
for altruistic individuals is developed by Barro (1974) and Becker (1976, 1981). The
exchange mechanism is also referred to as (direct) reciprocity. It describes support for
the elderly as reciprocal payments for the financial and/or non-financial investment
made in the donors’ childhood (Cox, 1987). However, the existing empirical results are
not robust enough to support these two motives in theoretical models (Arrondel and
Masson, 2006). The theory of indirect reciprocity may serve to reconcile the motives
of altruism and exchange. Indirect reciprocity is also the theoretical support for the
inter-generational transmission of the norm of giving support to the elderly.
The concept of indirect reciprocity is usually attributed to Mauss (1950, 1968), a
French anthropologist. He expands the common “gift-return” reciprocity relationship
between two parties, the giver and the beneficiary, to three parties. He states that
indirect reciprocities involving three successive generations will lead to infinite chains
of transfers. He observes that the givers do not get direct payback from the beneficiary
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but receive it from a third person (Arrondel and Masson, 2001). The channel works for
any type of transfer: upward, downward, positive or negative. Cox and Stark (1996)
provide a model to describe similar behaviours in the provision of support in old age,
which coincides with the upward and positive indirect reciprocity channel. In the
context of support for the elderly, the interaction between three parties is that parents
educate their children by providing support for the elderly to their parents so that the
parents when elderly will receive support from their children. It is usually referred to as
the “demonstration effect”. The model predicts that transfers from individuals to their
parents are positively affected by the presence of their children. Cox and Stark (2005)
test the prediction using U.S. data. Wolff (2001) and Mitrut and Wolff (2009) also
find that the existence of granddaughters increases the visits paid to the grandparents;
Becker et al. (2016) believe that parents can “manipulate” the preferences of children,
an assumption underlying the demonstration effect.
Bau (2019) studies the connection between the cultural norm and support for the
elderly in Ghana and suggests that support for the elderly is a product of cultural
norms. Except for Mitrut and Wolff (2009), the relevant literature considers only the
role of the children in the transmission of the norm of old-age support, without any
consideration of the role of gender. Given the gender difference regarding support for
the elderly and preference in China for sons, the demonstration effect may also be linked
with the gender of the third generation. Godelier (1982) describes indirect reciprocity
as gender-specific when it functions as a channel for the transmission of cultural traits
and norms. If there is a gender-specific social norm, then it is also a channel for passing
on gender norms in society. Mitrut and Wolff (2009) find that parents’ visits to their
own parents are largely affected by the presence of daughters rather than sons in their
households. This empirical finding is consistent with common beliefs about the role of
gender: parents of girls are the more likely ones to pay visits and care for the elderly
(Lee et al., 1993).
If providing support for the elderly links with gender norms, one vital assumption
is that parents should be able to influence their same-gender children more effectively
than cross-gender children. Children would also mimic the behaviour of the same-
gender parent in the future, a phenomenon which is known in psychology and sociol-
ogy as “gender socialisation/specification”. Many sociologists and psychologists believe
that the same-sex parent is the main source for ensuring that children to learn the cor-
responding gender role that fits social expectations and that the children will perform
gender-related behaviours when they become adults (Lytton and Romney, 1991; Bussey
and Bandura, 1999; McHale et al., 1999). In the recent economics literature, several
papers focus on same-gender intergenerational transmission. Jayachandran and her
colleagues show that the effects of the same-sex parent on gender attitudes are greater
than the peer effects (Dhar et al., 2018). Kleven et al. (2018) reveal that in Denmark
preferences over family and career for females are largely influenced by the mother’s
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preference observed during childhood. Alesina et al. (2013) also find that paternal
ancestors affect the perspectives of males on the gender role and the female labour
market participation.
Parents should also internalise the fact their children’s future behaviours will be
affected by theirs. This internalisation means that parents will begin to influence
their offspring in order to form their children’s preferences. Becker (1996), Bisin and
Verdier (2000), Guttman (2001), Bronnenberg et al., (2012), and Becker et al. (2016)
study whether parents show certain behaviours to or spend more resources on their
children in order to formalise their children’s preferences. After listing the relevant
evidence supporting the demonstration effect and same-gender intergenerational norm
transmission, it is reasonable to assume that the demonstration effect works in a more
gender-specific way when there is a wide gender difference in the planned support for
the elderly. People will demonstrate the norm of support in old age to their same-
gender offspring by providing support for the elderly to their own parents. Figure 1.1
provides examples in China for the same-gender demonstration effect.
1.3 Data and empirical results
1.3.1 Data
Two datasets are used to assess the gender effects of children on the norm transmission
of old-age support, more specifically, how the gender of children affects the support
for the elderly provided by their parents. The first dataset is the China Health and
Retirement Longitudinal Study (the CHARLS). The CHARLS is a longitudinal survey
of 28 out of the 34 provinces of the country for three waves in the years 2011, 2013 and
2015 up to the present day.6 It collects a representative sample of residents aged 45 or
above. The main wave used in this chapter is the 2011 wave. The data set contains
information on each respondent’s family, work, retirement, wealth, health and income.
The main demographic group in the survey is people aged 45 or above. In the 2011
sample, this covered about 17,708 individuals in 10,257 households from 28 provinces.
The sample was randomly selected from four samplings at different levels: county-level,
neighbourhood-level, household-level and respondent-level.7
The CHARLS provides detailed information on inter-generational and inter-household
transfers. One advantage of this dataset is that it clearly distinguishes between the
transfers from each child of the respondents. The survey also identifies different types
of support, whether regular or non-regular. The regular support acts as income re-
ceived from the children of the respondents at fixed times. Regular support is similar
to the support for the elderly as defined: a certain amount of income paid repetitively
6The detailed distribution in provinces and counties is presented in Figure A.1.
7The detailed sampling method at each level can be accessed at:
http://charls.pku.edu.cn/en/page/about-sample-2011.
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to the elderly at a fixed time. Non-regular support is the support provided at different
times of the year and is not necessarily repetitive, whereas the regular one is.8 Given
the high average age of the respondents, the sample size for the available observations
in terms of the transfer provided by the respondents to their parents is small. But
many of the respondents have children of working age, so most of them receive support
from their children. I regard the support for the respondents provided by their children
as the support from parents to their elderly parents discussed in the previous section.
The respondents in the survey are the passive recipients of old-age support. Namely,
they are the elderly the main regressions in the CHARLS. The grandchildren of the
survey’s respondents are the children of the respondents’ children.
To fit the original dataset into my setting, I construct a new sample that cov-
ers the adult children of the survey respondents, namely, the parents.9 In the newly
constructed sample, the sample size decreases to about 14,000 observations. In the
reconstructed 2011 wave, around 65% of people come from rural areas, and more than
75% of them have rural hukou (“household registration”). However, due to the ques-
tionnaire design of the CHARLS, the demographic information on the parents and their
children is not as detailed as the information on their elderly parents in my regression.
The available demographic variables in the 2011 wave about the children are only the
gender and the number of them. In the 2013 and 2015 wave, the only available demo-
graphic variable is the number of the children. This is the reason why I can conduct
only cross-sectional analyses when using the CHARLS.
I used a second dataset to verify the generalisation of the results from the CHARLS
and also to provide supplementary evidence for the demonstration effect. The dataset
is the China Household Finance Survey (the CHFS). The CHFS is a panel dataset
covering 25 provinces in China, by Southwestern University’s Department of Finance
and Economics and Research Institute of Economics and Management. This survey
focuses on household-level financial behaviours. It currently has three waves: for the
years 2011, 2013, and 2015. The survey does not have the same age limitation on the
survey respondents as the CHARLS does; hence, there is no need to reconstruct the
dataset. In the CHARLS, I treated the main respondents of the survey as the parents.
The sample in the 2011 wave includes only 8,438 households, and its questionnaire
includes only the gender of the children who are living together with the respondents.
In the 2013 wave, the number of observations increased significantly: 28,142 households
and 97,916 individuals. Accordingly, I used the 2013 wave in the CHFS for more
observations and more precise information on the gender ratio of the children and
old-age support provided.
I include only the main respondent for each household in my CHFS sample for
regression. The main respondents know the household financial situation best (Li et
8In the CHARLS, non-regular support is defined as “support at Spring Festival or/and Mid-
Autumn Festival or/and birthday or/and wedding or/and funerals or/and others”.
9A detailed discussion of the dataset reconstruction is in Appendix A.3.
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al., 2015). They are responsible for answering the household-level financial questions,
which includes the questions regarding inter-household transfers. If I included only the
main respondents, there would be a selection bias. In this sample, the parents are in
charge of household finances. So, one possible effect would from females who were in
charge of the household finances, who may have a higher power in their household than
is held by females who are not in charge. A possible result of this selection would be
that the females in my CHFS sample transferred more to their parents, which makes my
CHFS results an upper bound of the female demonstration effect. However, regarding
the households’ support for the elderly, the main respondents may know only the exact
amount of their own transfers, and not that of their partner. Their partner may hide
the information from them (Ashraf, 2009). Moreover, only the main respondents have
information about their own parents. The 2013 wave also includes the gender of all the
children of the respondents. One limitation of the CHFS is that the information about
the intergenerational and inter-household transfer collected in the survey is not as
detailed as the information available in the CHARLS. Each dataset has its advantages
and disadvantages. A comprehensive interpretation of the results from both datasets
is necessary.
1.3.2 Main regression
The chapter sets out to examine the gender effects of the children on the support for the
elderly provided by their same-sex parent. The main regression includes the gender of
the parents, the gender ratio of their children in their household, and their interaction
term. The main regression is:
yi = α + βsex ratioKi + γmalePi + δ(malePi × sex ratioKi) + X′iθ + φc + εi. (1.1)
In the equations, i stands for a parent i. yi represents the outcome variables testing
various aspects of old-age support. The error term is εi is clustered at the prefecture
city-level for the CHARLS and the province-level for the CHFS.10 The different cluster-
levels for the CHARLS and the CHFS is because the CHFS does not provide any
information on prefecture cities. φc is the province fixed effects. For the main regressors,
I use the three-generation setting: P is the parents, K represents the children of P ,
and O is the parents of P . malePi is the gender of a parent i in the P generation.
It equals 1 if the parent is male and 0 otherwise. The regressor sex ratioKi is the
actual male-to-female gender ratio of the children in parent i’s household. The gender
ratio of K equals the number of sons for a parent i divided by the total number of
K in the household if i has more than one child. For i with one child, if the only
10The results are similar when the error terms clustered at the individual-level and also the province-
level. The choice of the cluster level is discussed in the following section discussing the instrumental
variable.
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child is a boy, then sex ratioKi = 1. If the only child is a girl, then sex ratioKi = 0.
sex ratioKi×malePi is the interaction term, and Xi is the set of demographic variables
for P and O to be controlled for in the regression.11 I run separated regressions for
the CHARLS and the CHFS, since the difference between the two datasets is quite
large. Using this regression equation, I manage to calculate the within-parent gender
differences in terms of providing support for the elderly caused by the gender ratio of
their children, while controlling for the P ’s own gender and household-size.
There are three consistent main outcome variables in both two data sets. They are
the dummy indicating whether P provide any financial transfer to O (any-transfer),
the amount of any transfer provided (amount), and the number of days spent on P ’s
visits paid to O per year (visit days). The transfers provided to P ’s parents are the
pecuniary old-age support provided. For the amount of the transfer, I unify it to the
annual amount and the amounts are capped.12 The summary statistics for the outcome
variables, key regressors, and control variables in different datasets are shown in Table
1.2.13 In the CHARLS questionnaire, transfers are classified into two different types:
regular transfer and non-regular transfer. The regular transfer is the fixed-amount
transfer that parents make to their elderly parents at fixed times. The non-regular
transfer represents transfers provided by the parents at non-regular but important
social events or circumstances. These two types of transfers are not used in the main
analysis, but in the check parts only. The amount of any transfer provided in the
CHARLS is the sum of the regular and the non-regular transfer.
The OLS results from Equation (1.1) for the CHARLS and the CHFS are shown in
Table 1.3. Before analysing the gender effects of children, I first want to verify whether
there are gender differences in the provision of support for the elderly by the parents
in the CHARLS and the CHFS. In the recent literature, it seems that males no longer
provide more old-age support than females (Xie and Zhu, 2009; Oliveira, 2016).14 I
want to use the simple OLS regressions with maleP as the only key regressor to check
whether the male P provide more in the datasets used. The corresponding results in
Table A.3 might imply that there are certain gender differences of P in old-age support.
The coefficients of maleP are similar to the corresponding coefficients in Table 1.3. The
detailed discussion about the gender differences of P in old-age support is in Appendix
Section A.1.
For the main results in Table 1.3, they suggest that most of the effects of the
gender of K on old-age support are insignificant. From now on, I refer to females in
11The controls are different in the CHARLS and the CHFS. I try to make the controls consistent
between the two datasets. The control variables for O are more in the CHARLS than in the CHFS,
but information on P and K is more precise in the CHFS.
12The amount of transfers are capped at 100,000 per year in the CHARLS and 10,000 in the CHFS.
13The full summary statistics for all the controls and the summary statistics by gender of the adult
children are in the Appendix, Tables A.1 and A.2.
14Oliveira (2016) shows that there is no gender difference in the support for the elderly provided
by parents. Xie and Zhu (2009) show that females in urban areas provide more to their parents than
males do.
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the P generation as mothers, and their male counterparts as fathers. I only focus on
the gender effects of K within a certain gender of P . In Equation 1.1, −β indicates,
for mothers, the change of old-age support provision corresponding to decreases in the
gender of K in their households. The decrease in the gender of K means there are more
daughters in one’s household, controlling for the total household size. So I name −β as
the mother demonstration effect. β+δ shows the same change for fathers corresponding
to increases in the gender of K in their households, which is the father demonstration
effect. If the same-gender channel works, the expected coefficients of β should be
negative and significant for the mother demonstration effect. The coefficients of β + δ
should be positive and significant to show the father effect. For outcome variables in
the CHARLS, the coefficients of sex ratioK, which is β, for visit days is negative and
significant. The mother and father demonstration effect on the probability of providing
any transfer are insignificant. The father demonstration effects are significant for visits
paid and the amount of transfer. The coefficients for β and β + δ are all insignificant,
yet the signs mostly fit the prediction of the same-gender effects in the CHFS results.
I also include the coefficients for the P household size in the results in Table 1.3.
A large household size implies more children in one’s household. For a mother, an
increase in household size has possible negative effects on her provision of old-age
support, financially or non-financially. But these effects are only significant for the
visits paid to her parents in both datasets. A father, on the other hand, an increase in
his household size have positive effects on the amount of his support provided and the
visits paid to his parents. These positive effects are significant for the visits paid to his
parents in both datasets and for the amount of old-age support in the CHARLS. The
impacts of household-size on fathers are consistent with the demonstration effect by
Cox and Stark (1996): people provide more old-age support if they have more children
in their households. The household size is another important factor that might affect
the decision of gender selections, which is a problem that I would discuss more in the
subsample check section, so controlling the household size and its interaction term with
maleP might help to alleviate the possible selections.15
1.3.3 Identification strategy
The OLS results in both datasets do not appear to support the proposed demonstration
effect. It may be that the results under the OLS model suffer from biases caused by
various possible endogenous problems. One main endogeneity problem comes from the
gender selection issue affecting the gender ratio of the children, sex ratioK. According
to the China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbooks, the yearly national-
level gender ratio of new-borns has been increasing since the late 1980s.16 The national
15It would be more desirable if I can use calculate a counter-factual household size without its
correlation with the household gender ratio using Qian’s method in her paper ”Quantity-Quality and
the One-Child Policy: the Only-Child Disadvantage in School Enrolment in Rural China”.
16The yearly national-level gender ratio of new-borns is shown in Figure 1.2.
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gender in 2011 shows the ratio of boys to girls to be as high as 1.25 to 1, revealing
the gender selection problem as quite severe. Households with son preference would
be likely to conduct selective abortions, and these are usually the households holding
the traditional stereotypes of daughters. Households with modern views on gender
equality are less likely to select their children’s gender. In my sample, the gender ratio
of the parents is almost free from this problem. In the CHARLS the average age of
the parents in the sample is 40 and in the CHFS, it is 48. It is around 0.51 in both
datasets. When they were born, gender selection technology was not yet available in
China (Chen et al., 2013). The endogeneity problem of sex ratioK is a larger one, and
it may affect the OLS outcomes in two opposite ways as illustrated by males with a
preference for sons. First, if a male is eager to have a boy only to secure his own future
support, then gender-selection will lead to an upward bias for the father demonstration
effect. Second, if, alternatively, a father wants to have a boy to enhance the household’s
prosperity, he will invest more family resources in a son’s upbringing. So the father
effect is downwardly biased. The effect of the endogeneity is ambiguous in this setting.
To alleviate the bias, I use the timing of a regulation announced in late 2002 by the
Ministry of Health, State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) together with the
National Family Planning Commission (NFPC). The regulation bans the use of B-scan
ultrasonography and other technologies for determining foetal sex from January 1st
2003.17 It states that all methods of gender selection should be banned and imposes
fines for different levels of violation of the regulation. Fines are imposed on individuals
who choose the sex of a foetus allowed to survive and on the hospitals that conduct
scans and abortions. The policy was intended to make the gender of the children born
in or after 2003 closer to the natural birth rate relatively random, which is lower than
the gender ratio of the children born before. The policy was designed to reduce the
gender ratio of new-born males to females, so it would be relevant to the average gender
ratio of children in households, which is the variable sex ratioK in the main regression
equation. Figure 1.3 shows the estimated yearly gender ratios of new-borns using the
2011 wave in the CHARLS and the estimated yearly gender ratios of the first-born
children using the 2013 wave in the CHFS. This graph shows that both gender ratios
fall after the year 2003.
I use mainly the timing of the policy change to construct the first part of the
instrumental variable employed in the chapter. The policy covers most of the provinces,
and the provincial congresses passed the policy at much the same time,18 with no great
time difference between them. I assign the value of the policy timing variable to 1 for
P with at least one child born in or after 2003, and 0 otherwise. The increasing gender
ratio of male to female new-borns is a heated social issue that usually attracts public
17Website: http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-10/24/content 82759.htm. Last accessed: September
2018.
18 The provincial congresses all passed the policy at some time between November 2002 and January
2003. The information was collected from the provincial government websites.
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attention. So public discussion may accompany the agenda-setting process of the policy.
However, Hu (1998) and Shen (2008) declare that detailed information and plans are
rarely revealed to the Chinese public in the policy planning stage. Thus, the timing of
the policy implementation is exogenous to the general public. Regarding this policy,
in particular, most of the news about it on Baidu.com or Google.com appears after
the provincial governments or the central government passed the associated regulation.
Also, the policy ban on gender-selective abortions is designed mainly for adjusting the
high male-to-female gender ratio for the newborns in China.19 The exclusion restriction
of using the policy variation is satisfied policy-wise because the policy design does not
include the concern of the old-age provision. However, people might still violate this
policy ban and pay high fines to conduct gender-selective abortions. This could, in turn,
affect that total expenditure of the households, and affect old-age support provision
due to household budget limitations. To conclude, the exogeneity assumption of the
policy timing is reasonable in my setting.
Although Figure 1.3 shows the gender ratio in the CHARLS and the CHFS de-
creased after 2003, the situation is not quite the same as in Figure 1.2. The national
gender ratio has been stagnating at a high level since 2003, although it has not in-
creased since then. Figure 1.2 implies a slight chance that the policy does not ban
sex-selective abortions outright.20 To address this concern, I combined the dummy
indicating the timing of the policy implementation together with the gender of the
first-born child in the households surveyed. The gender ratio of the oldest child in a
family is relatively balanced in China. The One-Child Policy (OCP) does not strictly
require all households to have only “one child”, especially in rural areas, so the first
child’s gender is relatively close to the natural ratio of new-borns (Ebenstein, 2010). In
Figure 1.4, the graphs show the ratio of new-born boys who are not the eldest to their
girl counterparts are all larger than the gender ratio among first-born babies. For the
relevance condition for this variable, the gender of the oldest child is usually correlated
with the gender ratio of children in households (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Heath and
Tan, 2018). But the male-to-female ratio for the first-born child is still higher than the
natural rate. Together with the timing of the plausible exogenous policy, my instru-
mental variable can plausibly satisfy the exclusion condition. The IV is an interaction
term of two dummies: one dummy equals 1 for households with at least one child born
in or after 2003 and one dummy equals 1 if the oldest child in a household is a son.
This instrumental variable borrows the concept of the instrumented difference-in-
differences design (DDIV) (Dulfo, 2001; Hudson et al., 2017).21 The key variation
19http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-10/24/content 82759.htm
20Because the policy did not make the gender ratio of new-borns completely random, I cannot use
the subsample of households with new babies in or after 2003 to test the demonstration effect.
21Using of the interaction term of the gender of the first child and whether a household is affected
by the policy as IV is necessary. I cannot use only the subsample of households that are affected
by the policy ban when using the gender of the first children as IV. This is because, even with the
policy ban, the gender ratios in some provinces are still higher than the natural rate. A more detailed
explanation in Appendix A.3 and the sub-sample regression results are shown in Table A.22.
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comes from the policy compliers: those who were not allowed to conduct sex-selective
abortions after the policy implementation and had young children of the undesired
gender. Take, for example, people with only one child and a preference for sons;
assume they want to have a son but cannot conduct sex-selective abortions due to the
policy ban. If they happen to have a son by natural chance, they are not the compliers
that I expect under this policy. The compliers are people of the same type who have a
daughter eventually. The gender ratio of the first child in the compliers’ households will
decrease after the policy implementation beyond the gender ratio of the first child before
the policy change. The constructed instrumental variable is used for two datasets. As
noted above, the CHARLS gives limited information on the children of the parents
that it surveys. Hence, constructing the gender of the first child in a household using
the CHARLS entails a few assumptions, which are included in Appendix A.3.
One additional assumption that should be stated is that the support for the elderly
provided by the parents does not change over time after controlling for the demographic
variables, because the DDIV outcome variables are usually time-variant. Due to the
data limitation, I manage to get only cross-sectional datasets, so I use the CHFS
dataset to compute the average probability of providing old-age support for the elderly
for groups of P who have their last child in the same year. If there is no increasing trend
in these averages in the different years of the last childbirth, the DDIV assumption is
likely to be satisfied in the datasets. The graphs for plotting the “time-trend” are
shown in Figure A.2 in the Appendix. They show that for the P generation, there is
no significant decrease in the trend in the year of birth of the last child in households
until the last two years before 2013.
I also construct another instrumental variable to proxy for the household-level gen-
der ratio for the CHARLS only. It is the prefecture-level compliance index of the policy
implementation/enforcement. Ebenstein (2010) uses different enforcement levels of the
OCP in China and shows that the regional variation in fines levied for unauthorized
births is associated with the gender ratio. Bo (2018) exploits geographical variations in
the policy ban on gender-selective abortions and use it as an IV of the children’s gen-
der ratio. Only the CHARLS has detailed information on the different prefecture-level
cities. One of the components included in the index is the time when the provinces in-
cluded the policy change in their provincial-level Regulation on Population and Family
Planning. The policy change was announced in late 2002, and the actual implementa-
tion date was in early 2003. The time when the policy was introduced in the provincial
regulation may indicate the level of compliance in different provinces.
Another component included in the index concerns a campaign in early 2005 ini-
tiated by the Ministry of Health with the NFPC targeting illegal clinics and under-
qualified doctors in prefecture-level cities.22 The illegal clinics are usually the ones
which illegal conduct sex-selective abortions. The policy acts to complement the pol-
22Website: http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-08/02/content 352694.htm. The regulation date was in
2006, but in the content, it states that the campaign started early in 2005.
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icy ban of 2003. Both the central and the provincial governments decide to use this
top-down approach because the local governments may have better control of the ac-
tual implementation of the campaign. Different prefecture-level cities have different
enforcement-level of this campaign. Some cities have mounted this campaign every
year since the campaign started. Others may have implemented the campaign in 2005
for only one year or may even have started the campaign later than the NFPC require-
ment. The number of years that a city has enforced the campaign and also the year
each city started to do so are indicators of the strictness with which the regulation was
implemented at the prefecture-level. I take the relevant information from various pre-
fectural government websites and also from newspapers and generate an index showing
the various compliance levels of the listed prefectural cities regarding this policy and
this campaign. The constructed compliance index varies from 0 to 2, where 2 is the
highest level of allegiance to the aims of the campaign.
The policy implementation levels at the prefectural city-level also link to the choice
of the cluster level in the main regression for the CHARLS. As the policy compliance
level varies in different prefectural cities, it is likely that the residuals for the regressions
for the CHARLS are correlated at the prefecture-level. So, it is reasonable to cluster
the stander error at the prefecture-level for the regression results in the CHARLS. For
the CHFS, because the data does not offer any information on prefectural cities, I
cluster the standard errors at the province-level. The similar argument applies when
using the province-level cluster in the CHFS. The policy enforcement of policies also
varies between different provinces, similar to the OCP enforcement level (Ebenstein,
2010). There is another argument that the error terms should be clustered at the
household-level in generation O in the CHARLS. Under the data reconstruction, some
P and their sibling P are from the same family in O. Also, given the provision of the
old-age support is a household-level decision, the stander errors in the CHFS should
be clustered at the household level. The main results for the CHARLS and the CHFS
are similar to the results in Table A.4 when clustering at different levels. I use the
prefecture-level cluster for the CHARLS and the province-level cluster for the CHFS
for conservative clustered standard errors.
To summarise, the instrumental variables used in the chapter are the gender of the
first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 and the prefecture-
level compliance index. The IV method exploits three facts: first, that the gender of
the first child is closer to the natural rate than the total gender ratio for all new-borns;
second, that amongst the first-born children, the gender of those who were born in or
after the year of the policy ban is more random; third, that the prefecture-level policy
compliance level is higher when the gender ratio of the children, in general, is lower.
The results from the IV regressions are shown in Tables 1.4. The first stage results are
in Table A.5 in the Appendix.
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1.3.4 Main results
The first three columns of Table 1.4 shows the results for the CHARLS. For any-
transfer, the coefficients of maleP and maleP × hh-size have opposite signs com-
pared to the corresponding coefficients in OLS results, but all four coefficients are
insignificant. The coefficients of maleP and maleP × hh-size for the amount of any
transfers and maleP × hh-size for the visits paid are consistent with the OLS results.
The maleP coefficient for visit days is negative and significant in the IV results. The
CHARLS IV results show that the father demonstration effects are positive for all three
outcomes, and significant for the probability of providing any transfer and the visits
paid. One unit increase in the actual gender ratio of K in fathers’ households increases
the fathers’ probability of providing old-age support to their parents by 7.9%. A simple
interpretation is that, compared to fathers with only daughters, fathers with only sons
are 7.9% more likely to provide support of any support to their own parents. They also
pay 72 days of annual visits more to their own parents. For the mother demonstration
effect, the coefficients of sex ratioK are negative yet insignificant for three outcomes.
These results indicate there might be some potential mother demonstration effects, but
the effects are less significant compared to the father demonstration effects. It implies
that mothers may also try to demonstrate filial piety to their daughters, as the fathers
in the CHARLS do.
The demonstration effect in the CHFS is different from the father demonstration
effect in the CHARLS. The mother demonstration effect is stronger and more signifi-
cant than the father counterpart.23 The coefficients for sex ratioK are negative and
significant for the probability of providing any support and visits paid to their own
parents, and negative for the amount of transfer. Similar interpretations, mothers with
only daughters are 7.3% more likely to provide any support to their own parents than
mothers with only sons. They will also devote 46.9 more days per year visiting their
own parents. In the CHFS, it is difficult to draw any conclusion about the father
effect. The coefficients for sex ratioK + maleP × sex ratioK are insignificant for all
outcomes, and the signs of these coefficients are also inconsistent.
The gender ratio of the third generation is the actual gender ratio of children in P ’s
households. Using the actual gender ratio, I impose a linear assumption on the gender
ratio when interpreting the results. It is possible that the linear interpretation would be
violated when the gender ratio changes from values below 0.5 to values above 0.5. So I
create a variable, more sons, which is a dummy variable equals 1 if the gender ratio is
greater or equal to 0.5, and 0 otherwise. The results are presented in Table A.6 in the
Appendix. The coefficients are very similar to and consistent with the ones in Table
1.4. So I continue to use the actual gender ratio sex ratioK as my main regressor in
the later analyses. It is also possible the definition of the outcome variables, especially
23The difference between the mother demonstration effects and the father demonstration effect is
−2× β − θ, which are significant for the outcomes any-transfer and visit days in the CHFS results.
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for financial old-age support, could affect the results. In Section A.2 in Appendix A,
I discuss detail about different ways to present the financial old-age support and show
the demonstration effect under the different representations. The signs of the father
or mother demonstration effects in Table A.7 are also mostly consistent with the main
results in Table 1.4, yet the significance-level varies.
The IV results from the CHARLS and the CHFS, they show a very interesting phe-
nomenon. The fathers in the CHARLS and the mothers in the CHFS both demonstrate
to their same-gender children. One possible explanation may be that the CHARLS and
the CHFS focus on different samples. As shown in the summary statistics, one major
difference between the CHARLS and the CHFS is the proportion of urban samples in
each dataset. The CHFS has a sample of which 65.2% live in an urban area, while
the sample in the CHARLS contains 33.2% urban dwellers. In the CHARLS OLS re-
sults, fathers, in general, support their own parents more than mothers do. This result
is consistent with the hypothesis that sons in rural areas are still preferred for their
propensity to provide old-age support. In China’s rural areas, a higher proportion of
people accept traditional gender discrimination/stereotype, and females have less bar-
gaining power in their households than males (Wang and Zhang, 2018). Urban areas
contain more households with a single child than rural areas do as a result of the “1.5”
Child Policy implemented in China (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009; Wang and Zhang,
2018).24 If a household only has a daughter, mothers are more likely to demonstrate
to this daughter so that they can look forward to receiving support when they grow
old. Urban areas in China also have more opportunities for female labour market
participants and more gender equality compared to rural areas. My predictions for
the discrepancies between the CHARLS and the CHFS are an urban-rural difference
and/or a single-K/nonsingle-K household difference. The significant female or male
demonstration effect might be driven by the corresponding subsamples with more ob-
servations. The results of a subsample check and heterogeneity analysis provide more
empirical findings on these two conjectures in the following subsections.
There is a possible channel that could also explain the demonstration effects that I
found. Fathers with only or more sons might anticipate receiving more old-age support
in future, thus they are able to provide more old-age support to their own parents
because they do not need to save for their old age. Analogously, it could also happen
to mothers, especially in the urban areas, with daughters as the possible future old-age
support. They could have more money to provide support to their own households.
This channel works in the same directions with the demonstration effect. It is likely
that they co-exist in the real world scenario and also in the empirical results. The key
component that distinguishes the demonstration effect from this possible channel is
that the demonstration behaviours from fathers and mothers need to be observed by
their same-gender children. In the CHARLS, there are two different types of transfer:
24The gender preference in the CHFS is in Table A.8 in the Appendix.
19
regular transfer and non-regular transfer. The regular transfer is the fixed-amount
transfers that parents make to their elderly parents at fixed times, which suits the
definition of old-age support but less visible to their children. The non-regular transfer
represents transfers provided by the parents at festivals, birthdays, weddings, funerals,
and for medical treatments, and also for other non-regular but important social events.
In these family-gathering situations, the provisions of transfer are more visible to their
children. If the channel described and the demonstration effect co-exist, then I would
expect both coefficients representing the father or mother demonstration effects are
significant when using the regular and non-regular transfer as outcome variables. Also,
the magnitudes of these demonstration effects should be larger for the more visible
transfer compared to the less visible one.
Table 1.5 show the corresponding results for four different outcomes: the proba-
bility of providing regular and non-regular transfer, and the amount of regular and
non-regular transfer. Focusing on the IV results in Panel B, the father demonstration
effect is 5.6% for the probability of providing non-regular support and 3.2% for the cor-
responding probability for the regular transfer. In terms of the amount of the regular
and non-regular transfer, both father demonstration effects are insignificant. The mag-
nitude of the effect for the regular support is larger than the one for the non-regular.
This can be interpreted as a substitution effect between the regular and the non-regular
support due to household budget constraint. Males are responsible for the regular old-
age support provision, according to the traditional gender norm of the old-age support.
One interesting result from Table 1.5 is the significant mother demonstration effect for
the amount of non-regular transfer. The results suit the traditional norm of old-age
support as provided by adult daughters in rural areas: they are not mainly responsible
for the living expense of their parents. Also, the mother demonstration effects for the
probability of providing non-regular support is positive and insignificant. The results
from Table 1.5 shows that the possible channel discussed could be one of the possible
channels that drives the results, but the larger effects for the probability of providing
more visible old-age support might indicate the demonstration effects also exist.
In the main results, I notice the demonstration effects of visits paid to the parents
are larger than other outcome variables when compared to their corresponding mean.
Cohabitation with the elderly parent would be one of the possible explanations for
the large effect in visits paid to O. Living together with the elderly parent is one
important way to take care of them. Although this may count as mutual care of the
family members, it seems that the P generation is more likely to take care of their
elderly parents with respect to income-earning. In the literature, cohabitation with
one’s ageing parents is generally used as an outcome variable. In my specification,
the probability of providing monetary support and the outcome variable visit days
partially capture the cohabitations. I use cohabitations with O as a dummy outcome
variable for both datasets. The prediction of the results would be similar: the same-
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gender demonstration effects of cohabitation. The results are shown in Table 1.6. Both
mothers and fathers are more likely to cohabit with their own parents to demonstrate
filial piety to their same-gender children, except for the father demonstration effect in
the CHFS results. The father demonstration effects of cohabitation are significantly
larger than the mother effects in the CHARLS. The same-gender demonstration effect
has a higher significant level for this outcome variable than the main CAHRLS results.
Apart from running the main regression on the cohabitation dummy, I also check
the subsample of those who are not living together with their own parents for their
old-age support provision. The results are in Table A.9. The results imply that the
father demonstration effect in the CHARLS might be fully driven by P who are living
together with their own parents. But in the CHFS, the mother demonstration effect
shows up in the subsample results as well. The living pattern in urban and rural areas
could explain why two subsamples are showing the demonstration effect results for the
CHARLS and the CHFS. Nuclear families are more common in urban areas; while in
rural areas, people are more likely to live with extended family members, especially
with males’ ageing parents and sometimes their male siblings.
1.3.5 Subsample analysis and heterogeneity check
To verify the effect of the gender composition of K working mostly through the demon-
stration mechanism, I use results from the subsample analysis and the heterogeneity
check to show whether, in different circumstances, the results are still consistent with
the predicted results from this mechanism. The analyses are conducted for both or
only one of the datasets, depending on the available information. I mainly describe
the subsample analysis results and then mention the consistency of the results with
the corresponding heterogeneity checks. Since the CHARLS data exhibits the father
demonstration effect and the CHFS shows the mother effect, I focus only on the fa-
ther effect in different groups from the CHARLS and the mother effect in different
groups from the CHFS. Six categories are used for the analysis: high or low income-
level, singleton or non-singleton households regarding the children, urban or rural res-
idence, parents with or without older brothers, the pension coverage of the parents,
and membership of the Han/non-Han ethnic group. The category for the singleton
or non-singleton households and the urban-rural residence are the two categories that
may provide possible explanations for the discrepancies between the results from the
CHARLS and the CHFS.
Income-level difference
As the future support for the elderly received from the offspring acts as an economic
incentive to have children (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011; Alfano, 2017), households at
different income levels will have different patterns for the demonstration effect. People
in the high-income group will have enough savings, investments, and pension income to
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support their consumption after retirement. So, their incentive to demonstrate to their
children by pecuniary support for the elderly is not as large as those who in the low-
income group. For the financial old-age support, if the demonstration effect is to obtain
secure private old-age support in future, the subsample results would show larger or
more significant demonstration effects for people in the lower-income group than those
with higher income. Regarding the non-pecuniary support, the high-income group may
demand it as much as or even more than the other group, so larger or more significant
father and mother demonstration effects are also expected for visit days in the high-
income group. The reason for the possible higher demand for non-pecuniary support
for the high-income group is that the time and monetary support are substitutes.
The subsample IV regression results for the CHARLS and the CHFS are shown in
Table 1.7. The CHARLS only have one categorical variable of the household income
level of the parents. To get a balanced subsample in the CHARLS, I classify those whose
household income level above the 20,000 RMB per year category as the high-income
group. The father effects in the low-income group are significant for the two pecuniary
outcomes; while for the high-income, the father demonstration effects are not significant
for these outcomes. For the non-pecuniary outcome, the father demonstration effect
is also significant in both high and low-income group, but the magnitude of the effect
is greater in the high-income group. The mother demonstration effects for visits paid
in the high-income group are positive, yet they are negative in households with a low
income. But both of the mother effects are insignificant. The coefficients seem to be
consistent with the prediction. The evidence for the mother demonstration effect of
pecuniary outcomes is that mother insignificantly signal the old-age support behaviours
to their daughters.
With the detailed income information in the CHFS data, I classify those who have
above the average income in the high-income group and the rest of the sample in the
low-income group. The last three columns of Table 1.7 show that in the low-income
group, mothers increase their visits paid to their own parents with more daughters,
which implies a mother demonstration effect in the non-pecuniary old-age support.
While in the high-income group, the mother demonstration effects are insignificant for
all outcomes. The mother demonstration effect for amount is even positive. For the
insignificant mother effects for visit days, it could be the reason that people in urban
areas with busier lifestyles than rural areas, so people with high income might hire
others to take care of their own parents.
The heterogeneity check provides similar results to those of the subsample analysis.
It can also check whether there are significant differences in the demonstration effect
between the high and low-income groups. The results of the heterogeneity check for
the income-level are shown in Tables A.10 in the Appendix. The CHARLS results
show that the father demonstration effects for pecuniary outcomes are positive and
significant in the low-income group, while they are negative and significant in the high-
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income group. The differences in the father demonstration effect between these two
subgroups are significant for the two pecuniary outcomes, which indicates the low-
income group has a larger father demonstration effect than the high-income group.
Both groups show positive and significant father effects for the visits paid, yet the
difference is insignificant.
In CHFS heterogeneity results, an important coefficient is the coefficient for sex ratioK
×high income. It is the difference between the mother demonstration effects for P
with high-level income and the mother demonstration effects for P with low-level in-
come, which should be negative and significant if the mother demonstration effects
for P with high-level income are larger than the mother demonstration effects for P
with low-level income. The absolute value of the coefficient of sex ratioK is now the
mother demonstration effect for P with low-level income. The mother demonstration
effect in the high-income group is insignificant for the pecuniary outcomes and positive
and significant for the visits paid. The coefficient for sex ratioK × high income is
positive and significant for the amount of transfer and the visits paid, which implies
the mother demonstration effect for P with low-level income is larger than the effect
for P with high-level income. The CHARLS heterogeneity results are mostly consis-
tent with the subsample analysis, yet the CHFS heterogeneity fit the prediction better
than the subsample results. Both results show the low-income group has larger father
demonstration effects.
The number of the children
This chapter mainly focuses on how the gender of the children affects the support
for the elderly provided by their parents. While the chapter does not, on the whole,
discuss other characteristics of the children, I can use the number of members of the
third generation to conduct a subsample analysis and heterogeneity check. Most of the
households with only one child (‘singleton households’) are the households that strictly
comply with the OCP, even when they have an only daughter. These households may
hold modern views of gender roles; hence, females in these households may be able to
enjoy higher bargaining powers. A preference for sons is a good indicator of whether
a household has more traditional views on gender roles. Such households are more
likely to violate the OCP (or be allowed by “1.5” Child Policy) to have a second child
if their first child is a girl. If the existence of the father and mother demonstration
effects depend on the types of views of gender roles, then I expect larger and more
significant mother demonstration effects in singleton households and father effects in
non-singleton households. Tables 1.8 displays the results for the CHARLS and the
CHFS. The number of children may also correlate with the gender of the first child
in the households, which may lead to biased results in my IV regressions even with
the household size controlled. The subsample analysis of the number of household
children also helps to get rid of the possible bias arising from selections in the number
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of children for the singleton households sub-group.
The first three columns of Table 1.8 show male P in both types of households in-
crease the visits paid with more sons. P with non-single child family show significant
and positive father demonstration effect in terms of the probability of providing any
transfer to their own parents, while the corresponding father effect is insignificant in
the households with a single child. As discussed in the previous section, given the OCP,
households with more than one child are usually rural households or urban households
with relatively strong son preference. In rural areas, the OCP allows households in
which the first child is a daughter to have a second child, and the law and the enforce-
ment of fines in rural areas are not as strict as they are in urban areas (Ebenstein,
2010). According to Ebenstein (2010), if the OCP is violated in an urban area, the
fine is quite high. Non-singleton households in urban areas usually possess a stronger
preference for sons than singleton ones do; hence, females may have less bargaining
power in non-singleton households. The singleton households in the CHARLS is try-
ing to show up a mother demonstration effect in the pecuniary old-age support, when
the magnitude of the coefficient of sex ratioK is larger in this subsample than the
magnitude in the non-single child households, although both of them are insignificant.
The CHFS results in Table 1.8 show significant mother demonstration effects in sin-
gleton households in terms of the probability of providing any transfers and the visits
paid. But in terms of the amount of provision and the visits paid, the non-singleton
households also show significant mother demonstration effects. The father demonstra-
tion effects are insignificant for both subsamples. The results of the heterogeneity check
for the singleton and non-singleton households are shown in Tables A.11 in the Ap-
pendix. The CHARLS results show that the father demonstration effect in terms of the
visits paid is on average greater in non-singleton households than in singleton house-
holds, yet the difference is insignificant. Table A.11 also shows that in the CHFS the
mother demonstration both exists in the singleton and the non-singleton households.
But, for the amount of transfer provided, the non-singleton group has a larger and
significant mother demonstration effect compared to the singleton group. The hetero-
geneity analysis results are in general consistent with the subsample analysis. Higher
bargaining power for mothers in singleton households is one of my conjectures for ex-
plaining the difference between the CHARLS and the CHFS results. But the CHFS
results do not support this conjecture completely. I need to explain the discrepancy of
the results between the CHARLS and the CHFS by the urban-rural difference.
Urban-rural differences
Another conjecture in explaining the discrepancies between the CHARLS and the
CHFS results is the urban-rural difference. Residences in urban areas in China enjoy
more developed public pension systems, more opportunities for females to be employed
and more gender equality. As the argument in the previous subsample check, with the
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shift in gender norm of providing old-age support in urban areas, the mother demon-
stration effect should show up more in urban areas, and the father effect should appear
in the rural subsample. Table 1.9 presents the regression results for the urban and ru-
ral subsamples in the CHARLS and the CHFS using the IV regressions. In the urban
and rural areas in the CHARLS, the gender effects of the children are insignificant for
pecuniary and non-pecuniary outcomes of the mother demonstration effect. While in
the rural subsamples, the father demonstration effects are significant for any-transfer
and visit days for the CHARLS. In urban areas, the CHARLS results only show up a
significant father demonstration effect for the visits paid. The heterogeneity analysis
in Table A.12 shows the father demonstration effect for the amount of transfer and the
visits paid is significantly larger in the rural areas. The heterogeneous analysis findings
may indicate that the gender norms as regards support for the elderly are not strong
in urban areas compared to rural areas.
The difference in the gender effects of the children between rural and urban areas in
the CHFS partially corresponds to my prediction. The last three columns of Table 1.9
show that the mother demonstration effect is significant except for amount in the urban
subsample. In the rural subsample, there is no significant demonstration effect for
mothers to their daughters nor fathers to their sons in terms of the pecuniary outcomes.
But the differences between the rural and urban mother demonstration effects are
insignificant. The father demonstration effect for visit days in the rural subsample is
significantly larger than the corresponding coefficients in the urban subsample with
the supporting evidence from Table A.12. This indicates that the gender norm of
providing support for the elderly may still be different between rural and urban areas.
Although the coefficients for the father demonstration effects of the pecuniary outcomes
are insignificant in rural areas in Table 1.9, there may still be gender-role differences
concerning the demonstration effects. The heterogeneity check results in Table A.12
support and are mostly consistent with the subsample analysis results.
The urban-rural subsample analysis partially supports my prediction of more mother
demonstration effects and fewer father effects in urban areas. Scholars believe that fe-
males have higher bargaining power in urban areas in China (Fong, 2002). However,
certain urban households where the first-born is a girl would pay the high fine to have a
son (Ebenstein, 2010). Lee (2012) and Hu and Shi (2018) find that the human capital
investment for boys and girls is not significantly different in singleton households, but
the gap is still wide in multiple-child households. Fong (2002) also limits the rising
female empowerment in urban China only to daughters in singleton households. I run
a simple urban-singleton and other types of household subsample in CHARLS.
I find only significant father demonstration effect in the urban-singleton subsample
is the non-pecuniary outcome. In the non-urban-singleton households in the CHARLS,
the father demonstration effects are again significant for any-transfer and visit days.
The signs of the mother effects are inconsistent between different outcome variables
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for the urban-single-K subsample, but all negative and insignificant for the non-urban-
singleton subsample in the CHARLS. The CHFS subsample results show significant
mother demonstration effects in the urban-singleton group for any-transfer and visit
days. The results for this simple subsample are shown in Tables A.13 in the Appendix
and are mostly consistent with Table 1.9. The similar results between urban-rural and
urban-singleton subsample results show that the urban-rural difference is a possible
explanation for the discrepancies between the CHARLS and the CHFS results, not only
driven by the urban-singleton households. But both subsample results only provide a
partial explanation for the CHARLS and the CHFS discrepancies, especially for the
outcome any-transfer.
Siblings of the parents
Supporting ageing parents is crucial for most males in China owing to the enduring
cultural impact of Confucianism. Some people have to support their own parents,
regardless of the gender of their children. This is especially true for many males who
provide regular support to their own parents. It may also be the case for some females
in the second generation if they are the oldest child in their own family or have no
older brothers. If people are not fully responsible for the support of their elderly
parents and only want to demonstrate the norm of providing support for the elderly
to their children, the results may show greater effects from the gender ratio of the
children. I use the same regression equations and the identification methods to obtain
the separate results for those who with and without older brothers. The results are
shown in Table 1.10. The CHFS provides only the number of siblings for the main
respondents in households, but no information on his or her rank in the siblings. So
this subsample analysis is conducted in the CHARLS dataset only.
The results indicate that, for the probability of providing any support and also
the visits paid, the father demonstration effects are all significant for those with older
brothers and for those without. The magnitude of all father demonstration effects are
larger in the subgroup for people with older brothers, yet the differences are mostly
insignificant according to the heterogeneity results in Table A.14. Most of the het-
erogeneity results are consistent with the subsample effect, except the father effect is
significantly larger for P without old brother than those who with. The subsample
results suit the predicted results under the demonstration effect channel than the het-
erogeneity analysis results. But I still cannot draw any conclusions on the subsample
check results in this part.
Pension coverage
In the introduction, I treat family support for the elderly as a complement of the public
pension scheme. As Table 1.1 shows, in rural areas where the public pension coverage is
low family-provided support for the elderly is the primary source of support of China’s
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elderly according to 48% of the NBS survey respondents. Under the demonstration
channel, if parents want to secure future old-age support because they do not have
public pension coverage, then parents without proper pension coverage of their own
are expected to be more likely to provide more support to their own elderly parents
if they have more same-gender children. The demonstration effect will be larger or
more significant for parents without any pension coverage, especially for the pecuniary
old-age support.
To check this hypothesis, I run heterogeneity-analysis regressions on parents with
and without a pension scheme. In the CHARLS, due to the data reconstruction, I
have no information on P ’s pension coverage. However, I can use the occupation
of the parents as a proxy for their pension status. The CHARLS provides six cate-
gories of occupation for the parents, namely, managers; professionals and technicians;
clerks, commercial and service workers; agricultural, forestry, husbandry, and fishery
producers; and production and transportation workers. Of these six categories, the
agricultural, forestry, husbandry, and fishery producers are less likely to be covered by
a pension scheme. I create a dummy, pensionP , that equals 0 if a parent is classified
as an agricultural, forestry, husbandry, or fishery producer, and 1 otherwise. The re-
sults from this heterogeneity analysis are shown in Table 1.11 and they show that the
father demonstration effect is larger for parents if they are less likely to be covered by
a pension system for the visits paid. But for amount, it is the group are more likely to
be covered by a pension showing up the father demonstration effect. Yet the difference
between the father demonstration effects in the group with pension coverage and with-
out is insignificant for the probability of providing any transfer. The empirical results
from the CHARLS only fit part of the description of the relationship between a public
pension scheme and family old-age support. It may due to the pension information is
not detailed enough in the dataset.
In the CHFS, the information is available for defining the exact pension status of the
parents. I create a dummy which equals 1 if a parent is covered by at least one pension
scheme, and 0 otherwise. The heterogeneity check results are shown in the last three
columns of Table 1.11. Yet mothers both with and without any pension coverage have
two out of three negative coefficients corresponding to the mother demonstration effect.
The differences between them show that the mother demonstration effects for P without
any pension coverage are larger the effects in the other sub-group, although only the
difference for amount is significant. The CHFS results in Tables 1.11 might provide a
piece of suggestive evidence on the relationship between public pension schemes and
family support for the elderly suggested previously in the chapter. The conclusion is
difficult to draw from the CHARLS results.
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Han culture and norm
As discussed in the background section, the norm of providing support for the elderly is
closely linked with Confucianism and filial piety. This raises a possible concern: because
the culture of Confucianism is well-known in Chinese society, not only do parents teach
their children to provide support for the elderly in the future through the demonstration
effect, but also the surrounding community, in schools, the neighbourhood, or the
media, could shape young children’s predilection to provide support to their parents
in their old age. Han ethnic group is the majority ethnic group in China and filial
piety is the key value in the Han group. If other channels apart from the parents
affect children’s preferences regarding old-age support, the demonstration effect from
the parents will be smaller or less significant in a Han-ethnic dominated community or
an exclusively Han-ethnic group.
In the community survey questionnaire in the CHARLS, there is information on
whether minority ethnic groups are living in the same community that the parents live
in. I generate a dummy that equals 1 if there are minority ethnic groups living in the
community, and 0 otherwise. From the results in Table A.15 in the Appendix, the
father demonstration effect for any-transfer and visit days in communities with people
from minority ethnic groups are significant, yet the differences are insignificant for the
fathers in two types of community.
There is no information on the community ethnic composition in the CHFS, but
there is detailed information on P ’s own ethnic groups. So I use this information
to check whether Han ethnic group are more likely to demonstrate the filial piety to
their children than other ethnic groups. I create a Han dummy that equals 1 for
members of the Han ethnic group, and 0 otherwise. In the heterogeneity analysis
results in Table A.16 shown in the Appendix, the mother demonstration effects are
significant for Han ethnic groups in terms of any-transfer and visit days. The effects are
insignificant for non-Han group. Yet, the differences are again insignificant. Combining
the heterogeneity check results from the CHARLS and the CHFS, it seems that there
still are possible mother and father demonstration effects in Han ethnic families and
communities with other ethnic groups, but these effects cannot significantly distinguish
themselves from the corresponding results from the opposite sub-groups.
Migrants and old-age support
The visibility of old-age support is discussed using different types of transfers. The
results seem to show that the demonstration effects are larger when the demonstrative
behaviours are easier for K to observe the demonstration behaviours. When discussing
the visibility of the old-age support, it is also common to focus on the migrants, es-
pecially the rural-to-urban migrants, in China. A lot of migrants work far from their
home town, and a large proportion of them are not living together with their young
children. Given these circumstances, it is difficult for the migrants to signal the norm
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of providing old-age support to their children. Thus, if the demonstration effects are
the channel driving the results, I would expect the migrant subsample does not show
large and/or significant father and mother demonstration effects.
Neither of the data sets provides very clear information on whether an individual is a
migrant or not. I use a general definition of migrants for both datasets. An individual
is defined as a migrant is one’s hukou status does not match one’s current resident
areas. This means a migrant in this part is people with rural (urban) hukou status
living in urban (rural) areas. I only run the main regressions for the migrant subsample
for the CHARLS and the CHFS. Table A.17 shows the subsample results. The results
show that the migrants in the CHARLS do not show significant father demonstration
effect as the main results in Table 1.3. It implies the visible demonstration effect
could be the right channel explaining the main results for the CHARLS. However, the
results for the CHFS in Table A.17 imply the opposite interpretation. The migrants
in the CHFS show large and significant mother demonstration effects for all three
main outcomes. Female migrants increase the probability of proving any transfer, the
amount of transfers and also visits paid to their own-parents with more daughter in
their own households. The results from CHFS do not seem to support the argument
that the demonstration effect is the channel behind the main results from the CHFS.
Different types of migrants in the CHFS and the CHARLS are one of the possible
explanations for the different results generated from the migrant subsample. 75% of
the migrants in the CHFS have hukou that belongs to the county where their current
residence place. This means that most of them are intra-county migrants, so they can
easily commute between their hometowns and their workplaces. It is relatively easy
for them to demonstrate the norm of old-age support to their children compared to
inter-county or even inter-province migrants. On the contrary, the statistics in the
CHARLS show that 67% of migrants are working in another county or province. The
commuting costs are high for these inter-county or inter-province migrants, so it is less
likely for them to go back to their home town frequently and signal the old-age support
behaviours to their children.
The CHFS also provides information on whether a migrant P lives together with
one’s children and/or own parents. Thus, I further separate the migrant subsample
into two different samples: migrants living with their children but without their par-
ents, and migrants living without their children and parents. The main regressions
run on these two samples, and the results are in Table A.18. The results imply that
females increase the visits paid to their own-parent with more daughters in their own
household for migrants living with their children but without their parents. But this
effect is not significant for migrants living without their children and their parents.
This could suggest that at least part of the mother demonstration effects are signif-
icant in the migrant sample may due to female migrants take their children to visit
their own parents, which makes the provision of non-pecuniary old-age support more
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visible to their children. Other mother demonstration effects for the financial support
are similar in these two different migrant subsamples, which, again, the intra-county
migrant behaviour is one of the possible explanation for the significant effects.
1.4 Robustness check
1.4.1 Mechanism check
There are other different channels that may explain the effects of children on the
support for the elderly provided by their parents. Testing the subsamples may show
what are the main drivers behind the effects of children’s gender on the parents’ support
for the elderly provision. In this section, I also check other mechanisms discussed in the
literature review section and try to disentangle the demonstration effects from other
possible mechanisms. I first discuss the channels of altruism and direct reciprocity
that may affect my empirical results and go on to discuss the effectiveness of the
demonstration effect.
Education investment in K
The difference in the education investment in the children could be one of the possible
explanations for the mother demonstration effect. The significant mother demonstra-
tion effect in the CHFS may result from the fact that mothers with daughters are less
likely to invest in their daughters’ human-capital such that they can provide more for
their parents. However, this argument does not work for the father demonstration
effects because human capital investments in sons in China are on average higher than
the investments in daughters, except for urban singleton households (Fong, 2002). In
addition, I run the main regressions on three new outcome variables that indicate the
education investment for K.
Only the CHFS offers information on the education investments in K. The evidence
from the CHFS is shown in Table A.19. It shows that, at least in the CHFS, mothers
with more daughters increase the amount of education investment and the percentage
of education investment in the household expenditure, and decrease the probability
of investing in K’s education, controlling for the household size. For fathers with the
household size fixed, with more sons, they increase the probability of investing in K’s
education and decrease the amount of education investment and the percentage of
education investment in the household expenditure. From the results, the gender of
K affects the total amount of education investment and the probability of providing
education investment in different ways, so I cannot draw the conclusion on whether
mothers and fathers invest more on their daughters or their sons. So the possibility of
the different education costs in sons and daughters of P might not be the main channel
working for the mother demonstration effect found in the CHFS results.
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Altruism and Direct reciprocity channel
The first possible mechanism is altruism. If the main mechanism is pure altruism,
the only reason behind the parents providing support to their own elderly parents is
that these parents are poor and in need of help. There should not be any significant
coefficients for the gender of the adult children, the gender ratio of the children or
their interaction term after controlling for the income of the elderly parents in the
regression. I run heterogeneity checks on the elderly parents’ income-level as included
in the CHARLS. In the sample, most of the elderly parents observed have no income, so
I create a dummy income of O which equals 1 if the elderly parents have some income,
and 0 otherwise. The results are shown in Table 1.12. They reveal that, for any-transfer
and visit days, the father effect is significant for elderly parents without any income,
whereas for the high-income group, the effects are positive but insignificant except for
the father effect for visit days. However, the key is that the difference between these
two groups is also insignificant. I may draw the conclusion that there is a certain degree
of altruism among the motives of providing support to one’s elderly parents, but it is
not the main channel working behind the empirical results in this chapter.
Another mechanism discussed in the previous section is direct reciprocity. One
kind of direct reciprocities in the context of old-age support is the parents’ desire to
support ageing parents to repay the investment in their childhood. I name this kind
of direct reciprocity as sequential direct reciprocity. It may also explain why females
provide less support to the elderly to their parents because, according to the CHARLS,
they did not get enough financial or non-financial investment from their parents during
their childhood. Only the CHARLS includes this type of information, so I use only
this dataset to check this mechanism.
If sequential direct reciprocity is the only channel for old-age support to flow along,
then controlling in the regression for the same financial and non-financial investment
received by the parents in their childhood should confirm that males and females in
the P generation should provide the same amount of old-age support. Moreover, the
gender of the children should not have different effects on the transfers provided by the
parents. I control for different variables that indicate the financial investment and non-
financial investment the P received during their childhood in the regression. The results
are shown in Table 1.13. There are two variables represent the time investment (non-
financial support) during the parents’ childhood. awaytime is the variable representing
how long a P has been away from his or her parents in childhood, and awayage indicates
the age when the parent left her/his parents.
The log edu expense indicates the financial investment in education that P received
in their childhood. I also show the coefficients for edu level in the table, which is the
education level controlled in the main regression. It is another indicator of the size of
the financial investment. Table 1.13 shows that, after controlling for the non-financial,
financial investment, and their interaction terms with maleP , the coefficients that
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represent the demonstration effect are still similar to the results in Table 1.4. With most
of the coefficients representing the father demonstration effect being still significant,
it also suggests that the same-gender demonstration effect also works as one of the
potential channels. Most of the coefficients including awaytime, awayage, log edu
expense, edu level, and their interaction terms with maleP are insignificant as well.
In addition to the results in Table 1.13, the CHFS main results may also demonstrate
that this sequential direct reciprocity channel is not the main mechanism. In general,
mothers provide more to their own parents in the CHFS than fathers, given the fact
that females on average have a lower education level than males.
Another direct reciprocity channel works through the transfers from the elderly
parents to the parents in the same period. This is a type of non-sequential direct
reciprocity. In the previous regressions in the CHARLS and the CHFS, I control the
transfer from the elderly parents to the parents. This variable would, in theory, have
positive effects on the outcome variable, and vice versa. I also control for the time
that the elderly parents spend on taking care of the children of the parents and also
the transfer to the children in the regressions in the CHARLS. For the robustness
check, I show the regression results without these controls in Table A.20, also their
corresponding coefficients in Table A.21. The key results are similar to the main
results, except for the mother demonstration effect for any-transfer in the CHFS. The
coefficients for these transfers exhibit positive father and mother demonstration effects
on the transfers provided.
The rationale behind the non-sequential direct reciprocity is that if the parents
with more same-gender children receive more from their elderly parents than those
receiving less, then they also provide more old-age support. However, when I run
the same regression on the transfer received by the parents from their elderly parents,
the CHARLS results appearing in the second column of Table 1.14 show that people
who provide more to their elderly parents, namely fathers with more sons, receive less.
Also, for the CHFS in the fourth and the fifth column of Table 1.14 show the fathers,
who are more likely to receive transfers from their parents with more sons, are not
more likely to provide transfer to their parents. Also, in the CHFS, mothers increase
the probability of old-age support provision with more daughters but are less likely
to receive transfers from O. The results may fit the explanation by Li et al. (2010):
the elderly parents may show more altruism toward their adult children, which are P ,
who do not provide more transfer than others, rather than expecting commensurate
paybacks from the parents who receive their support. To conclude, the non-sequential
direct reciprocity may exist, but there is still room for the proposed mechanism: the
demonstration effect.
The CHARLS results in Table A.21 show that the coefficients for both time and
financial transfer from elderly parents to their grandchildren are positive for most of
the outcome variables. This may suggest another form of indirect reciprocity. The
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elderly can transfer to their favourite grandchildren. If the favourite grandchildren
receive more, their parents (the parent generation) are more likely to provide support
to the ageing parents, O, in return. This type of indirect reciprocity has no time lag
for the payback, unlike the demonstration effect studied in the present paper. Usually,
the preferred grandchildren are grandsons. This could be one of the explanations of
the father demonstration effect in the CHARLS. If the indirect reciprocity works in
this way, male parents with more sons should have more transfers from their elderly
parents to their sons. However, the third column of Table 1.14 shows that, statistically,
male P ’s sons do not receive more than daughters of males with more daughters. These
grandchildren gender effects are not significant for transfers from elderly parents. Thus,
it is less likely to be the main channel driving the main results observed.
Effectiveness of the demonstration effect
Apart from verifying the possible channels, I also have to test for the effectiveness of
the demonstration effect in the datasets. The parents expect their children to provide
support to them in the future. The previous results imply only that the parents
demonstrate filial piety to their children, but they do not show whether the children
actually go on to provide old-age support to their parents in the future. Using the
CHARLS dataset only, I obtain the information on support in old age that is provided
by the elderly generation to their own parents, who are the grandparents of the parent
generation. I run a simple OLS regression to regress the upward-transfers of males and
females among the elderly parents to their own parents on the outcome variables used
for the CHARLS results. I run the regression separately for male and female parents.
The types of transfer provided by the elderly parents to their own parents on the left-
hand side of the equation also match the corresponding dependent variables. Take,
for example, the regressions for log(regular), two key regressors, father’s transfer and
mother’s transfer, these are the logarithm amount of the regular transfer provided by
the father and mother of the present parents’ generation to their own parents in an
earlier sequence. The outcome variables are the probability of providing any, regular,
and non-regular transfer, and the logarithm of the amount of regular and non-regular
transfer. The control variables are the same as the controls in Table 1.2. One extra
control that I have for the particular regressions is the average self-reported health of
the grandparents of the parents. The health problems of P ’s grandparents may affect
the support provided.
To simplify the description of the results, I continue to use the O, P , and K setting
in this part. The results are combined in Table 1.15. The key regressors for male and
female P panels are father’s transfer and mother’s transfer. For male and female P ,
the demonstration effects seem to take into account the effects from the same gender
channel: females are more affected by the support for the elderly provided by their
mothers than their fathers’. The converse is partially true for males. The same-gender
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demonstration effect is more significant for female members of P than the cross-gender
demonstration effect. The magnitude and also the significance level for father’s transfer
are much smaller than the mother’s transfer for female P ; while for males P , the
difference is not large. The results show that if the members of O provide more to
their parents, they are more likely to receive more from P .
1.4.2 Panel results: Event study
The main regression results mainly show the cross-sectional empirical evidence of the
demonstration effect. The conclusion will be more convincing if there is empirical
evidence from a panel dataset. Both the CHARLS and the CHFS are longitudinal
datasets, but CHARLS does not provide information on the gender composition of
the children for the whole sample in the 2013 and 2015 wave. The CHFS contains
this necessary information in the 2011, 2013, and 2015 wave. The reason for using
this three-wave dataset is to gain more yearly data before and after the event. The
drawback of using the CHFS is that I can only test the demonstration effect on one
consistent outcome variable - the probability of providing old-age support - for three
different waves. Together with the limited number of waves in the CHFS, I use only
the panel result as a robustness check for the main results.
To examine the yearly effect of having a son or a daughter on old-age support, I use
the event study approach. The event is the birth of the first child. The event usually
causes sharp changes in several outcomes for the parents, especially labour market
outcomes (Kleven et al., 2018). I apply a similar event study approach to that used by
Kleven et al. (2018) and aim to show even possible causal results in the event study
approach. In the three-wave panel dataset, the sample is still limited to household
respondents. Given the event study approach setting and the limited number of waves
for the data, the panel sample includes only those respondents whose first child was
born between 2011 and 2015. For each household respondent, I set the event time
e = 0 for the year in which the respondent has his or her first child. The value of other
years is set relative to the e = 0 year. Using the specification in Kleven et al. (2018),
the regression is:
yite =
∑
j
αj × I[j = e] +
∑
k
βk × I[k = ageit] +
∑
l
γl × I[l = t] + εite, (1.2)
where i stands for individual i, t for wave t, and e for the event time e. yite is the
probability of providing support to elderly parents. I[j = e] represents the event time
dummies, I[k = ageit] is for the age dummies, and I[l = t] is the wave fixed effects. By
controlling the age dummies, I can control the non-parametrical underlying life-cycle
trend (Kleven et al., 2018). I run this regression separately for four different groups:
fathers with a first son (father-son), fathers with a first daughter (father-daughter),
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mothers with a first son (mother-son), and mothers with a first daughter (mother-
daughter). Then I compare the results for the parents within a certain gender and
observe that the effect of having a first son/daughter on the father/the mother. The
reason why the results may be causal is that I examine the variation in the results
caused by the gender of the first child. As noted in the previous section, the gender
of the first child is almost exogenous. In addition, the timing of the birth for the first
child is after 2003, which is after the ban on the use of ultrasonography techniques for
sex-detective abortions. The regression results are shown in Table 1.16. The sample
size for each group is around 800 observations, which also indicates that the gender of
the first child in the event study sample is satisfactorily balanced.
The graph for the plot of the event time dummies coefficients is shown in Figure
1.5. The graph on the left shows the difference between fathers with a first son and
fathers with a first daughter. The right graph is the difference between mothers. After
the birth of a first child, the mothers with a first daughter provide more than those
with sons, whereas the differences between fathers are relatively small. For the pre-
trend of the event study, I can only observe one period before the birth of the first
child in the panel dataset due to the limitations of the data. But from this one-period
pre-trend result, it seems that for mothers and father, the pre-trend differences are
insignificant. Lack of the pre-trend time period will affect the validity of the inference
and the causality of the event study results. But the results may provide some insights
into the effects of the gender of the children on the old-age support provided by their
same-gender parents.
There is a concern that the mother demonstration effect from the event study takes
off from the birth year of the child. For the demonstration effect, K have to observe the
corresponding behaviour of their same-gender P . More likely to provide old-age support
during the very early stage of K’s life (age 0-2) would not help with the interpretation
of the demonstration effect. However, the birth of a new child is a big change in
household composition. According to Heath and Tan (2018), “a daughter raises her
mother’s participation in household decisions”, and the mothers with daughters would
seek more female autonomy in their households. With a newborn girl in the family,
it is likely that the mother realises that she needs to start to participate more in the
decisions on the household resources allocation and to provide more old-age support to
her own parents, so she could affect her daughters’ norm formation later and receive
more old-age support in her old age.
It is also possible that a mother with a newborn daughter will receive more support
from her own parents. However, the transfers from the elderly are not included in the
construction of the outcome variables used in the main regressions. I change the transfer
outcome variables to net transfer variables. If any-transfer, regular or nonregular
equals 1 and the parents receive the transfers from or are living together with their
elderly parents, I change the corresponding value to 0. For the amount of transfer, I
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use the net transfer provided by the parents, which is the amount of transfer provided
to the parents minus the amount of the transfer received by them from their elderly
parents. The change is made for both datasets. The results for the net transfers are
shown in Table A.7. They are consistent with the main results, except for the negative
father demonstration effect for any-transfer in the CHFS. The magnitudes of the
demonstration effect also increase beyond the main results.
1.5 Welfare analysis
1.5.1 “Missing women” and the old-age support
As pointed out by Qian (2008), the future income of children will affect their gender
ratio, and parents expect in their old age to receive support from their children . My
empirical results show the causality of the support for the elderly provided by the par-
ents and the gender of their children. It may be possible to draw some inferences on
the correlations between the support for the elderly and the gender of children from
the literature and my results. The results in the chapter show that, in rural areas,
males provide more in general, and the effects are more persistent for households with
consistent male heirs over several generations. I may be able to argue that support for
the elderly is at least correlated with the gender ratio, or the “missing women” in China
may be correlated with the demand for support in old age. I follow Oster’s method in
2005. She calculates the number of “missing women” in China due to hepatitis B infec-
tion. She estimates the effect of prevalent hepatitis B on the male-female gender ratio
and calculates the hepatitis B-adjusted gender ratio using the percentage of the pop-
ulation infected with hepatitis B. She draws the conclusion that hepatitis B accounts
for 75% of the “missing women” in China. Her results are not entirely accurate due to
the data that she collected, but her method provides a reasonable estimation strategy
to evaluate how much the unbalanced gender ratio can be correlated with hepatitis B
infection. I use her method of estimation to measure the possible correlation between
the “missing women” and the need for support in old age.
I use the CHFS to conduct the estimation.25 One of the advantages of using the
CHFS is that the dataset provides people’s attitudes on family, children and support for
the elderly. There are two relevant questions in the survey: “Do you prefer daughters
or sons?” and “Who do you think is responsible for your care in old age?”. I created
a dummy that equals 1 if people prefer sons and believe that their children should be
responsible for supporting their elderly parents and 0 otherwise. I obtain the mean of
this dummy in the full sample in the main regressions, the urban subsample and rural
subsample. Running the dummy on the gender ratio of the children, the coefficient
for the dummy, which is the prevalence of old-age support, is shown in the second
25The CHARLS does not contain many questions on people’s ideology, so I cannot distinguish those
who have a preference for sons from whose who do not.
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column of Table 1.17. Then I calculate the estimated gender ratio on the sole basis
of the prevalence of support for the elderly shown in the third column. Given that
the natural male-to-female gender ratio (1.049) and the percentage of people who
prefer sons and who believe that their children should be responsible for their old-
age support, I calculate the adjusted gender ratio in Column 5.26 The equation for
the adjusted gender ratio is GRadjust = GRold−age× percentageold−age +GRnonold−age×
(1 − percentageold−age) (Oster, 2005). The percentage of the gender ratio correlated
with the needs of the future support for the elderly is listed in the last column. From
the estimations, around 12%-18% of the unbalanced gender ratio is correlated with the
needs for support in old age. 17.23 million Chinese babies were born in 2017, and the
medium gender ratio for 2015-2017 is 1.150 according to the world population prospects
in 2017.27 If people conduct gender selections to secure future support in their old age,
the number of “missing girls” due to this would have been around 93,000 in 2017.
1.6 Conclusions
The existence of a younger generation plays an essential role in parents’ decisions on
the support that they provide for the elderly. This chapter finds that the gender of the
children in China affects the support for the elderly provided by their parents. The
parents are more likely to provide more financial and non-financial support to their
ageing parents when they themselves have more same-gender offspring, which is the
demonstration effect. However, the demonstration effects by mothers and fathers are
exhibited in different areas in China. Rural areas show the father demonstration effects
while mother demonstration effects appear in urban areas. The urban-rural difference
may be due to female empowerment in urban areas, but this needs to be verified by
future studies. The demonstration effect is a way for the norm of providing support
in old age to be conveyed to future generations. The intergenerational transmission of
norms is also gender-specific.
This chapter predicts that support for the elderly provided by a father increases
when more sons in his family and when he has greater bargaining power than his wife,
fixing his household size constant. The support for the elderly provided by mothers
increases with the advent of more daughters and when mothers earn more income. The
empirical results of the gender ratio for the household’s children match the predictions
of the model in the next chapter. In China, urban females have more bargaining
power in their households than females in rural areas have. The findings indicate
that the mother demonstration effect mainly shows up in the dataset with more urban
26The percentage of people who prefer daughters or who have no preference, and who believe that
their children should be responsible for their support in old age is 34.38% for the full sample, 47.48%
for the rural subsample and 18.39% for the urban subsample.
27The source for these data can be accessed through the following web-
sites: https://www.statista.com/statistics/250650/numberof-births-in-china and
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=PopDiv& f=variableID%3A52.
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samples. The heterogeneity analysis for the urban households further suggests that the
assumption of intra-household bargaining is valid. The theoretical model that support
the empirical results is in Chapter 2.
The empirical evidence shows that the gender of the parents and their children in
China jointly affect the likelihood and the amount of old-age support, both financial and
non-financial, that they provide. The story behind this is more complicated than any
pure gender effect from the children. The proposed mechanism, with the same-gender
intergenerational transmission, is indirect reciprocity, or the demonstration effect. It
carries the social norm of providing private support for the elderly across the genera-
tions. Given the heavy financial burden of the public pension system facing the central
government in China, the government has realised that private support for the elderly
is a crucial complement to the public pension. In 2017, the central government started
a pilot implementation of “homebased old-age care services”. One of the expected
goals of this pilot implementation is to collect information on the demographics of all
households with ageing parents and use the information to set future policies or in-
centives for completing the home-based system of care services for old people.28 The
empirical results in the present paper can offer some insights into the demographics of
those who provide or do not provide support to their ageing parents: policy-makers
could introduce diverse incentives in order to target different groups. The rural-urban
discrepancies in the results will also help the government to set targeted policies in
rural and urban areas.
Although the Chinese government has become aware of the importance of private
support for the elderly and has started to promote “filial piety”, there may be a hidden
hazard behind this action. As this chapter shows, sons in rural areas in China provide
more support for the elderly than daughters do. The previous literature also states that
economic incentives, especially old-age support, provide one reason for sex selection
before birth (Qian, 2008; Ebenstein and Leung, 2010). The gender ratio might stagnate
at a high level, to create a damaging equilibrium. The government needs to promote
gender equality by legislating to protect the right of females to inherit, own property
and compete in the labour market, especially in rural areas. In urban areas, there is
already a healthier balance in the gender ratio of new-borns. Mother demonstration
effects showing in urban areas alone may also be due to female empowerment and
higher bargaining powers in the household for females. More research is needed to
confirm this possible mechanism.
28Website: http://xinhuanet.com/gongyi/yanglao/2017-04/17/c 129543350.htm
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1.7 Figures and Tables
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Figure 1.1: Public service announcement posters in China
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Figure 1.2: Actual gender ratios for the newborns in China: the yearly trend
Note: The information is obtained from the China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook.
1982-2011. y-axis is the male to female gender ratio for the newborns (female=100). x-axis is the year
1982 to 2011. The yearly trend started in 1987. The circle dot is the national male to female gender
ratio. The diamond dot represents the male to female gender ratio in urban areas only. The triangle
and square dots are for the male to female gender ratio in township (suburban) areas and rural areas
respectively.
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Figure 1.3: Estimated gender ratios for the newborns in China: the yearly trend
Note The graphs are the estimated male-to-female gender ratio for the newborns in China using the
2011 CHARLS wave (above), and the estimated male-to-female gender ratio for the first-born child
in the 2013 CHFS wave (below). y-axis is the male-to-female gender ratio (male newborns divided by
the total number of newborns). x-axis is the year from 1995 to 2011 for the CHARLS and from 1995
to 2013 for the CHFS. The dots represent the estimated gender ratio for each year. The red vertical
line represents the implementation of the policy ban on gender-selective abortion. The solid line is
the linear estimation of the gender ratio trend before 2003, and the dashed line is the estimated linear
trend after 2003.
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Figure 1.4: Actual gender ratios for the newborns in China: by birth order
Note: The information is obtained from the National Population Census. 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and
2010. The figure shows four graphs on the male-to-female gender ratio (female=100) of the new-borns
by different birth orders. From left to right, the graphs show the gender ratios in China, urban areas,
township (suburban) areas, and rural areas. The circle dot is the overall gender ratio. The diamond
dot represents the ratio for the first-born children. The triangle and square dots are for the male to
female gender for the second-born and the third-born children respectively.
Figure 1.5: Impact of the gender of the first child on the probability of providing any
old-age support
Note: The graphs are the plot of the coefficients in Table 1.16. y-axis is the probability of providing
any transfer to O, and x-axis is the event time. The event is the birth of the first child in households.
The graph on the left is the coefficients for males and the right graph is the results for females. The
diamond dot coefficients represent people with first child as a son. The square dot coefficients are for
people with first child as a daughter. Due to data limitation, I can only get one period before the
event in the panel dataset.
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Table 1.1: Primary source of support of China’s elderly, 2005 and 2010
2005
Urban Rural
Source of support Average Male Female Average Male Female
Labour income 13.0 18.4 7.9 37.9 48.5 27.5
Pensions 45.4 56.9 34.6 4.60 8.1 1.3
Dibao 2.4 1.8 2.9 1.3 1.8 0.9
Insurnace and subsidy 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0
Property income 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1
Family support 37.0 20.7 52.3 54.1 39.3 68.5
Other 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.7
Source: NBS, 2006. Most significant share of support reported.
2010
Urban Rural
Source of support Average Male Female Average Male Female
Labour income 6.16 9.72 3.75 41.18 50.53 32.14
Pensions 66.30 74.21 58.99 4.60 7.19 2.09
Dibao 2.33 1.76 2.87 4.48 5.14 3.85
Insurnace and subsidy - - - - - -
Property income 0.68 0.75 0.62 0.19 0.21 0.16
Family support 22.43 12.13 31.95 47.74 35.13 59.93
Other 1.64 1.44 1.83 1.81 1.79 1.83
Source: NBS, 2011. Most significant share of support reported.
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Table 1.3: The demonstration effect on the provision of old-age support: OLS
OLS: CHARLS (mostly rural) OLS: CHFS(mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
maleP 0.0104 -95.90 14.51*** -0.0325** -99.75 23.70***
(0.0281) (233.8) (5.201) (0.0153) (63.95) (6.275)
sex ratioK 0.00471 -7.627 -4.680** -0.0119 -38.61 -1.326
(0.0172) (136.6) (2.352) (0.00968) (51.97) (3.441)
maleP × sex ratioK -0.0108 271.2 10.39*** 0.00977 41.14 6.089
(0.0215) (175.7) (3.853) (0.0116) (62.96) (5.324)
hh-size -0.00910 -12.69 -4.398** -0.00527 -20.49 -7.979***
(0.0129) (89.94) (1.829) (0.00527) (18.53) (1.263)
maleP× hh-size -0.000565 327.5** 12.22*** -0.00299 30.36 14.73***
(0.0120) (152.5) (2.837) (0.00675) (24.30) (2.843)
sex ratioK+ -0.006 263.6* 5.713* -0.002 2.535 4.762
maleP × sex ratioK (0.013) (142.8) (3.251) (0.009) (38.86) (4.208)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232 19,509 19,509 19,509
R-squared 0.205 0.050 0.628 0.282 0.203 0.168
Mean 0.401 831.2 118.7 0.303 489.1 91.66
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. maleP
is the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration
effect. sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy
indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer
provided (amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (visit days). The key
controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital
status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit,
hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K, depending on the availability of the information in the
CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is
the province-level in the CHFS.
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Table 1.4: The demonstration effect on the provision of old-age support: IV
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS(mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
maleP -0.0802 -230.5 -29.89*** -0.0518 -237.7 -3.363
(0.0499) (316.5) (11.24) (0.0448) (173.5) (16.57)
sex ratioK -0.0450 -273.3 -4.315 -0.0733** -96.20 -46.92***
(0.0437) (399.4) (7.493) (0.0343) (135.4) (10.82)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.125** 472.9 76.49*** 0.0412 259.2 49.37**
(0.0579) (442.2) (14.13) (0.0645) (291.9) (24.53)
hh-size -0.0116 -35.25 -3.153 -0.00878 -21.63 -10.35***
(0.0139) (73.55) (2.005) (0.00599) (18.06) (1.259)
maleP× hh-size 0.0085 340.3** 16.66*** -0.00180 39.99 16.52***
(0.0132) (147.0) (2.910) (0.00789) (26.58) (3.048)
sex ratioK+ 0.079*** 200.0 72.17*** -0.032 163.0 2.455
maleP × sex ratioK (0.026) (190.6) (11.72) (0.045) (203.9) (17.92)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232 19,509 19,509 19,509
R-squared 0.201 0.050 0.610 0.280 0.203 0.159
Mean 0.401 831.2 118.7 0.303 489.1 91.66
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. maleP
is the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration
effect. sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy
indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer
provided (amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (visit days). The key
controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital
status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit,
hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K, depending on the availability of the information in the
CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is
the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child born in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance
index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child born in or after 2003 for the CHFS.
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Table 1.5: Visibility of the provision of financial old-age support
Panel A OLS: CHARLS (mostly rural)
VARIABLES regular nonregular amount reg amount nonreg
maleP 0.00117 0.000998 -161.2 65.27
(0.0138) (0.0267) (205.9) (110.0)
sex ratioK -0.00141 0.00227 -39.45 31.82
(0.00744) (0.0177) (110.0) (70.37)
maleP × sex ratioK -0.00503 -0.00224 110.2 161.1*
(0.00976) (0.0215) (139.5) (93.03)
hh-size -0.0147** 0.000577 -55.72 43.03
(0.00636) (0.0133) (63.71) (52.53)
maleP× hh-size 0.0211*** -0.0166 222.6 104.9*
(0.00670) (0.0114) (137.3) (60.95)
sex ratioK+ -0.006 0.000 70.71 192.9**
maleP × sex ratioK (0.007) (0.134) (105.4) (81.46)
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232 12,232
R-squared 0.077 0.141 0.043 0.025
Panel B IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)
VARIABLES regular nonregular amount reg amount nonreg
maleP -0.0149 -0.0848* -165.8 -64.68
(0.0241) (0.0480) (254.7) (235.5)
sex ratioK 0.0126 -0.0697 79.85 -353.1**
(0.0218) (0.0447) (337.7) (166.9)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.0190 0.126** 116.9 356.1
(0.0248) (0.0561) (355.6) (230.1)
hh-size -0.0129* -0.00421 -43.84 8.588
(0.00671) (0.0145) (49.49) (46.01)
maleP× hh-size 0.0228*** -0.00816 223.5* 116.8*
(0.00738) (0.0126) (132.9) (68.68)
sex ratioK+ 0.032*** 0.056** 196.7 2.929
maleP × sex ratioK (0.012) (0.024) (165.0) (101.9)
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232 12,232
R-squared 0.075 0.139 0.043 0.023
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.105 0.243 354.6 476.6
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. maleP is the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P
and represents the mother demonstration effect. sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father
demonstration effect. The four outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide
any regular and non-regular financial transfer to their elderly parents (regular and nonregular) and
the amount of any regular and non-regular transfer provided (amount reg and (amount nonreg). The
key controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in urban
areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education,
working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household income and hours of O taking
care of P ’s K. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS. The IVs
are the gender of the first child born in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the
CHARLS.
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Table 1.6: The demonstration effect on cohabitation
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS (mostly urban)
VARIABLES Ageing parents cohabitation
maleP -0.564*** 0.003
(0.047) (0.031)
sex ratioK -0.039** -0.059**
(0.018) (0.023)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.883*** 0.109**
(0.064) (0.048)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.843*** 0.049
+sex ratioK (0.061) (0.034)
P demographics Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 19,509
R-squared 0.183 0.141
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. maleP is the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the
mother demonstration effect. sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father demonstration effect. The
outcome variable is a dummy that equals 1 if P is living together with their own parents. The key controls are P ’s
household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status,
occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit,
hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K, depending on the availability of the
information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the
CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child born in
or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child born in or
after 2003 for the CHFS.
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Table 1.7: Subsample analysis: Income-level
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS (mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
Low income group
maleP -0.0982 -533.8* -5.406 -0.0375 -339.8* -18.91
(0.0694) (299.2) (13.90) (0.0599) (205.2) (19.64)
sex ratioK -0.0680 -226.6 5.073 -0.0757 -285.5 -86.57***
(0.0623) (151.2) (10.75) (0.0481) (192.7) (14.78)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.131** 0.0166 0.122** 247.4 125.1 47.07***
(0.0614) (0.0296) (0.0581) (297.2) (158.3) (11.61)
sex ratioK+ 0.080** 376.4*** 56.12*** -0.057 140.5 16.57
maleP × sex ratioK (0.031) (196.7) (11.67) (0.062) (249.3) (22.45)
Observations 7,048 7,048 7,048 12,663 12,663 12,663
R-squared 0.177 0.021 0.626 0.288 0.168 0.177
High income group
maleP -0.0636 -107.4 -55.53*** -0.0538 -57.27 -7.504
(0.0651) (691.3) (15.59) (0.0568) (236.4) (25.08)
sex ratioK -0.0168 -320.0 -12.74 -0.0631 113.6 -3.169
(0.0534) (796.2) (10.61) (0.0432) (204.0) (11.90)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.0935 569.3 114.2*** 0.0457 -75.62 -1.974
(0.0749) (975.3) (21.93) (0.0875) (411.6) (33.00)
sex ratioK+ 0.077 249.3 101.5*** -0.017 37.94 -5.143
maleP × sex ratioK (0.046) (507.0) (19.06) (0.059) (290.6) (25.97)
Observations 5,184 5,184 5,184 6,846 6,846 6,846
R-squared 0.238 0.080 0.160 0.259 0.220 0.126
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. maleP
is the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration
effect. sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy
indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer
provided (amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (visit days). The key
controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital
status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit,
hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K, depending on the availability of the information in the
CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is
the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child born in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance
index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child born in or after 2003 for the CHFS. The sample is split based on the
income-level of P .
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Table 1.8: Subsample analysis:: Single-K family
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS (mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
Single child family
maleP -0.0437 26.27 0.900 -0.0751** -121.7 31.15**
(0.0379) (299.0) (8.138) (0.0355) (133.6) (12.90)
sex ratioK -0.0540 -323.9 -0.0551 -0.0891** 50.33 -18.69*
(0.0402) (395.0) (8.140) (0.0348) (155.5) (10.46)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.0852 431.4 51.12*** 0.0737 94.86 12.40
(0.0518) (444.6) (11.76) (0.0588) (252.6) (21.59)
sex ratioK+ 0.031 107.4 51.07*** -0.015 145.2 -6.285
maleP × sex ratioK (0.025) (255.3) (8.782) (0.038) (265.5) (15.85)
Observations 5,909 5,909 5,909 12,144 12,144 12,144
R-squared 0.209 0.064 0.650 0.270 0.210 0.148
Non-single child family
maleP -0.175* 19.53 -64.56** 0.0280 -405.2 -43.86
(0.106) (701.5) (26.02) (0.0934) (383.3) (47.88)
sex ratioK -0.0175 0.151 -13.72 -0.0266 -534.2** -146.9***
(0.111) (674.3) (17.47) (0.0669) (236.6) (39.24)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.184 29.52 145.0*** -0.110 766.6 167.0**
(0.140) (919.2) (32.91) (0.151) (650.6) (73.58)
sex ratioK+ 0.167*** 29.67 131.3*** -0.137 232.4 20.09
maleP × sex ratioK (0.060) (416.4) (26.24) (0.110) (525.8) (56.69)
Observations 6,323 6,323 6,323 7,365 7,365 7,365
R-squared 0.198 0.046 0.566 0.293 0.149 0.175
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. maleP
is the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration
effect. sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy
indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer
provided (amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (visit days). The key
controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital
status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit,
hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K, depending on the availability of the information in the
CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is
the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child born in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance
index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child born in or after 2003 for the CHFS. The sample is split based on
whether P have only one child in the household or not.
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Table 1.9: Subsample analysis: Urban-rural differences
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS (mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
Urban
maleP -0.0306 -973.8 -16.20 -0.0658* -318.9* -9.214
(0.0621) (758.0) (16.74) (0.0391) (188.2) (16.84)
sex ratioK 0.00798 -475.3 1.422 -0.0846** -193.8 -30.11***
(0.0614) (931.6) (16.47) (0.0386) (154.7) (9.295)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.0471 657.9 34.88* 0.0681 357.3 25.96
(0.0779) (1,074) (20.65) (0.0613) (319.1) (24.20)
sex ratioK+ 0.055 182.7 36.31** -0.016 163.5 -4.149
maleP × sex ratioK (0.048) (504.4) (15.61) (0.042) (236.4) ( 19.56)
Observations 3,869 3,869 3,869 12,979 12,979 12,979
R-squared 0.231 0.067 0.587 0.260 0.200 0.132
Rural
maleP -0.125** 105.4 -30.25* 0.115 286.8 -79.63
(0.0620) (377.7) (15.61) (0.130) (288.7) (49.30)
sex ratioK -0.0677 -141.7 -3.406 0.0443 287.3 -155.2***
(0.0550) (321.2) (8.393) (0.0944) (216.2) (37.84)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.179*** 226.9 91.59*** -0.226 -445.5 240.9***
(0.0688) (391.1) (18.96) (0.172) (410.6) (67.97)
sex ratioK+ 0.111*** 85.27 88.18*** -0.181 -158.1 85.71*
maleP × sex ratioK (0.030) (209.3) (15.21) (0.113) (306.1) (46.12)
Observations 8,363 8,363 8,363 6,530 6,530 6,530
R-squared 0.195 0.046 0.622 0.312 0.076 0.217
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
maleP is the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother
demonstration effect. sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome
variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (any-transfer),
the amount of any transfer provided (amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per
year (visit days). The key controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in
urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education, working status,
retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K, depending on the
availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level
for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child born in or
after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child born in or after 2003 for
the CHFS. The sample is split based on whether P lives in urban areas or rural areas.
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Table 1.10: Subsample analysis: P with or without brothers (CHARLS)
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days
With older brothers
maleP -0.0795 -594.8 -49.85***
(0.0742) (616.8) (16.75)
sex ratioK -0.0425 210.5 -7.118
(0.0681) (669.6) (14.63)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.132 595.4 96.13***
(0.0806) (829.5) (20.22)
hh-size -0.0176 -103.2 -2.210
(0.0210) (91.64) (3.102)
maleP × hh-size 0.0195 557.4** 20.80***
(0.0209) (245.8) (3.993)
sex ratioK+ 0.090** 805.8 89.01***
maleP × sex ratioK (0.045) (555.0) (16.16)
Observations 5,283 5,283 5,283
R-squared 0.202 0.040 0.566
Without older brothers
maleP -0.0788 -63.51 -7.773
(0.0558) (479.5) (11.14)
sex ratioK -0.0417 -588.3 1.403
(0.0498) (466.3) (8.813)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.121* 451.5 49.05***
(0.0654) (542.4) (14.51)
hh-size -0.00345 38.00 -4.284*
(0.0138) (93.56) (2.585)
maleP × hh-size -0.00234 196.5 14.03***
(0.0153) (137.0) (3.548)
sex ratioK+ 0.078** -136.7 50.45***
maleP × sex ratioK (0.031) (198.3) (10.43)
Observations 6,912 6,912 6,912
R-squared 0.207 0.065 0.647
P demographics Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. maleP is the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio
of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration effect.
sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father demonstration effect. The three
outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial
transfer to their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided
(amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year
(visit days). The key controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education,
hukou status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance
from O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education, working status, retirement status, any
deposit, hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K. The
standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS. The IVs are the
gender of the first child born in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for
the CHARLS. The sample is split based on whether P have any older brothers.
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Table 1.11: Heterogeneity Check: Parents’ pension coverage
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS (mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
maleP -0.120* 35.20 -59.80*** 0.0243 4.783 5.230
(0.0626) (514.2) (12.73) (0.0625) (174.3) (30.80)
sex ratioK -0.0808 -362.6 6.448 -0.0912 -375.5** -59.71***
(Without pension mother (0.0565) (585.4) (10.15) (0.0647) (166.5) (20.62)
demonstration effects)
pensionP -0.0894 -300.8 8.126 0.0131 -152.5 -6.875
(0.0580) (341.1) (8.636) (0.0351) (151.5) (14.70)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.183* -171.5 106.1*** -0.0497 0.968 45.57
(0.101) (860.9) (19.01) (0.0981) (309.3) (47.91)
maleP × pensionP 0.0907 -498.3 39.13** -0.0872 -249.2 -7.197
(0.104) (587.3) (15.93) (0.0592) (235.1) (32.88)
sex ratioK × pensionP 0.0692 192.3 -17.39 0.0366 470.0* 22.06
(Difference in mother (0.0961) (517.2) (13.85) (0.0594) (272.1) (25.15)
demonstration effects)
sex ratioK ×maleP -0.109 1,172 -26.08 0.104 238.5 -0.917
×pensionP (0.169) (960.7) (23.87) (0.104) (426.6) (56.75)
With pension father 0.063 829.7** 69.07*** -0.000 334.0 7.002
demonstration effects (0.058) (392.2) (17.35) (0.057) (259.1) (22.69)
Without pension father 0.103 -534.1 112.5*** -0.140** -374.4 -14.14
demonstration effects (0.072) (509.5) (15.74) (0.067) (231.8) (42.81)
Difference in father -0.040 1363* -43.47** 0.141 708.4** 21.14
demonstration effects (0.118) (803.7) (17.60) (0.088) (329.4) (52.64)
With pension mother -0.012 -170.2 -10.94 -0.054** 94.55 -37.65***
demonstration effects (0.072) (342.8) (10.30) (0.027) (203.8) (13.28)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232 19,509 19,509 19,509
R-squared 0.202 0.049 0.600 0.281 0.201 0.160
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The
three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents
(any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided (amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly
parents per year (visit days). The key controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether
live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education, working
status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K, depending on
the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level
for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child born in or
after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child born in or after 2003 for
the CHFS. pensionP is a dummy representing whether P have any types of pension, and it interacts with key regressors.
maleP is the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and is the mother demonstration effect
for P without pension. sex ratioK × pensionP represents the difference between the mother demonstration effects for P
with pension and the mother demonstration effects for P without pension coverage, which should be negative and significant
if the mother demonstration effects for P with pension coverage is larger than the mother demonstration effects for P without
pension coverage.
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Table 1.12: Heterogeneity Check: Income of generation O
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days
maleP -0.0877 -249.4 -30.60*
(0.0624) (372.4) (17.26)
sex ratioK -0.0520 -572.3 5.128
(Low-income O’s mother (0.0664) (445.7) (11.20)
demonstrate effect)
income of O -0.0141 -529.4 16.14
(0.0592) (418.1) (10.13)
sex ratioK× income of O 0.00973 804.0 -15.20
(Differences in mother (0.0938) (688.9) (17.02)
demonstrate effects)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.141* 646.0 80.50***
(0.0840) (590.1) (22.24)
maleP× income of O 0.0169 91.57 -14.40
(0.0831) (672.2) (15.66)
maleP × sex ratioK -0.0384 -469.8 12.06
× income of O (0.146) (1,153) (23.06)
High-income O’s father 0.060 407.9 82.49***
demonstrate effect (0.072) (577.5) (12.36)
Low-income O’s father 0.089** 73.66 85.63***
demonstrate effect (0.043) (340.5) (17.35)
Differences in father -0.029 334.2 -3.143
demonstrate effects (0.100) (825.1) (15.14)
High-income O’s mother -0.042 231.7 -10.07
demonstrate effect (0.059) (608.5) (11.48)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,233
R-squared 0.202 0.050 0.601
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any
financial transfer to their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided (amount),
and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (visit days). The key
controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in urban
areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education,
working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household income and hours of O taking
care of P ’s K. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS. The IVs are
the gender of the first child born in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS.
income of O is a dummy representing whether O have any income sources, and it interacts with key
regressors. maleP is the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and is
the mother demonstration effect for P whose O have income. sex ratioK× income of O represents the
difference between the mother demonstration effects for P whose O have income and the mother
demonstration effects for P whose O do not have income, which should be negative and significant if the
mother demonstration effects for P whose O have income is larger than the mother demonstration effects
for P whose O do not have income.
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Table 1.13: Effects of education and time investment on the provision of old-age support
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days
maleP -0.0996* -417.1 -22.01
(0.0562) (337.8) (15.09)
sex ratioK -0.0459 -244.3 -2.669
(0.0438) (388.1) (7.441)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.126** 424.7 88.30***
(0.0582) (429.2) (15.88)
awayage 0.0675** -13.89 -0.0725
(0.0291) (140.0) (4.325)
awaytime -0.0110 35.12 0.200
(0.00903) (82.48) (1.040)
ln(edu expense) 0.00175 125.0* 0.0899
(0.00421) (72.07) (0.586)
edu level -0.00137 24.90 9.006***
(0.0194) (128.2) (3.137)
maleP × awayage -0.0824*** 202.5 -7.187
(0.0319) (274.8) (5.885)
maleP × awaytime 0.00531 -116.7 0.0528
(0.0110) (95.28) (2.161)
maleP × ln(edu expense) -0.00768 -99.08 -1.089
(0.00471) (93.84) (0.775)
maleP × edu-level 0.0283 292.3 -13.92***
(0.0223) (211.8) (5.011)
sex ratioK+ 0.080*** 180.4 85.63***
maleP × sex ratioK (0.027) (191.9) (13.83)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232
R-squared 0.202 0.051 0.642
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. maleP is the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P
and represents the mother demonstration effect. sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father
demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide
any financial transfer to their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided
(amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (visit days).
The key controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in
urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education,
working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household income and hours of O taking
care of P ’s K. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS. The IVs are
the gender of the first child born in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS.
awayage is the age that P were away from their parents during P ’s childhood. awaytime is the length of
time that P were away from their parents during P ’s childhood. edu− level is the education-level of P
and ln(edu expense) is the log of the education investment that P received from their parents during P ’s
childhood.
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Table 1.14: The demonstration effect on upward and downward transfer
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS (mostly urban)
VARIABLES any transfer any receipt by P any receipt by K any transfer any receipt by P
maleP -0.0802 0.0368** 0.101** -0.0518 0.00864
(0.0499) (0.0164) (0.0450) (0.0448) (0.0363)
sex ratioK -0.0450 -0.0397*** 0.0353 -0.0733** 0.173***
(0.0437) (0.0144) (0.0288) (0.0343) (0.0278)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.125** 0.00392 -0.0912 0.0412 -0.00716
(0.0579) (0.0168) (0.0577) (0.0645) (0.0607)
any receipt by P -0.0200 - 0.170*** 0.357*** -
(0.0331) - (0.0261) (0.0151) -
any transfer - -0.00442 0.0901*** - 0.242***
- (0.00653) (0.0113) - (0.0108)
sex ratioK+ 0.080*** -0.036*** -0.056 -0.032 0.166***
maleP × sex ratioK (0.027) (0.009) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232 19,509 19,509
R-squared 0.201 0.040 0.086 0.280 0.229
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. maleP is the
gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration effect. sex ratioK
+maleP × sex ratioK shows the male dominated demonstration effect. any-transfer is the probability of P providing any transfer
to O, and anyreceiptbyP and anyreceiptbyK are the transfer from O to P ’s household and P ’s children K. The key controls are
P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation,
distance from O, and Os transfer to P , age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household
income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The
standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The
IVs are the gender of the first child born in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of
the first child born in or after 2003 for the CHFS.
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Table 1.15: The demonstration effect by generation O
OLS: CHARLS (mostly rural)
VARIABLES any-transfer regular nonregular log(regular) log(nonregular)
Male P
father′s transfer 0.064** 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.114*** 0.102***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.037) (0.035)
mother′s transfer 0.048** 0.067** 0.109*** 0.111** 0.116***
(0.021) (0.028) (0.023) (0.045) (0.027)
Observations 6,688 6,688 6,688 6,688 6,688
Female P
father′s transfer 0.056 0.031 0.112*** 0.058* 0.113**
(0.035) (0.025) (0.039) (0.030) (0.045)
mother′s transfer 0.108*** 0.075** 0.185*** 0.171*** 0.206***
(0.048) (0.031) (0.030) (0.054) (0.034)
Observations 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540 5,540
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The father′s transfer and mother′s transfer are the transfer provided by O to P ’s paternal and maternal grandparents.
The outcome variables are the probability of providing any, regular, and non-regular transfer to O (any-transfer, regular,
and nonregular), and the log of the amount of regular and non-regular transfer (log(regular) and log(nonregular)). The
controlling variables for P are age, marital status, rural hukou, provinces, education, professional title, income level,
whether P lives with parents and the distant to parents place, visit frequency to O, the number and rank of siblings and
the number of children. And also O’s transfer to P , age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou
status, household income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level.
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Table 1.16: Impact of the gender of the first child on the probability of providing any
old-age support
VARIABLES any-transfer in CHFS (mostly urban)
father-son father-daughter mother-son mother-daughter
Event time
-1 0.244 0.479* 0.207 -0.0824
(0.264) (0.278) (0.160) (0.418)
0 0.175 0.148 -0.155 0.655***
(0.186) (0.262) (0.114) (0.211)
1 0.157 0.148 0.0436 0.588***
(0.181) (0.258) (0.108) (0.206)
2 0.163 0.125 -0.0116 0.618***
(0.183) (0.258) (0.105) (0.204)
3 0.208 0.0787 0.0499 0.660***
(0.180) (0.259) (0.102) (0.201)
4 0.150 0.105 0.0507 0.607***
(0.182) (0.258) (0.0991) (0.204)
Age fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 809 771 811 765
R-squared 0.140 0.142 0.093 0.064
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. any-transfer is the probability of providing any transfer to O. The event is the birth of the first child in
the respondents’ household. The event time equals 0 in the year of the birth of the first child. All the other event
times are adjusted accordingly. male-son is the male group with the first child as a son, male-daughter is the male
group with the first daughter. female-son and female-daughter are the corresponding female groups. The outcome
variable is the probability of providing any transfer to elderly parents. The results are for the CHFS only and use
2011, 2013 and 2015 wave. The error term is clustered at household-level.
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Chapter 2
The Role of Social Norms in
Old-age Support: a Theoretical
Approach
This chapter presents an economic model of the intergenerational transmission of social
norms in old-age support. The analysis is based on the same-gender intergenerational
transmission channel of the social norm. Research in sociology and psychology suggests
that young children are more likely to inherit their same-gender parents’ social traits
and norms (Lytton and Romney, 1991; Bussey and Bandura, 1999). Because of the
same-gender transmission, the old-age support provided by individuals to their parents
depends on the gender of their children. Based on existing intergenerational transfer
models, I include the gender ratio of children in the model and examine the effect of the
gender ratio on old-age support provided by their parents to their grandparents. The
model concludes that fathers with more sons in their households provide more old-age
support than fathers with more daughters. For mothers, they provide more support to
their parents with more daughters in their household.
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2.1 Introduction
The topic of intergenerational transfers within the family is of general interest to
economists, especially upward intergenerational transfers: the support that adults pro-
vide to their elderly parents. However, in the literature, most models of motives for
people to provide old-age support to their parents, especially the standard models, do
not seem to match the empirical findings (Arrondel and Masson, 2006). Moreover,
the existing models usually focus only on interactions between two generations, adult
children and their parents. One of the possible reasons for the mismatch between the
empirical evidence and the theoretical models may be that researchers sometimes ig-
nore the fact that the norm of people providing old-age support, whether financial or
otherwise, to their parents exists in nearly every generation. Usually, the norm of pro-
viding old-age support is gender-specific in developing countries, and most commonly
in China. The element of norm transmission combined with gender should be included
in the model for explaining old-age support provision with families.
This chapter presents a model of the intergenerational transmission of the social
norm of old-age support provision in China, which focuses on the same-gender channel.
The way that parents provide support to their own parents conveys the social norm of
old-age support provision to their children of the same-gender. The model is based on
the demonstration effect model established by Cox and Stark (1996). The demonstra-
tion effect means that parents treat their parents well if they have “their own children
to whom to demonstrate the appropriate behaviour” (Cox and Stark, 2005). I modify
Cox and Stark’s demonstration effect by adding the same-gender transmission channel
for the old-age support provision and find that this produces two major improvements
in the model’s ability to match the empirical findings. First, the model fills the gap
of the same-gender transmission channel in the theoretical framework in economics,
while a lot of empirical evidence exists. Sociologists and psychologists believe that
children are largely influenced by their same-sex parent in their learning of gender
norms in society (Lytton and Romney, 1991; Bussey and Bandura, 1999; McHale et
al., 1999). Economists have also recently found empirical evidence for same-gender
inter-generational transmission in individual preferences and social norms (Alesina et
al., 2013; Keleven et al., 2018). Second, the gender element in the model makes it more
suitable for the real-world scenario. The gender difference is prominent in the norm of
old-age support provision in China and other developing cultures (Das Gupta et al.,
2003). Traditionally, it is sons who are responsible for supporting their elderly parents
in China (Lee et al., 1994; Chan et al., 2002).
To illustrate the same-gender demonstration effect, I set up a simple two-period
consumption model describing the three-generation interactions in providing old-age
support. The model includes inter-household transfers (Banerjee et al., 2014) and a
same-gender demonstration effect. The same-gender demonstration effect in the model
is expressed as the total amount of the childrens future transfer to their parents that will
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be more likely and positively affected by the transfer from their same-gender parent
to their paternal or maternal grandparents that they observe when they are young.
The same-gender demonstration effect is similar to the demonstration effect by Cox
and Stark (1996) but adds gender-specific parental influences to the demonstration
effect. It also contains a simple intra-household bargaining component. The model
concludes that the parent who holds the higher bargaining power in a household is
more likely to demonstrate the norm of old-age support to offspring of the same gender.
By reflecting the empirical results in Chapter 1, the model in this chapter provides a
possible explanation for providing old-age support. It also makes the gender of the
children a key component in the interaction between three generations in terms of
old-age support, given that the key channel of the model is gender-specific.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides a literature review of the
current standard models and the theoretical background for same-gender social norm
transmission and establishes the connections between my model assumptions and the
literature. This is followed by Section 2.3, which presents a baseline unitary household
model with simple assumptions. Section 2.4 adds a simple intra-household bargaining
component to the baseline model. Section 2.5 offers a more complicated model with
relaxed assumptions based on the model in Section 2.4. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
The discussion of the literature review in Chapter 1 Section 1.2 implies that altruism
and exchange are the two main motives in the standard theoretical models explain-
ing intergenerational transfer. However, the existing empirical results are not robust
enough to support these two motives in theoretical models (Arrondel and Masson,
2006). My model in this chapter, together with the empirical evidence in Chapter 1,
reconcile the theoretical framework with the empirical evidence and add to the lit-
erature, showing the intergenerational transmission of social norms as one possible
explanation of the personal support given to the elderly. In this section, I also focus on
how the assumptions in my model are matched with the existing empirical and theoret-
ical literature. Altruism, as discussed by Barro (1974) and Becker (1976, 1981), is one
of the generally accepted reasons for people providing old-age support. Thus, I include
an altruism parameter into my model, assuming people generate utility by providing
old-age support to their own parents. Yet this utility generated from people’s altruism
is smaller than the utility generated directly from the consumption.
The norm transmission proposed in the model is similar to the concept of indirect
reciprocity, which is attributed to Mauss (1950, 1968). He states that indirect reciproc-
ities involving three successive generations will lead to infinite chains of transfers. He
observes that the givers do not get direct payback from the beneficiary but receive
it from a third person (Arrondel and Masson, 2001). Similar concepts are also dis-
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cussed in Cox and Stark’s 1996 model, which specify the upward and positive indirect
reciprocity channel in the context of the provision of old-age support. Cox and Stark
(1996) called this channel the “demonstration effect”. The norm transmission and the
indirect reciprocity both rely on the assumption that parents can affect their children’s
behaviours in the future. Becker et al. (2016) support this assumption and believe
that parents can “manipulate” the preferences of their children. The interpretation of
this transmission of the norm is that people educate their children by providing old-age
support to their own parents. Their children are affected by this behaviour their par-
ents, who in turn receive old-age support when the time comes. In my model, the norm
transmission is represented by an assumption that the old-age support people received
from their children in future should be positively affected by the old-age support people
provided to their own parents.
The norm of providing old-age support is usually gender-specific, thus the norm
transmission process should also be based on the gender of the future generation.
Godelier (1982) describes indirect reciprocity as gender-specific when it functions in
the anthropology literature as a channel for the transmission of cultural traits and
norms. If there is a gender-specific social norm, then it also should be the channel for
passing on gender norms in a society. Mitrut and Wolff (2009) find that parents’ visits
to their own parents are largely affected by the presence of daughters rather than sons
in their households. This empirical finding is consistent with common beliefs about the
role of gender: girls are the more likely ones to pay visits and care for the elderly (Lee
et al., 1993). However, except for Mitrut and Wolff (2009), there is no other paper in
the related literature that takes note of the gender of children and the role of children
in the transmission of the norm of old-age support.
For the transmission of gender-specific norms to be valid, one important factor
is that parents can influence their same-gender children more effectively than cross-
gender children. Many sociologists and psychologists believe that the same-sex parent
is the main channel for ensuring that children learn the corresponding gender role in
a way that fits social expectations and that the children will behave in gender-related
ways when they become adults (Lytton and Romney, 1991; Bussey and Bandura,
1999; McHale et al., 1999). In the recent economics literature, several papers focus
on same-gender intergenerational transmission. Jayachandran and her colleagues show
that the effects of one’s same-sex parent on gender attitudes are greater than the
effects of one’s peers (Dhar et al., 2015). Kleven et al. (2018) reveal that in Denmark
preferences in matters of family and career for females are largely influenced by the
mother’s preferences observed during childhood. Alesina et al. (2013) also find that
paternal ancestors affect the perspectives of males on the roles of the genders and the
participation of females in the labour market. The same-gender influence from the
parents is represented by the following assumptions in my model. Old-age support
provided by females to their parents affects old-age support for the females will receive
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from their daughters more than from their sons. Males’ old-age support provisions
affect the support that they will receive from their sons more than from their daughters.
Another key assumption in determining whether the gender of the children affects
their parents’ decision to providing old-age support is that parents also internalise the
fact that their childrens future behaviours will be affected by theirs. This internalisa-
tion means that parents understand their influence on their children and they will try
to shape their childrens preferences according to their own. Becker (1996), Bisin and
Verdier (2000), Guttman (2001), Bronnenberg et al., (2012), and Becker et al. (2016)
study whether parents show certain behaviours to or spend more resources on their chil-
dren in order to formalise their children’s preferences. In my model, this internalisation
means that the parents know the function of their children’s future transfers.
All the literature mentioned above acts as supporting evidence for the same-gender
demonstration effect assumption that I included in my model. Under the same-gender
demonstration effect, the model should predict a father with more sons in his family
provides more old-age support than a father with more daughters, fixing the number
of children. For mothers, they provide more with more daughters in their households.
Figure 2.1 provides a simple graphic illustration of the same-gender demonstration
effect in China. In a simple situation with only one child in the household, when the
only child is a son, then the father provides more old-age support and has a greater
influence on the son than the mother does. When the only child is a daughter, then
the mother provides more and has a greater influence on the daughter.
2.3 Baseline model
The model describing the same-gender demonstration effect in the following section is
based on the demonstration effect model by Cox and Stark (1996, 2005), combined with
a definition of intergenerational transfers taken from a model by Banerjee et al. (2014).
It is a simple inter-temporal two-period consumption model. Cox and Stark (1996,
2005) maintain that “... childhood experience affects behaviour in adulthood”. Parents
who value support for the elderly will demonstrate the norm of providing support for
the elderly to their children by providing support to their own elderly parents. Based
on the demonstration effect, the model assumes that parents know that their support to
their own elderly parents will affect the future support behaviour of their same-gender
children. Another assumption noted above is that children will be affected by the
behaviour of their same-gender parents. Given differences in anticipation of the future
and same-gender intergenerational transmission, the model predicts that parents will
provide support to their own parents, according to the gender of their children. This
explains the relationship between parents’ support for the elderly and the gender ratio
of their children.
There are three generations in the model: the mid-age generation (P ), the parents;
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the older generation (O), parents of P , and the younger generation (K), children of P .
They correspond to the second generation, the first generation and the third generation
respectively, but only in this chapter. There are two periods in the model: the first
period, t = 1, and the second period, t = 2. The baseline model uses the notation in
Banerjee et al. (2014) and requires a few additional assumptions:
• (i) each household in P has a father and a mother;
• (ii) the father transfers a fraction τF1 of his income and the mother transfers a
fraction τM1 of hers to their own parents. Both of them have income Y1. Y1 is
exogenous;
• (iii) the number of K in each household, n, is exogenous. The male-to-female
gender ratio of children in a household is φ;
• (iv) people value their parents’ welfare as well as their own consumption, so they
derive utilities from providing transfers to their parents. However, there is also
a discount factor, 0 < δ < 1, for the utility derived from the provision of old-age
support, since the transfer to O is not direct consumption for the individuals;
• (v) τFt and τMt are endogenous and different when t = 1 and when t = 2. The
transfer from the children of the father and mother in the second period will
be affected by their same-gender parents’ transfer in the first period.1 In the
equations, this assumption is expressed as
τF2 = T F (τF1 ) and τM2 = T M(τM1 ). (2.1)
Both functions are strictly concave and increasing in τF1 and τ
M
1 , and
τF2 = 0 if τ
F
1 = 0 and τ
M
2 = 0 if τ
M
1 = 0;
• (vi) the father and the mother in a household make unitary household-level de-
cisions. The household consumption is ct in each time period;
• (vii) for simplicity, I assume the transfer from P to their parents-in-law would
only make their children provide transfers to their parents-in-law in the second
period. So providing transfers to P ’s parents-in-law is not in line with the interest
of the P ’s household. So I do not consider the transfer to P ’s parents-in-law in
Chapter 2;2
• (viii) for simplicity, I assume that there is no saving in the baseline model;3
1This same-gender demonstration assumption is later relaxed (See Section 2.3.1).
2This assumption is a bit restrictive. I should consider incorporating the relaxed version of this
assumption in future.
3Saving is included in the basic model in Section B.1.
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• (ix) u(·) is a strictly concave function.
In this model, P is the generation solving the optimisation problem in the first
period. O passively receives support from P in the first period and dies in the second
period. Members of K observe their parents’ τ1 in the first period and provide their
parents with τ2 in the second period. With the assumptions above, a typical household
in generation P solves the following problem:
max
τF1 ,τ
M
1
U = u(c1) + δu(e1) + βu(c2)
s.t.
c1 + c2 ≤ Y1(2− τF1 − τM1 ) + Y2(T F (τF1 )φn+ T M(τM1 )(1− φ)n);
e1 = Y1(τ
F
1 + τ
M
1 ).
The father and the mother in generation P make unitary household-level decisions,
and there is no saving, thus that the expressions for the household consumption for
the two periods are as follows:
c1 = Y1(2− τF1 − τM1 ); c2 = Y2[T F (τF1 )φn+ T M(τM1 )(1− φ)n].
e1 is the old-age support provided by the whole household. δ is the discount factor
for the utility generated from altruism, and β is the time discount factor. If u(c) is
specified as a log or a CRRA function, and τ2 is a concave function of τ1, the FOCs
with respect to τF1 and τ
M
1 are:
U1 =
dU
dτF1
= u′(c1)(−Y1) + δu′(Y1(τF1 + τM1 ))Y1 + βu′(c2)Y2τF
′
2 φn = 0; (2.2)
U2 =
dU
dτM1
= u′(c1)(−Y1) + δu′(Y1(τF1 + τM1 ))Y1 + βu′(c2)Y2τM
′
2 (1− φ)n = 0. (2.3)
Given Equations (2.2) and (2.3), I obtain the following condition to derive the optimal
τF1 and τ
M
1 , which are τ
F∗
1 and τ
M∗
1 respectively:
τF
′
2
τM
′
2
=
1− φ
φ
. (2.4)
From the FOCs, I can derive the SOCs corresponding to τF1 , τ
M
1 , and φ. Recall
that c1 = Y1(2− τF1 − τM1 ) and c2 = Y2(τF2 φn+ τM2 (1−φ)n). From Equation (2.2), the
SOCs with respect to τF1 and φ are:
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d2U
dτF21
= u′′(c1)(Y 21 ) + δu
′′(Y1(τF1 + τ
M
1 ))Y
2
1
+ βu′(c2)Y2τF
′′
2 φn+ βu
′′(c2)(Y2τF
′
2 φn)
2;
d2U
dτF1 dφ
= βu′′(c2)(Y 22 φn
2)τF
′
2 (τ
F
2 − τM2 ) + βu′(c2)Y2τF
′
2 n.
(2.5)
I assign:
U11 =
d2U
dτF∗21
; U13 =
d2U
dτF∗1 dφ
,
which are the SOCs at the optimal value of τF1 and τ
M
1 . Recall that function u is
strictly concave in c1 and c2. T F and T M are both strictly concave functions. U11 is
always smaller than 0 under these assumptions. For the sign of U13, when the function
u(·) is specified as a log or a CRRA function, I obtain
|u′′(c2)(Y 22 τF
′
2 φn)(nτ
F
2 − nτM2 )|< |u′(c2)Y2τF
′
2 n| ⇒ U13 > 0.
From Equation (2.3), the corresponding SOCs are:
d2U
dτM21
= u′′(c1)(Y 21 ) + δu
′′(Y1(τF1 + τ
M
1 ))Y
2
1
+ βu′(c2)Y2τM
′′
2 (1− φ)n+ βu′′(c2)(Y2τM
′
2 (1− φ)n)2;
d2U
dτM1 dφ
= βu′′(c2)(Y 22 (1− φ)n2)τM
′
2 (τ
F
2 − τM2 )− βu′(c2)Y2τM
′
2 n.
(2.6)
The SOC for τF1 and τ
M
1 is:
d2U
dτF1 dτ
M
1
= u′′(c1)(Y 21 ) + δu
′′(Y1(τF1 + τ
M
1 ))Y
2
1 + βu
′′(c2)Y 22 τ
F ′
2 τ
M ′
2 φ(1− φ)n2. (2.7)
Here again I specify
U22 =
d2U
dτM∗21
; U23 =
d2U
dτM∗1 dφ
; U12/21 =
d2U
dτF∗1 dτ
M∗
1
;
which are the SOCs at the optimal value of τF1 and τ
M
1 . Because of the concave
assumptions for u(·), T F , and T M , I infer the signs of U22, U23, and U12/21 are negative,
and do not depend on the specification of the utility function u(c), as long as u(c) is
concave. If Equation (2.4) is substituted for Equations (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7), then the
comparison between the absolute values of U11, U22, and U12 is
|U11| > |U12|; |U22| > |U12|.
According to the assumption of the demonstration effect, I would expect the optimal
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value of the transfer from the father, τF∗1 , to be positively affected by his children’s
gender ratio, φ, and the optimal value of the transfer from the mother, τM∗1 , would be
negatively affected by φ. In other words, the expected comparative statics from the
optimisation problem are:
dτF∗1
dφ
> 0;
dτM∗1
dφ
< 0.
To obtain these two comparative statics, I need to totally differentiate Equations (2.2)
and (2.3), which are:
U11dτF∗1 + U
12dτM∗1 + U
13dφ = 0;
U21dτF∗1 + U
22dτM∗1 + U
23dφ = 0,
(2.8)
where again
U11 =
d2U
dτF∗21
; U13 =
d2U
dτF∗1 dφ
; U22 =
d2U
dτM∗21
; U23 =
d2U
dτM∗1 dφ
; U12/21 =
d2U
dτF∗1 dτ
M∗
1
.
The asterisks denote optimal values. The U ijs are the SOCs when τF1 = τ
F∗
1 and
τM1 = τ
M∗
1 , i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Hence, the comparative statics from the
conditions in Equation (2.8) are:
dτF∗1
dφ
=
U12U23 − U13U22
U11U22 − U12U21 ;
dτM∗1
dφ
=
U11U23 − U13U21
U12U21 − U11U22 .
The signs for SOCs when τF1 = τ
F∗
1 and τ
M
1 = τ
M∗
1 are:
U11 < 0; U13 > 0; U22 < 0; 4
U23 < 0; U12 = U21 < 0.
From the equations for SOCs, I can obtain the sign of the numerators and denominators
in the comparative statics:
U12U23 − U13U22 > 0;
U11U23 − U13U21 > 0;
U11U22 − U12U21 > 0,
and thus the signs of the comparative statics are:
dτF∗1
dφ
=
U12U23 − U13U22
U11U22 − U12U21 > 0;
dτM∗1
dφ
=
U11U23 − U13U21
U12U21 − U11U22 < 0. (2.9)
4Note that U13 > 0 when the utility function is specified as a log or a CRRA function. For example,
if u(c) = log(c), then U13 =
βY 22 n
2τF
′
2 τ
M
2
C22
> 0.
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The comparative statics can be summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In the model in this section, when the utility function is specified
as a log or a CRRA function, then τF∗1 is increasing in φ and τ
M∗
1 is decreasing in the
gender ratio of K, φ. The model shows:
dτF∗1
dφ
> 0;
dτM∗1
dφ
< 0.
The first interpretation of the comparative statics in Proposition 1 is that the
fraction of the father’s income transferred to his parents increases with the male-to-
female gender ratio of his children. It also means that he will provide more old-age
support to his parents the more sons he has in his household, fixing the number of K.
The mother will transfer more to her own parents if she has more daughters, regardless
of whether τF1 is greater or smaller than τ
M
1 . As noted above, it is more usual in China
for males to support their parents than for females. τF1 > τ
M
1 indicates that the father
transfers more than the mother does, as a general social norm. However, the condition
τF1 > τ
M
1 does not affect the conclusion of the baseline model.
One key assumption for the interpretations is that φ should be exogenous. To make
sure that φ, the gender ratio of the generation K, is exogenous at the household-level
in the empirical part of the first chapter, I use the policy change which started in
2003. From this date, the selection of unborn children by sex was banned in China. I
give a more detailed explanation in the empirical section in Chapter 1. The regulation
brought the gender ratio of newborns after 2003 closer to the natural rate than the
gender ratio was before the policy changed.
2.3.1 The demonstration effect from different-gender parents
In the basic model, I assume generation P ’s transfer would affect only the future
transfer that they received from the same-gender members in the next generation. The
formulas for these assumptions are:
τF2 = T F (τF1 ); τM2 = T M(τM1 ),
and they are both strictly concave and increasing functions in τF1 and τ
M
1 . I relax this
assumption to a more general one: both parents would affect the future transfer of
the next generation, but each parent would have a greater influence on the same-sex
children of the next generation than on the the hetero-sex ones. The equations for τF2
and τM2 under the relaxed assumptions are:
τF2 = T F (τF1 , τM1 ); τM2 = T M(τF1 , τM1 ).
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The functions are still concave in both τF1 and τ
M
1 , and I impose new assumptions on
the new equations as well:
• (i) assumptions on the FOCs for τF2 and τM2
dτF2
dτF1
>
dτF2
dτM1
;
dτM2
dτM1
>
dτM2
dτF1
;
dτM2
dτM1
>
dτF2
dτM1
;
dτF2
dτF1
>
dτM2
dτF1
;
• (ii) assumptions on the SOCs
d2τF2
dτF1 dτ
M
1
= 0;
d2τM2
dτF1 dτ
M
1
= 0.
The interpretation of the assumptions on the FOCs of τF2 and τ
M
2 with respect to
τF1 and τ
M
1 is that the marginal effects of old-age support in the first period from P
on the old-age support in the second period provided the same-gender K are greater
than the opposite-gender effects. For the SOCs, I assume in this section that the cross
partial derivatives equal 0, which means that T F (τF1 , τM1 ) and T M(τF1 , τM1 ) are linear
combinations of τF1 and τ
M
1 .
Under these new assumptions, I re-consider the basic model. The maximisation
problem is still the same except for the equations of τF2 and τ
M
2 . I would want the
counterpart to Proposition 1 to hold given the SOCs and FOCs derived from the
optimisation problem in this subsection, even under certain limitations on the value of
optimal τF1 and τ
M
1 . The new maximisation problem is:
max
τF1 ,τ
M
1
U = u(c1) + δu(e1) + βu(c2)
s.t.
c1 + c2 ≤ Y1(2− τF1 − τM1 ) + Y2(τF2 φn+ τM2 (1− φ)n);
e1 = Y1(τ
F
1 + τ
M
1 ).
According to Proposition 1, the key comparative statics from this model should be:
dτF∗1
dφ
> 0;
dτM∗1
dφ
< 0.
In this model, for τF1 and τ
M
1 , the FOCs:
U1 =
dU
dτF1
= u′(Y1(2− τF1 − τM1 ))(−Y1) + δu′(Y1(τF1 + τM1 ))Y1
+ βu′(c2)Y2n(τF
′
2,τF1
φ+ τM
′
2,τF1
(1− φ)) = 0;
U2 =
dU
dτM1
= u′(Y1(2− τF1 − τM1 ))(−Y1) + δu′(Y1(τF1 + τM1 ))Y1
+ βu′(c2)Y2n(τF
′
2,τM1
φ+ τM
′
2,τM1
(1− φ)) = 0.
(2.10)
The expressions for c2 is Y2(τ
F
2 φn+ τ
M
2 (1− φ)n). Given Equation (2.10), I obtain the
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following condition to derive the optimal τF1 and τ
M
1 :
τF
′
2,τF1
− τF ′
2,τM1
τM
′
2,τM1
− τM ′
2,τF1
=
1− φ
φ
. (2.11)
τF∗1 and τ
M∗
1 are the optimal solution for τ
F
1 and τ
M
1 derived from Equation (2.11).
From Equation (2.10), I can also obtain the corresponding SOCs. The SOCs are:
d2U
dτF21
= u′′(Y1(2− τF1 − τM1 ))Y 21 + δu′′(Y1(τF1 + τM1 ))Y 21
+ βu′(c2)Y2n(τF
′′
2,τF1
φ+ τM
′′
2,τF1
(1− φ)) + βu′′(c2)(Y2n(τF ′2,τF1 φ+ τ
M ′
2,τF1
(1− φ)))2 < 0;
d2U
dτM21
= u′′(Y1(2− τF1 − τM1 ))Y 21 + δu′′(Y1(τF1 + τM1 ))Y 21
+ βu′(c2)Y2n(τF
′′
2,τM1
φ+ τM
′′
2,τM1
(1− φ)) + βu′′(c2)(Y2n(τF ′2,τM1 φ+ τ
M ′
2,τM1
(1− φ)))2 < 0;
d2U
dτF1 dτ
M
1
= u′′(Y1(2− τF1 − τM1 ))Y 21 + δu′′(Y1(τF1 + τM1 ))Y 21
+ βu′′(c2)Y 22 n
2(τF
′
2,τM1
φ+ τM
′
2,τM1
(1− φ))(τF ′2,τF1 φ+ τ
M ′
2,τF1
(1− φ))
+ βu′(c2)Y2n(τF
′′
2,τF1 ,τ
M
1
φ+ τM
′′
2,τF1 ,τ
M
1
(1− φ)) < 0;
d2U
dτF1 dφ
= βu′′(c2)Y 22 n
2(τF
′
2,τF1
φ+ τM
′
2,τF1
(1− φ))(τF2 − τM2 ) + βu′(c2)Y2n(τF
′
2,τF1
− τM ′2,τF1 );
d2U
dτM1 dφ
= βu′′(c2)Y 22 n
2(τF
′
2,τM1
φ+ τM
′
2,τM1
(1− φ))(τF2 − τM2 ) + βu′(c2)Y2n(τF
′
2,τM1
− τM ′2,τM1 ).
(2.12)
While the sign for the first three SOCs in Equation (2.12) is known, the signs for d
2U
dτF1 dφ
and d
2U
dτM1 dφ
are uncertain. Depending on the value of τF1 , τ
M
1 , τ
F ′
2,τM1
, and τM
′
2,τF1
, the signs
for d
2U
dτF1 dφ
and d
2U
dτM1 dφ
vary. There are two sets of conditions to set the signs of d
2U
dτF1 dφ
and d
2U
dτM1 dφ
:
1. If the function u(·) is specified as a log or a CRRA function and τF2 > τM2 :
(a) d
2U
dτM1 dφ
< 0;
(b) if τM
′
2,τF1
is small enough or τM
′
2,τF1
→ 0
• τF ′
2,τF1
τM2 − τF2 τM ′2,τF1 > 0
• then d2U
dτF1 dφ
> 0.
2. If the function u(·) is specified as a log or a CRRA function and τF2 < τM2 :
(a) d
2U
dτF1 dφ
> 0;
(b) if τF
′
2,τM1
is small enough or τF
′
2,τM1
→ 0:
• τF ′
2,τM1
τM2 − τF2 τM ′2,τM1 < 0
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• then d2U
dτM1 dφ
< 0.
Recall that the comparative statics are:
dτF∗1
dφ
=
U12U23 − U13U22
U11U22 − U12U21 ;
dτM∗1
dφ
=
U11U23 − U13U21
U12U21 − U11U22 .
τF∗1 and τ
M∗
1 is the optimal solution of τ
F
1 and τ
M
1 from Equation (2.11). The U
ijs are
the SOCs listed above when τF1 and τ
M
1 at their optimal values.
5 I need the signs of
the U ij to determine the sign of the comparative statics. For U11, U22 and U12/U21,
the signs are all negative as showed in Equation (2.12).
For the sign of U13 and U23, U13 > 0 and U23 < 0, if under with two sets of
conditions:
1. τF∗2 > τ
M∗
2 and τ
F∗′
2,τF∗1
τM∗2 > τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2,τF∗1
; or
2. τF∗2 < τ
M∗
2 and τ
F∗′
2,τM∗1
τM∗2 < τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2,τM∗1 ∗
,
so the signs of the numerators in the comparative statics are:
U12U23 − U13U22 > 0;
U11U23 − U13U21 > 0.
For the sign of the denominator, under the assumption
d2τF2
dτF1 dτ
M
1
= 0 and
d2τM2
dτF1 dτ
M
1
= 0, I
obtain:
|U11| > |U12| and |U22| > |U12| ⇒ U11U22 − U12U21 > 0.
Combining the signs of the denominator and numerator, the signs of the comparative
statics are:
dτF∗1
dφ
> 0;
dτM∗1
dφ
< 0.
The signs for
dτF∗1
dφ
and
dτM∗1
dφ
are consistent with the baseline model. The counterpart
to Proposition 1 for this model holds under two sets of conditions:
1. τF∗2 > τ
M∗
2 and τ
F∗′
2,τF∗1
τM∗2 > τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2,τF∗1
; or
2. τF∗2 < τ
M∗
2 and τ
F∗′
2,τM∗1
τM∗2 < τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2,τM∗1 ∗
.
The interpretations of the counterpart to Proposition 1 are similar to the interpre-
tations in Section 2.3, although it should be borne in mind that these two sets of
conditions may be difficult to realise in the real world scenario.
5i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. U11 = d2U
dτF∗21
, U13 = d
2U
dτF∗1 dφ
, U22 = d
2U
dτM∗21
, U23 = d
2U
dτM∗1 dφ
, and
U12 = U21 = d
2U
dτF∗1 dτ
M∗
1
, which are the SOCs at the optimal value of τF and τM .
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2.4 Collective household model: the intra-household
bargaining
One of the assumptions in the baseline model is that households in generation P make
unitary household-level decisions, and the utility generated by providing the old-age
transfer counts as a utility of the household. To relax this assumption, I assume a col-
lective model for the household-level decisions, which involves intra-household resource
allocation. According to Browning and Chiappori (1998), the genders hold different
bargaining powers or “distributions of powers” in households. This can be translated
into different weights attached to the father’s and mother’s utility in the household-
level utility function. The additional assumptions on intra-household bargaining are
as follows:
• (i) The father earns Y Ft and the mother earns Y Mt . The weight for the father’s
utility function is ρt when t ∈ {1, 2}, and
ρt = P( Y
F
t
Y Mt
) ∀ t ∈ {1, 2}.
The weight for the mother is 1−ρt. ρt is increasing in Y
F
t
YMt
and 0 ≤ ρt ≤ 1. When
Y Ft = Y
M
t , ρt = 0.5.
• (ii) The father and the mother each have 5 own individual-level consumption, cF1
and cM1 respectively, when t = 1.
• (iii) ηt is a result from the intra-household resource allocation between Y Ft and
Y Mt .
ηt = H( Y
F
t
Y Mt
) ∀ t ∈ {1, 2}.
It is increasing in
Y Ft
YMt
and 0 ≤ ηt ≤ 2. When Y Ft ≥ Y Mt , 1 ≤ ηt ≤ 2, and when
Y Ft < Y
M
t , 0 ≤ ηt < 1.
• (iv) The results of the intra-household resource allocation are represented in
both periods. The father in each period provides a proportion, ηt, of his original
fraction of provision, τFt , while the mother provides 2− ηt of her original fraction
of provision, τMt for t ∈ {1, 2}.
• (v) In the second period, when neither the father nor the mother earns income,
the previous intra household bargaining parameters are not applicable. Thus, I
assume that they share the transfer that they received from their next generation
when t = 2. The consumption in the second period (c2) is also at the household
level.
• (vi) The second period transfer τF2 and τM2 depends not only on τF1 and τM1 , but
also on η1. τ
F
2 = T F (η1τF1 ) and τM2 = T M((2− η1)τM1 ).
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Other assumptions are the same as the assumptions in the baseline model in Section
2.3. These additional assumptions describe that the incomes from the father and the
mother, Y Ft and Y
M
t , affect the allocation of household resources, such as providing
old-age support to the father’s ageing parents (τFt ) and those of the mother (τ
M
t ).
For example, in the first period, the father provides η1Y
F
1 τ
F
1 and the mother provides
(2− η1)Y M1 τM1 to their respective own parents. The optimisation problem becomes:
max
τF1 ,τ
M
1
U = ρ1u(c
F
1 ) + (1− ρ1)u(cM1 ) + δρ1u(eF1 )
+ δ(1− ρ1)u(eM1 ) + βu(c2);
s.t.
cF1 + c
M
1 + c2 ≤ Y F1 (1− η1τF1 ) + Y M1 (1− (2− η1)τM1 )
+ Y F2 η2T F (η1τF1 )φn+ Y M2 (2− η2)T M((2− η1)τM1 )(1− φ)n;
eF1 = η1Y
F
1 τ
F
1 ;
eM1 = (2− η1)Y M1 τM1 .
In this section, I discuss only two extreme cases of the model:
1. when Y Ft ≥ Y Mt ∀ t, then ηt = 2,
2. when Y Ft < Y
M
t ∀ t, then ηt = 0.
When Y Ft ≥ Y Mt and ηt = 2, the father provides ηtY Ft τFt to his parents and the mother
accordingly provides no support to her parents. When Y Ft < Y
M
t and ηt = 0, the
reverse occurs and the mother provides (2− ηt)Y Mt τMt .6 When ηt = 2 or ηt = 0 ∀ t,
the d
2U
dτF1 dτ
M
1
= 0. The consumption for t ∈ {1, 2} is respectively:
cF1 + c
M
1 = Y
F
1 (1− 2τF1 ) + Y M1 or cF1 + cM1 = Y F1 + Y M1 (1− 2τM1 ),
and
c2 = 2Y
F
2 T F (2τF1 )φn or c2 = 2Y M2 T M(2τM1 )(1− φ)n,
depending on the value of ηt.
In this model, the FOCs and SOCs are different under different circumstances. In
the extreme cases, I need to assume u(c) is as a CRRA function form if c > 0 and
u(0) = 0.7 The detailed equations and signs for the FOCs and the SOCs under all the
assumptions in two extreme cases in terms of the economic circumstances in the house
are:
6The generalised case for this assumption is discussed in Section 2.4.1.
7The specification of the utility function can be relaxed to the log or the CRRA function in the
next section.
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1. When Y Ft ≥ Y Mt ∀ t, then ηt = 2 ∀ t, while cF1 = Y F1 (1− 2τF1 ) + Y M1 − cM1
and c2 = 2Y
F
2 τ
F
2 φn, then the FOC and the SOCs are:
dU
dτF1
= −(ρ1)u′(cF1 )2Y F1 + δρ1u′(eF1 )2Y F1
+ βu′(c2)2Y F2 τ
F ′φn = 0;
d2U
dτF21
= ρ1u
′′(Y F1 (1− 2τF1 ))4Y F21 + ρ1δ4Y F21 u′′(Y F1 τF1 )
+ βu′(c2)2Y F2 τ
F ′′
2 φn+ βu
′′(c2)(2Y F2 τ
F ′
2 φn)
2 < 0;
d2U
dτF1 dφ
= βu′(c2)2Y F2 τ
F ′
2 n+ βu
′′(c2)(2Y F2 n)
2τF
′
2 τ
F
2 φ > 0.
2. When Y Ft < Y
M
t ∀ t, then ηt = 0 ∀ t, while cM1 = Y F1 + Y M1 (1− 2τM1 )− cF1
and c2 = 2Y
M
2 τ
M
2 (1− φ)n, then the FOC and the SOCs are:
dU
dτM1
= −(1− ρ1)u′(cM1 )2Y M1 + δ(1− ρ1)u′(eM1 )2Y M1
+ βu′(c2)2Y M2 τ
M ′(1− φ)n = 0;
d2U
dτM21
= (1− ρ1)u′′(Y M1 (1− 2τM1 ))4Y M21 + (1− ρ1)δ4Y M21 u′′(Y M1 τM1 )
+ βu′(c2)2Y M2 τ
M ′′
2 (1− φ)n+ βu′′(c2)(2Y M2 τM
′
2 (1− φ)n)2 < 0;
d2U
dτM1 dφ
= −βu′(c2)2Y M2 τM
′
2 n− βu′′(c2)(2Y M2 n)2τM
′
2 τ
M
2 (1− φ) < 0.
Again U11 = d
2U
dτF∗21
, U13 = d
2U
dτF∗1 dφ
, U22 = d
2U
dτM∗21
, and U23 = d
2U
dτM∗1 dφ
, which are the
SOCs when τF and τM equal their optimal value derived from the FOCs. The key
comparative statics I want to prove in this setting are different depending on the value
of ηt. Again, there are two different cases:
1. When Y F ≥ Y M and ηt = 2 for all t, then the father in the household provides
old-age support to his parents and the mother does not. I would expect
dτF∗1
dφ
> 0;
dτM∗1
dφ
= 0.
2. When Y F < Y M and ηt = 0 for all t, then the mother in the household provides
old-age support to her parents and the father does not. Then the comparative
statics are
dτF∗1
dφ
= 0;
dτM∗1
dφ
< 0.
The derivation of these comparative statics in the different economic circumstances of
the household are shown as follows, based on all the previous assumptions, and also
on the assumption u(0) = 0:
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1. If Y Ft ≥ Y Mt and ηt = 2. τF∗1 is the optimal solution of τF1 from U1 = 0. The
total differentiation of U1 = 0 is
U11dτF∗1 + U
13dφ = 0.
Given the conditions U11 < 0 and U13 > 0, the conclusion from these conditions
is:
dτF∗1
dφ
= −U
13
U11
> 0.
In this case, the gender ratio of the generation K, φ, does not affect the mother’s
transfers to her parents, so
dτM∗1
dφ
= 0.
2. If Y Ft < Y
M
t and ηt = 0 for all t, τ
M∗
1 is the optimal solution of τ
M
1 from U
2 = 0.
The total differentiation of U2 = 0 is:
U22dτM∗1 + U
23dφ = 0;
so,
dτM∗1
dφ
= −U
23
U22
.
Given the conditions U22 < 0 and U23 < 0, as in the case when Y Ft < Y
M
t and
ηt = 0 for all t, the comparative statics from these conditions are:
dτF∗1
dφ
= 0;
dτM∗1
dφ
< 0.
From the derivations from these two cases, Proposition 2 can be established as follows:
Proposition 2: In the model with CRRA utility functions, with all the assumptions
stated,
1. when Y Ft ≥ Y Mt and ηt = 2 for all t, dτ
F∗
1
dφ
> 0 and
dτM∗1
dφ
= 0,
2. when Y Ft < Y
M
t and ηt = 0 for all t,
dτF∗1
dφ
= 0 and
dτM∗1
dφ
< 0.
The two simple parameters representing the collective-household assumption in this
model are: ρt and ηt. As stated in the results, the parameter ρt does not affect the
results during the process of deriving the signs of
dτF∗1
dφ
and
dτM∗1
dφ
. This parameter does
not represent the process of bargaining in terms of old-age support provided by the
father or the mother. It simply represents the different weightings attached to different
members of the households as a result of household bargaining. ηt is the key component
that is linked to the old-age support provided by P and the income of P , which affect
the signs of the key comparative statics.
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The interpretation of Proposition 2 from the intra-household bargaining model is as
follows: when the father in a household has a higher bargaining power than the mother,
he provides more old-age support to his own parents if he has more sons. When the
mother has a higher bargaining power than the father, she provides more with more
daughters in her family. Different bargaining powers possessed by fathers and mothers
lead to different demonstration effects from these fathers and mothers. Again, the key
assumption is that φ is exogenous.
2.4.1 Relaxed intra-household resource allocation condition
In the basic intra-household bargaining model, I analyse only the extreme cases when
ηt = 2 or ηt = 0, depending on the value of Y
F
t and Y
M
t . ηt is the parameter that
indicates the results of the intra-household resource allocation. The father provides
Y Ft (ηtτ
F
t ) to his parents after the intra-household bargaining, and the mother provides
Y Mt ((2−ηt)τMt ). When ηt = 2 or ηt = 0, the extreme cases are that either the father or
the mother with lower income does not provide any transfer to his or her own parents. I
relax this assumption in this section, and assume that the party with the lower income
in a household provides a smaller proportion of his/her income to his/her own parents.
The party with a higher income provides a larger proportion. The proportion can be
again represented by ηt defined in this intra-household bargaining model.
ηt = H( Y
F
t
Y Mt
) for t ∈ {1, 2}.
H( Y Ft
YMt
) is an increasing function in
Y Ft
YMt
, and 0 ≤ ηt ≤ 2. When Y Ft = Y Mt , then ηt = 1.
For simplicity, in this subsection, I assume again the same-gender demonstration effect,
which means that τF2 = T F (η1τF1 ) and τM2 = T M((2− η1)τM1 ). The new maximisation
problem for a household in generation P is:
max
τF1 ,τ
M
1
U = ρ1u(c
F
1 ) + (1− ρ1)u(cM1 ) + δρ1u(eF1 )
+ δ(1− ρ1)u(eM1 ) + βu(c2);
(2.13)
s.t.
cF1 + c
M
1 + c2 ≤ Y F1 (1− η1τF1 ) + Y M1 (1− (2− η1)τM1 )
+ Y F2 η2T F (η1τF1 )φn+ Y M2 (2− η2)T M((2− η1)τM1 )(1− φ)n;
eF1 = η1Y
F
1 τ
F
1 ;
eM1 = (2− η1)Y M1 τM1 .
For this optimisation problem, it would be interesting to have a counterpart to Propo-
sition 1 in Section 2.3 to hold. I may conjecture that such a counterpart would again
show that the percentage of the father’s income for old-age support transfer (τF∗1 ) in-
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creases, and the corresponding percentage for the mother’s transfer (τM∗1 ) decreases
with the increasing male-to-female gender ratio of the children (φ) in the household.
In addition, under the intra-household allocation assumption, it might seem reasonable
to find that the effect of the gender ratio in the household is greater on τF∗1 than τ
M∗
1
if the father’s earning is greater than the mother’s. Likewise, if the father earns less
than the mother, I might expect to find that the effect of the gender ratio is greater
on τM∗1 than τ
F∗
1 . These thoughts can be summarised in the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1: u(·) is specified as a log or a CRRA function.
1. When Y F1 ≥ Y M1 for all t, |dτ
F∗
1
dφ
|> |dτM∗1
dφ
|.
2. When Y F1 < Y
M
1 for all t, |dτ
F∗
1
dφ
|< |dτM∗1
dφ
|.
First let me examine the counterpart to Proposition 1, which would mean that the
comparative statics in this model with the relaxed intra-household resources allocation
assumption needs to be:
dτF∗1
dφ
> 0;
dτM∗1
dφ
< 0.
From the optimisation problem in Equation (2.13), the FOCs for τF1 and τ
M
1 are:
U1 =
dU
dτF1
= ρ1η1u
′(cF1 )(−Y F1 ) + ρ1η1δY F1 u′(eF1 ) + βu′(c2)η2Y F2 τF
′
2 φn = 0,
U2 =
dU
dτM1
= (1− ρ1)(2− η1)u′(cM1 )(−Y M1 ) + (1− ρ1)(2− η1)×
δY M1 u
′(eM1 ) + βu
′(c2)(2− η2)(1− φ)Y M2 τM
′
2 n = 0;
(2.14)
and
c2 = η2Y
F
2 τ
F
2 φn+ (2− η2)Y M2 τM2 (1− φ)n.
Again, τF∗1 and τ
M∗
1 is the optimal solution of τ
F
1 and τ
M
1 from Equation (2.14). The
corresponding SOCs are:8
d2U
dτF21
= ρ1η
2
1u
′′(cF1 )Y
F2
1 + ρ1η
2
1δY
F2
1 u
′′(eF1 )
+ βu′(c2)η2Y F2 τ
F ′′
2 φn+ βu
′′(c2)(η2Y F2 τ
F ′
2 φn)
2 < 0;
d2U
dτM21
= (1− ρ1)(2− η1)2u′′(cM1 )Y M21 + (1− ρ1)(2− η1)21δY M21 u′′(eM1 )
+ βu′(c2)(2− η2)Y M2 τM
′′
2 (1− φ)n+ βu′′(c2)((2− η2)Y M2 τM
′
2 (1− φ)n)2 < 0;
d2U
dτF1 dτ
M
1
= βu′′(c2)η2(2− η2)φ(1− φ)Y M2 τM
′
2 Y
F
2 τ
F ′
2 n
2 < 0;
8The function for d
2U
dτF1 dτ
M
1
is valid only when cF1 = Y
F
1 (1− η1τF1 ) and cM1 = YM1 (1− (2− η1)τF1 ).
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d2U
dτM1 dφ
= −βu′(c2)(2− η2)Y M2 τM
′
2 n
+ βu′′(c2)(2− η2)Y M2 τM
′
2 (1− φ)n2(η2Y F2 τF2 − (2− η2)Y M2 τM2 ) < 0;
d2U
dτF1 dφ
= βu′(c2)η2Y F2 τ
F ′
2 n+ βu
′′(c2)η2Y F2 τ
F ′
2 φn
2(η2Y
F
2 τ
F
2 − (1− η2)Y M2 τM2 ).
(2.15)
Again, the U ijs are the SOCs listed above when τF1 and τ
M
1 at their optimal values,
9
where
U11 =
d2U
dτF∗21
; U13 =
d2U
dτF∗1 dφ
; U22 =
d2U
dτM∗21
; U23 =
d2U
dτM∗1 dφ
; U12/21 =
d2U
dτF∗1 dτ
M∗
1
.
For U11, U12, U22, and U23, the signs are always negative according to the SOCs in
Equation (2.15). But the sign of U13 is not determined. If u(·) is specified as a log or a
CRRA function, then U13 > 0. The comparative statics from the total differentiation
equations of FOCs in Equation (2.14) are:
dτF∗1
dφ
=
U12U23 − U13U22
U11U22 − U12U21 ;
dτM∗1
dφ
=
U11U23 − U13U21
U12U21 − U11U22 . (2.16)
From the SOCs in Equation (2.15), I can infer
|U11| > |U12| and |U22| > |U12|,
if u(·) is specified as a log or a CRRA function. So the signs for the denominators and
numerators in Equation (2.16) are as follows:
U12U23 − U13U22 > 0;
U11U23 − U13U21 > 0;
U11U22 − U12U21 > 0.
Under these conditions, the key comparative statics are
dτF∗1
dφ
> 0;
dτM∗1
dφ
< 0,
thus the counterpart to Proposition 1 holds in the model with the relaxed intra-
household resource allocation condition.
To examine the validity of Conjecture 1, I need to consider two cases corresponding
to different economic circumstances in the family. The first case, as stated in Conjecture
1, is that when Y Ft > Y
M
t for t ∈ {1, 2}
|dτ
F∗
1
dφ
|> |dτ
M∗
1
dφ
|.
9i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
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From Equation (2.16), I infer
|dτ
F∗
1
dφ
|> |dτ
M∗
1
dφ
| if U12U23 − U13U22 > U11U23 − U13U21,
and
U12U23 − U13U22 > U11U23 − U13U21
if U23(U12 − U11) + U13(U21 − U22) > 0;
When Y Ft > Y
M
t for t ∈ {1, 2}, then from the function of SOCs in Equation (2.15), I
infer:
U12 − U11 > U21 − U22 > 0.
Given the function of U13 and U23 in Equation (2.15), the absolute value of U13 and
U23 have to be analysed under different conditions.
1. When τM∗2 τ
F∗′
2 < τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2 , then |U23|> |U13|. Under this condition, together
with U12 − U11 > U21 − U22 > 0, I conclude
U12U23 − U13U22 < U11U23 − U13U21 ⇒ |dτ
F∗
1
dφ
|< |dτ
M∗
1
dφ
|
2. When τM∗2 τ
F∗′
2 > τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2 , then |U13|> |U23|. But 0 < U21 − U22 < U12 − U11
when Y Ft > Y
M
t for t ∈ {1, 2}. It is difficult to draw any conclusion about
whether the inequation U12U23−U13U22 > U11U23−U13U21 is valid. In another
word, I cannot draw any conclusion on the relationship between |dτF∗1
dφ
| and |dτM∗1
dφ
|.
To conclude, when Y Ft > Y
M
t for t ∈ {1, 2}, I cannot prove the first case in Conjecture
1 is true.
The second case stated in Conjecture 1 is that when Y Ft < Y
M
t for t ∈ {1, 2},
|dτ
F∗
1
dφ
|< |dτ
M∗
1
dφ
|.
From Equation (2.16), I infer
|dτ
F∗
1
dφ
|< |dτ
M∗
1
dφ
| if U23(U12 − U11) + U13(U21 − U22) < 0.
When Y Ft < Y
M
t for t ∈ {1, 2} and analysing the function of SOCs in Equation (2.15),
U21 − U22 > U12 − U11 > 0.
Given the function of U13 and U23 in Equation (2.15), the absolute value of U13 and
U23 have to be analysed under different conditions.
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1. When τM∗2 τ
F∗′
2 > τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2 , then |U13|> |U23|. Under this condition, together
with U21 − U22 > U12 − U11 > 0, I conclude
U12U23 − U13U22 > U11U23 − U13U21 ⇒ |dτ
F∗
1
dφ
|> |dτ
M∗
1
dφ
|.
2. When τM∗2 τ
F∗′
2 < τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2 , then |U13|< |U23|. But U21 − U22 > U12 − U11 > 0
when Y Ft < Y
M
t for t ∈ {1, 2}. It is difficult to draw any conclusion about
whether the inequation U12U23−U13U22 < U11U23−U13U21 is valid. In another
word, I cannot draw any conclusion on the relationship between |dτF∗1
dφ
| and |dτM∗1
dφ
|.
When Y Ft < Y
M
t for t ∈ {1, 2}, I cannot prove that the second case in Conjecture 1
holds.
One possible explanation why neither case in Conjecture 1 hold lies in the property
of diminishing marginal utility. Take the scenario under Y Ft > Y
M
t when t ∈ {1, 2}
for example. The fathers earn more and the mothers earn less. For this reason, the
magnitude of the same-gender demonstration effect can be smaller for the fraction
of the fathers’ income provided (τF∗1 ) and greater for the mothers’ (τ
M∗
1 ) to obtain
the same amount of transfers from the next generation. So rather than trying to prove
whether the effects of φ on the fraction of the income used for providing old-age support
(τF∗1 or τ
M∗
1 ) is greater for the individual who earns more in his or her household, it
is more reasonable to show the effects of φ on the actual amount of old-age support
(η1Y
F
1 τ
F∗
1 or (2− η1)Y M1 τM∗1 ) is larger for the individual who earns more in his or her
household. As explained in the analysis for Conjecture 1,
1. When Y Ft > Y
M
t for t ∈ {1, 2} and τM∗2 τF∗′2 > τF∗2 τM∗′2 , then |U13|> |U23| and
U12 − U11 > U21 − U22 > 0. It is difficult to draw any conclusion about whether
the inequation U12U23 − U13U22 > U11U23 − U13U21 is valid. But if Y Ft  Y Mt ,
then
η1Y
F∗
1 (U
12U23 − U13U22) > (2− η1)Y M∗1 (U11U23 − U13U21),
so |dη1Y
F∗
1 τ
F∗
1
dφ
|> |d(2− η1)Y
M∗
1 τ
M∗
1
dφ
|.
2. When Y Ft < Y
M
t for t ∈ {1, 2} and τM∗2 τF∗′2 < τF∗2 τM∗′2 , then |U13|< |U23| and
U21 − U22 > U12 − U11 > 0. It is difficult to draw any conclusion about whether
the inequation U12U23 − U13U22 < U11U23 − U13U21 is valid. But if Y Mt  Y Ft ,
then
η1Y
F∗
1 (U
12U23 − U13U22) < (2− η1)Y M∗1 (U11U23 − U13U21),
so |dη1Y
F∗
1 τ
F∗
1
dφ
|< |d(2− η1)Y
M∗
1 τ
M∗
1
dφ
|.
Summarising the analyses above, I obtain another proposition for the optimisation
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problem in Equation (2.13):
Proposition 3: u(·) is specified as a log or a CRRA function.
1. When Y Ft > Y
M
t for all t, τ
M∗
2 τ
F∗′
2 > τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2 and the difference between Y
F
1 and
Y M1 is large enough, then
|dη1Y
F
1 τ
F∗
1
dφ
|> |d(2− η1)Y
M
1 τ
M∗
1
dφ
|.
2. When Y Ft < Y
M
t for all t, τ
M∗
2 τ
F∗′
2 < τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2 and the difference between Y
F
1 and
Y M1 is large enough,
|dη1Y
F
1 τ
F∗
1
dφ
|< |d(2− η1)Y
M
1 τ
M∗
1
dφ
|.
When fitting the model to the data, the difference between Y Ft and Y
M
t is quite
large, especially in rural areas in China. η1 and (2− η1) always amplify the difference
between Y Ft and Y
M
t accordingly. The conditions in Proposition 3 are not extreme in
situations in China, especially those for the first case in Proposition 3. It shows that the
effects of φ on the total amount of old-age support by the father are greater than the
old-age support provided by the mother if the father earns more in his household. When
the mother earns more than the father, the effect of the gender ratio of the children
on the amount of old-age support provided by her in the household is considerable. It
also means that the mother demonstrates more to her children if she earns more and
the male-to-female gender ratio is low in her household. The father demonstrates more
if he earns more and the gender ratio is high. The implications from Proposition 3 fit
the empirical results in Chapter 1.
2.5 Combined model
In the previous setting, I show for different models under various relaxed assumptions
that the individuals in generation P provide more old-age support if there are more
same-gender children in their household. In this section, I combine all the relaxed
assumptions in the model and try to reach a similar conclusion. The first relaxed
assumption is that the transfer from generation K is affected by both parents. The
second relaxed assumption is that the party that earns less in the household provides
a smaller proportion of her/his income to her/his parents. Under these two relaxed
assumptions and the basic bargaining model, the new optimisation problem is:
max
τF1 ,τ
M
1
U = ρ1u(c
F
1 ) + (1− ρ1)u(cM1 ) + δρ1u(eF1 )
+ δ(1− ρ1)u(eM1 ) + βu(c2);
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s.t.
cF1 + c
M
1 + c2 ≤ Y F1 (1− η1τF1 ) + Y M1 (1− (2− η1)τM1 )
+ Y F2 η2T F (τF1 , τM1 )φn+ Y M2 (2− η2)T M(τF1 , τM1 )(1− φ)n;
eF1 = η1Y
F
1 τ
F
1 ;
eM1 = (2− η1)Y M1 τM1 .
In this combined model, I want to show that the counterparts to Proposition 1 and
Proposition 3 hold. The counterpart to Proposition 1 would show that τF∗1 increases
and τM∗1 decreases with the increasing male-to-female gender ratio of the children, φ,
in the households. The counterpart to Proposition 3 is that, depending on different
household-level economic circumstances, the effect of φ is larger on the amount of old-
age support provided by the individual who earns more in the household to his or her
parents. In this section, I first examine the counterpart to Proposition 1 and then
check the validity of the Proposition 3 counterpart.
Both proofs for the counterparts to Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 needs the
functions of FOCs for τF1 and τ
M
1 . The FOCs from the optimisation problem are:
U1 =
dU
dτF1
= ρ1η1u
′(cF1 )(−Y F1 ) + ρ1η1δY F1 u′(eF1 )
+ βu′(c2)(η2Y F2 τ
F ′
2,τF1
φn+ (2− η2)Y M2 τM
′
2,τF1
(1− φ)n) = 0;
U2 =
dU
dτM1
= (1− ρ1)(2− η1)u′(cM1 )(−Y M1 ) + (1− ρ1)(2− η1)
δY M1 u
′(eM1 ) + βu
′(c2)(η2Y F2 τ
F ′
2,τM1
φn+ (2− η2)Y M2 τM
′
2,τM1
(1− φ)n) = 0.
(2.17)
and
c2 = η2Y
F
2 τ
F
2 φn+ (2− η2)Y M2 τM2 (1− φ)n).
The corresponding SOCs are:10
d2U
dτF21
= ρ1η
2
1u
′′(cF1 )Y
F2
1 + ρ1η
2
1δY
F2
1 u
′′(eF1 )
+ βu′(c2)(η2Y F2 τ
F ′′
2,τF1
φn+ (2− η2)Y M2 τM
′′
2,τF1
(1− φ)n)
+ βu′′(c2)(η2Y F2 τ
F ′
2,τF1
φn+ (2− η2)Y M2 τM
′
2,τF1
(1− φ)n)2 < 0;
d2U
dτM21
= (1− ρ1)(2− η1)2u′′(cM1 )Y M21 + (1− ρ1)(2− η1)21δY M21 u′′(eM1 )
+ βu′((c2)(η2Y F2 τ
F ′′
2,τM1
φn+ (2− η2)Y M2 τM
′′
2,τM1
(1− φ)n)
+ βu′′(c2)(η2Y F2 τ
F ′
2,τM1
φn+ (2− η2)Y M2 τM
′
2,τM1
(1− φ)n)2 < 0;
10The equation for d
2U
dτF1 dτ
M
1
is valid only when cF1 = Y
F
1 (1− η1τF1 ) and cM1 = YM1 (1− (2− η1)τF1 .)
84
d2U
dτF1 dτ
M
1
= βu′′(c2)(η2Y F2 τ
F ′
2,τF1
φn+ (2− η2)Y M2 τM
′
2,τF1
(1− φ)n)
× (η2Y F2 τF
′
2,τM1
φn+ (2− η2)Y M2 τM
′
2,τM1
(1− φ)n)
+ βu′(c2(η2Y F2 τ
F ′′
2,τF1 ,τ
M
1
φn+ (2− η2)Y M2 τM
′′
2,τF1 ,τ
M
1
(1− φ)n) < 0;
d2U
dτF1 dφ
= βu′(c2)(η2Y F2 τ
F ′
2,τF1
n− (2− η2)Y M2 τM
′
2,τF1
n)
+ βu′′(c2)(η2Y F2 τ
F
2 n− (2− η2)Y M2 τM2 n)
× (η2Y F2 τF
′
2,τF1
φn+ (2− η2)Y M2 τM
′
2,τF1
(1− φ)n);
d2U
dτM1 dφ
= βu′(c2)(η2Y F2 τ
F ′
2,τM1
n− (2− η2)Y M2 τM
′
2,τM1
n)
+ βu′′(c2)(η2Y F2 τ
F
2 n− (2− η2)Y M2 τM2 n)
× (η2Y F2 τF
′
2,τM1
φn+ (2− η2)Y M2 τM
′
2,τM1
(1− φ)n);
(2.18)
Similar to the proof in the Section 2.3.1, τF∗1 and τ
M∗
1 is the optimal solution of τ
F
1
and τM1 from Equation (2.17). The U
ijs are the SOCs listed above when τF1 and τ
M
1
at their optimal values,11 where
U11 =
d2U
dτF∗21
; U13 =
d2U
dτF∗1 dφ
; U22 =
d2U
dτM∗21
; U23 =
d2U
dτM∗1 dφ
; U12/21 =
d2U
dτF∗1 dτ
M∗
1
.
For U11, U12, and U12/21, the signs are always negative according to the SOCs in
Equation (2.18). But the sign of U13 and U23 are not determined. From the functions
of SOCs in Equation (2.18), if u(·) is specified as a log or a CRRA function, then under
two different sets of conditions:
1. τF∗2 < τ
M∗
2 and τ
F∗′
2,τM∗1
τM∗2 < τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2,τM∗1 ∗
; or,
2. τF∗2 > τ
M∗
2 and τ
F∗′
2,τF∗1
τM∗2 > τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2,τF∗1
.
I obtain U13 > 0 and U23 < 0. The summary of the signs for U ij is:
U11 < 0; U22 < 0; U12/21 < 0; U13 > 0; U23 < 0.
The comparative statics from the total differentiation equations of the FOCs in
Equation (2.17) are:
dτF∗1
dφ
=
U12U23 − U13U22
U11U22 − U12U21 ;
dτM∗1
dφ
=
U11U23 − U13U21
U12U21 − U11U22 . (2.19)
From the SOCs in Equation (2.18), I can infer that |U11| > |U12| and |U22| > |U12|, so:
11i = {1, 2} and j = {1, 2, 3}.
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U12U23 − U13U22 > 0;
U11U23 − U13U21 > 0;
U11U22 − U12U21 > 0.
Under these conditions, the counterpart to Proposition 1 is proved in the combined
model, which means that the signs for the key comparative statics from this model are:
dτF∗1
dφ
> 0;
dτM∗1
dφ
< 0.
For the examination for the counterpart to Proposition 3, I would like to show that
the effect of φ on the total amount of old-age support by the father (|dη1Y Ft τF∗1
dφ
|) are
larger than the effect on the old-age support provided by the mother (|d(2−η1)YMt τM∗1
dφ
|) if
the father earns more in his household. When the mother earns more than the father,
the effect of the gender ratio of the children on the amount of old-age support provided
by her in the households is more considerable than the old-age support provision by
the father. There are two cases corresponding to the different economic circumstances
in the household, as discussed in Section 2.4.1.
The first case is when Y Ft > Y
M
t for t ∈ {1, 2}. In this case, I want to show
|dη1Y
F
t τ
F∗
1
dφ
|> |d(2− η1)Y
M
t τ
M∗
1
dφ
|.
From Equation (2.19), I infer that
|dη1Y
F
t τ
F∗
1
dφ
|> |d(2− η1)Y
M
t τ
M∗
1
dφ
| if η1Y F1 (U12U23−U13U22) > (2−η1)Y M1 (U11U23−U13U21).
If I rearrange this condition, then the condition is:
U23U12(η1Y
F
1 − (2− η1)Y M1
U11
U12
) + U13U12((2− η1)Y M1 − η1Y F1
U22
U12
) > 0,
if U13 > 0 and U23 < 0,12 then this condition holds if
Y F1
Y M1
>
(2− η1)U11
η1U12
and
Y F1
Y M1
>
(2− η1)U12
η1U22
.
12The sign for U13 and U23 when u(·) is specified as a log or a CRRA function, and under two
different sets of conditions, are:
1. τF∗2 > τ
M∗
2 and τ
F∗′
2,τF∗1
τM∗2 > τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2,τF∗1
or,
2. τF∗2 < τ
M∗
2 and τ
F∗′
2,τM∗1
τM∗2 < τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2,τM∗1 ∗.
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From the functions in Equation (2.18), I get 0 < U
12
U22
< 1 and U
11
U12
> 1, so when
Y F1 > Y
M
1 for t ∈ {1, 2},
|dη1Y
F
1 τ
F∗
1
dφ
|> |d(2− η1)Y
M
1 τ
M∗
1
dφ
| if Y
F
1
Y M1
>
(2− η1)U11
η1U12
.
The second case is when Y Ft < Y
M
t for t ∈ {1, 2}. In this case, I expect
|dη1Y
F
1 τ
F∗
1
dφ
|< |d(2− η1)Y
M
1 τ
M∗
1
dφ
|.
From Equation (2.19), I infer that
|dη1Y
F
1 τ
F∗
1
dφ
|< |d(2− η1)Y
M
1 τ
M∗
1
dφ
| if η1Y F1 (U12U23−U13U22) < (2−η1)Y M1 (U11U23−U13U21).
Keeping U13 > 0 and U23 < 0, I rephrase this condition as
|dη1Y
F
1 τ
F∗
1
dφ
|< |d(2− η1)Y
M
1 τ
M∗
1
dφ
| if Y
M
1
Y F1
>
η1U
22
(2− η1)U12 .
The conditions required under different cases for |dY F1 τF∗1
dφ
|> |dYM1 τM∗1
dφ
| or |dY F1 τF∗1
dφ
|<
|dYM1 τM∗1
dφ
| to hold are different and more specific in the combined model than the con-
ditions in Proposition 3. The new proposition for the combined model is:
Proposition 4: When u(·) is specified as a log or a CRRA function, and under
two different sets of conditions:
1. τF∗2 > τ
M∗
2 and τ
F∗′
2,τF∗1
τM∗2 > τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2,τF∗1
; or,
2. τF∗2 < τ
M∗
2 and τ
F∗′
2,τM∗1
τM∗2 < τ
F∗
2 τ
M∗′
2,τM∗1 ∗
,
then I obtain the following statements:
When Y Ft > Y
M
t for t ∈ {1, 2} and
Y F1
Y M1
>
(2− η1)U11
η1U12
⇒ |dη1Y
F
1 τ
F∗
1
dφ
|> |d(2− η1)Y
M
1 τ
M∗
1
dφ
|.
When Y Ft < Y
M
t for t ∈ {1, 2} and
Y F1
Y M1
>
(2− η1)U12
η1U22
⇒ |dη1Y
F
1 τ
F∗
1
dφ
|< |d(2− η1)Y
M
1 τ
M∗
1
dφ
|.
The interpretations of Proposition 4 are still similar to the ones in Proposition 3.
The mother demonstrates more to her children or provide more old-age support if she
earns more and the male-to-female gender ratio is low in her household. The father
demonstrates more if he earns more and the male-to-female gender ratio is high. The
implications from Proposition 4 fit the empirical results in Chapter 1.
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2.6 Conclusions
This chapter discusses a simple model of old-age support provision based on the same-
gender social norm transmission. I include the male-female gender ratio of the third
generation, K, in the model and test the effect of the gender ratio of K on the old-age
support provided by their parents. The key assumption in the model is that parents
are more likely to influence their same-gender children in terms of old-age support
provision behaviours. The model shows that the father in a household increases the
old-age support that he provides to his own parents if the male-to-female gender ratio
of his children increases, fixing the number of children. For mothers, their provision
of old-age support decreases with the gender ratio of their children. In general, the
conclusion holds in the model of relaxed assumptions under certain conditions. The
model regards the motive for receiving more old-age support from the next generation
as a possible explanation for the provision of old-age support by individuals. Passing
on the norm of providing old-age support is a way of ensuring that the people who
provide old-age support can receive more support from their children when the time
comes.
However, the models in this chapter do not include all the aspects related to inter-
actions within families. My analysis does not include the social enforcement of forming
the norm of providing old-age support and does not include different cost when rais-
ing sons or daughters in households. These factors would also have the possibility of
affecting people’s old-age support provision behaviours. Moreover, no dynamic setting
is included in the model. If we want to understand the transmission of the social norm
through different generations, a dynamic setting or an OLG model would be a more
suitable setting. Yet, the comparative statics and the propositions from the model
generally reflect the empirical evidence provided in Chapter 1. Also, in the model, I
assume Y Ft > Y
M
t or Y
M
t > Y
F
t for all t. It would be interesting to show in the model
how the norm changes if the relationship between Y Ft and Y
M
t varies over time, like
what I presented empirically in the later sections in Chapter 1.
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Figure 2.1: Simple graphical illustration of the basic model
son of Mr. & Mrs. Wang
Mr. Wang Mrs. Wang
Mr. Wang’s parents Mrs. Wang’s parents
old-age support old-age support
household-level decision
DemonstrateDemonstrate
old-age support in the future
daughter of Mr. & Mrs. Wang
Mr. Wang Mrs. Wang
Mr. Wang’s parents Mrs. Wang’s parents
old-age support old-age support
household-level decision
DemonstrateDemonstrate
old-age support in the future
Note: This graphic illustration is for a simple scenario of the baseline model. I assume in this
graph that each household has one child only. Mr. and Mrs. Wang have different degrees
of influence on their child depending on its gender. The solid curve line represents a larger
influence compared to the dashed curve line. Also, the dashed lines from Mr.or Mrs. Wang
to their respective parents indicate Mr.or Mrs. Wang provide less old-age support than their
partner in the household.
2.7 Figures
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Chapter 3
Locked out? China’s New
Cooperative Medical Scheme and
Rural Labour Migration
Providing health insurance with certain geographical restrictions may lead to possi-
ble misallocations in the labour market by hindering migration. This chapter tests
whether the new rural health insurance introduced in 2003, the New Cooperative Med-
ical Scheme (NCMS), had unintended and negative effects on rural-to-urban migration
mobility in China. The NCMS only offers health insurance to people with rural house-
hold registration, and rural residents can only benefit from the NCMS if they visit the
hospitals near their registered location in the household registration system. Utilising
a new dataset collected from provincial yearbooks in China, the results of the event-
study approach show that the NCMS does not reduce the percentage of rural residents
who are rural-to-urban migrants and working outside their home counties at the county
level but does have negative effects on its growth rate. Using the China Health and
Nutrition Survey (CHNS), my instrumental variable results find that being enrolled in
the NCMS decreases the probability of being a migrant at the individual level. The
IV is a time-variant dummy indicating the counties that have relative early NCMS
implementations. In addition, I use the CHNS to construct a county-level dataset and
replicate the county-level results. Together, the results suggest that the NCMS grad-
ually locks the rural labour force into rural areas and further hinders geographical job
mobility in China.
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3.1 Introduction
Providing basic health care services to every citizen is one of the important responsibili-
ties of the central government in China (Wang, 2009). In 2003, the central government
initiated a new rural health insurance scheme to replace the old policy, which was
largely ineffective, to cover the health needs of the rural population. This scheme,
the New Co-operative Medical Scheme (NCMS), provides coverage for catastrophic ill-
nesses among those within the rural population and aims to prevent “poverty caused
by illness”.1 However, the policy has a major geographical restriction on the reim-
bursement rate for medical expenses. The reimbursement rates for medical expenses
vary depending on the administrative regions of the hospitals visited. Rural residents
are eligible for high reimbursement rates only when they visit hospitals in the same
administrative regions as their residence place registered in the household registration
system in China.2
How might this policy restriction on health insurance distort the migrant labour
market in China? This chapter finds that the implementation of the NCMS has a
negative effect on the number of rural residents who are rural-to-urban migrants and
work in urban areas away from their hometowns. However, from a first glance at the
general statistics, the trend seems to be the opposite. During the implementation
period of the NCMS from 2003 to 2008, the number of migrants increased dramatically
due to China’s rapid urbanisation process and increasing income differences between
rural and urban areas. The great temptation to work in urban areas might alleviate
the proposed negative effects of the NCMS. Despite the rapid economic development of
urban areas in China before 2008, the social security system for rural-to-urban migrants
is greatly underdeveloped. More than 70% of migrants were still not enrolled in health
or work injury insurance within employment-based health insurance in the urban areas
in 2012 (NBS, 2012; Giles et al., 2013). Rural-to-urban migrants are particularly
vulnerable to health problems that might hinder their earning ability (Barber and
Yao, 2010). Providing health insurance in rural areas fulfils rural-to-urban migrants’
need for the social safety net. But the geographical restriction brought by the health
insurance might potentially encourage these migrants to stay close to their hometown,
which is usually their residence place in the household registration system, to benefit
from high reimbursement rates.
This chapter studies the unintended consequences of the implementation of the
NCMS on the rural-to-urban migrant labour market in China. Similar effects of health
insurance schemes on labour market distortions have been noted in the U.S. context
at the individual level. Gruber and Madrian (1993) discuss the “job-lock” effect of
employer-sponsored health insurance portability; other papers examine the effects of
1Source for NCMS information: http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2002/content 61818.htm
(Content in Chinese), the State Council of the P.R.C.
2The system of household registration includes information such as whether the person is a rural
or urban resident, birthplace, age, gender and other basic personal information (Chan, 2009).
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health insurance, especially Medicare, on retirement decisions (Gruber and Madrian
1995; Fairlie et al., 2016). Results from the U.S. show that health insurance affects
job-related decisions at the individual level. However, none of the studies in the U.S.
investigates the effect of health insurance on geographical job mobility. This chapter
also contributes to the literature on welfare-induced migration. Borjas (1999) found
that immigrant welfare recipients are more likely to end up in high-benefit states in the
U.S. Others have also contributed to the literature by providing empirical evidence for
similar conclusions (Blank, 1988; Gelbach, 2004; McKinnish, 2005; McKinnish, 2007;
Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009), but mostly in developed countries. Munshi and Rosen-
zweig (2016) conducted a study on migration in India; their structural model estimates
whether the improvement of formal insurance on migrations, such as government safety
nets and private credit will double the migration rate. However, whether health in-
surance schemes have similar effects on the labour markets in developing countries,
especially in China, is still an under-studied topic in the literature. To date, there has
been almost no discussion of possible labour-market distortions caused by the NCMS
in China. Qin and Zheng (2011) mentioned this issue, but the results are limited to
an individual-level dataset with a restricted period and an identification strategy that
not fully identify possible individual endogeneities. My chapter provides both robust
individual and county-level evidence with clearer identification strategies and longer
time-span to fill the missing empirical evidence in the literature, with the new datasets
collected from various statistical yearbooks and newspapers.
I provide new county-level evidence of the effects of the implementation of the
NCMS on the rural-to-urban migration labour market. By collecting raw data of
the rural-to-urban migrants for each county for 13 years from five provincial statistical
yearbooks and the county implementation date of the NCMS from the newspapers, I use
an event-study approach to test whether the gradual roll-out of the NCMS decreases the
percentage of rural-to-urban migrants from different counties. Rural-to-urban migrants
from a county are a county’s rural residents who are working in urban areas outside
their home county. I call this percentage of rural-to-urban migrants at county-level the
‘migration propensity’. The results show that, although the NCMS implementation
does not decrease the migration propensity at the county-level, it has a lagged effect
on the corresponding growth rate of the migration propensity, usually taking effect
after the first year of the NCMS implementation.
As the results from the county-level data with limited geographical coverage might
suffer from misreporting, I also use a survey dataset, the China Nutrition and Health
Survey (CHNS), to conduct an individual-level analysis. In this analysis, I examine
the effects of individual NCMS enrolment on the probability of one being a rural-
to-urban migrant. The instrumental variable method is my identification strategy to
tackle the possible endogeneities between individual-level health insurance enrolment
and migration decision. I use the difference in time of counties becoming the “pilot”
92
county as an IV for the individual level enrolment. The results show that individual
enrolment in the health scheme decreases the probability of one being a rural-to-urban
migrant. I also utilise the CHNS to construct a county-level data, and the results from
the constructed county dataset provide supporting evidence for the results from the
self-collected county dataset.
The chapter seeks to fill the gaps in the current literature by studying the distor-
tionary effect of the NCMS on rural-to-urban migration in China. This is important
because the studied migrant group with potential distorted migration behaviour is one
of the main labour forces contributing to China’s recent development. The first contri-
bution of this chapter is that the new health insurance scheme in China might affect
people’s choices in the labour market on a larger scale compared to the effects of health
insurance in the U.S (Gruber and Madrian 1995; Fairlie et al., 2016). The results im-
ply that the unintended consequences of health insurance policies for labour markets
in developing countries might be greater than what has been discussed in the literature
on developed countries. Secondly, the chapter contributes to the existing literature
by documenting the aggregated change in migration behaviour caused by health in-
surance, while most of the papers studying the effects of health insurance focus on
individual-level evidence. Another contribution is the new county-level dataset that I
collected from provincial statistical yearbooks and used for the county-level analysis.
The remainder is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides background on different
types of health insurance, especially the NCMS, and rural-to-urban migrants in China.
Section 3.3 mainly focuses on the county-level data, and Section 3.4 discusses the
individual-level evidence. Policy implication and conclusions are in Section 3.5.
3.2 Background
To understand why the rural-to-urban migration labour market could possibly be dis-
torted by the geographical restriction of the NCMS, I first need to provide some back-
ground on the NCMS, other health insurance policies implemented in China, and also
rural-to-urban migrants.
3.2.1 New Cooperative Medical Scheme and other health in-
surance schemes
The Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS) was the health insurance before the imple-
mentation of the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) since the 1950s, and its
coverage was considerably low just before 2003 (Wagstaff et al., 2009). According to
Wagstaff and his colleagues, there were many efforts, from local areas to the central
government, to improve or even to resuscitate the CMS, yet the improvement on in-
dividual health nor the decrease in out-of-pocket medical expenses in rural areas in
China was quite insignificant.
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The NCMS was designed to cover the health expenditure on the illnesses of rural
residents and aimed to avoid possible “poverty caused by catastrophic illness” in rural
areas (Yi et al., 2009). The scheme was launched in some counties first in 2003, then
gradually rolled out until all counties in China had implemented the NCMS by 2008.
For each year from 2003, each provincial government chose different counties within the
province as “pilot areas”.3 Once a county became a pilot area, the local government
would continuously provide the NCMS to rural residents in the county from then on. I
regard the pilot counties as treated counties on and after their first year of this policy
implementation throughout this chapter. The treated counties increased year by year
from 2003.4 Figure 3.1 presents the number of counties that first become pilot counties
in different years.
It is called a “cooperative” medical scheme because there are different adminis-
trative level parties involved in the financing of the NCMS. Governments at every
administrative level, the central government, provincial government, county-level gov-
ernment, and local (village/township-level) government, are all involved in the imple-
mentation of the NCMS in rural areas, and so are the individual participants. The
county-level governments are the main operators and designers of the NCMS, and the
local government has “some discretion over the level of financing of the program, and
the associated benefit package” (Wagstaff et al., 2009). Individual participants pay a
relatively small fixed part of the contribution, and the central or provincial government
provides subsidies for the NCMS. The scheme only provides higher reimbursements for
medical expenses for a person seeking medical services in his or her township health
centres and county-level hospitals (Wagstaff et al., 2009). This geographical restriction
on the level of reimbursement rate across different administrative regions is mainly due
to the financial structure of the NCMS. Because county-level and local governments
are the main operators in the financing of the NCMS, the reimbursement rate is higher
if rural residents visit their local hospitals than higher administrative-level hospitals
(i.e. county-level or provincial level hospitals) and/or hospitals in places where are
administratively different from the rural residents’ household registration location.
The NCMS provides not only reimbursements for catastrophic and chronic diseases,
but also for inpatient and outpatient services, making the NCMS important for the
young rural generation as well as the elderly. The NCMS offers reimbursement services
for different types of service utilised. For any inpatient services, it provides reimburse-
ments for each inpatient treatment within-county, but there is a cap on the amount
that can be reimbursed per year. The highest rate is around 80% to 90%, but the rate
varies across counties and locations of hospitals. Some provinces allow a fixed subsidy
to each person per year for all outpatient services that this person consumes in a year,
and others provide different reimbursement rates depending on the hospitals visited.
3The selection of “pilot areas” is discussed in Section 3.3.
4Figure C.1 shows the gradual expansion of the “pilot” counties from 2003 to 2008 in the five
provinces used in the county-level dataset.
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These subsidies are in addition to the coverage for outpatient services for chronic dis-
eases. For outpatient services and medicines for chronic diseases, the NCMS provides
reimbursements depending on the type of disease. The inpatient or outpatient services
reimbursement level decreases to around 30-40% if the patients attend hospitals outside
their county but within the same provinces.5 The health expenditure coverage for the
NCMS varies slightly across counties but is mostly based on the provincial standard.
The reimbursement level has been increasing since its early implementation. Accord-
ing to Wagstaff et al. (2009), hospitals above the county level only consist of 26% of
the number of reimbursement episodes per NCMS member. There was no reimburse-
ment for inter-province out/inpatient visits until 2013. The information implies rural
residents are more likely to visit their local hospitals to benefit from the NCMS.
Apart from the NCMS, there are two other main health schemes in China, Urban
Resident Health Care Insurance and Urban Employee Health Care Insurance, up to
the final period of the NCMS implementation (Yu, 2015). Each of these three schemes
provides health insurance coverage for different groups of residents in China. The
NCMS mainly benefits rural residents and a small percentage of rural migrants that
work close to their home address according to their household registration. Urban
Resident Health Care Insurance covers residents with urban hukou but only those who
are not employed, such as young students and senior residents. Urban Employee Health
Care Insurance covers people who are employed in companies that offer this insurance
in urban areas, regardless of their household registration status. The summary of the
coverage is in Table 3.1.
Combining all three insurance schemes, it shows that most of the rural-to-urban
migrants are theoretically covered by the NCMS, yet it is difficult for them to directly
benefit from the scheme.6 Given their low-income level, it is not likely that they will
buy commercial health insurance.7 If rural-to-urban migrants want to enrol in the
scheme and benefit from the NCMS, they have to go back to the residence place in
their household registration, so this scheme might count as an incentive for them to
return to or to stay in rural areas, rather than working in urban areas and cannot
commute frequently between their workplaces and hometowns. This is one of the main
reasons why there might be potential negative effects of the NCMS on the rural-to-
urban migration labour market. There is some health insurance coverage for rural-to-
5Different counties have their own regulations on the NCMS, but there are usually some common
settings in these different regulations. Patients have the highest reimbursement rate when visiting
village-level NCMS-designated hospitals (above 90%), and get a relatively high reimbursement rate of
around (70-80%) when visiting county-level designated hospitals. If patients want to visit provincial-
level designated hospitals, they usually get around 40% for the reimbursement rate. The process of
getting reimbursements is also troublesome after visiting designated hospitals at their province-level.
Some counties require an official transfer document from the county or village-level hospitals if patients
want to visit the provincial level hospital. The regulation from Qidong (a county in Jiangsu) is in
http://www.qidongnews.com/html/2015-11/20151104063042.htm.
6Thorough discussion in Section 3.2.2.
7The market for commercial health insurance was very limited during the implementation period
of the NCMS.
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urban migrants in big cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, and Shenzhen, but
these schemes are not compulsory for the employers hiring the migrants and were not
well implemented before 2010 (Barber and Yao, 2010).
3.2.2 Rural migrants and the hukou system
The different coverages of the different insurance schemes in China imply that rural-
to-urban migrants are difficult to directly benefit from any of these schemes. One of
the possible reasons that inferred from the previous descriptions is the household reg-
istration system (hukou) in China. Hukou is the individual level record in the system
of household registration. It includes information such as whether a person is a rural
or urban resident, birthplace, age, gender and other basic personal information (Chan,
2009). The classification of rural or urban residency is very difficult for rural residents
to change. This geographical mismatch between where one’s hukou is registered and
where one is working and living potentially prevents a sizeable number of people in
rural areas from benefiting from other urban health insurance schemes and also the
NCMS, which most of the inter-province or even inter-county rural-to-urban migrants
should be able to utilise.
Rural-to-urban migrants consist of three types. The first type (Type 1) is intra-
county rural-to-urban migrants. They work in urban areas of the county in which they
reside and comprise some 20% of the total migrants (NBS report, 2012).8 It is easy
for the intra-county rural migrants to commute between their hukou residence and
their workplace, so they can still benefit from local welfare schemes such as the NCMS.
The second type (Type 2) consists of the rural-to-urban migrants who are the focus
of this chapter. They have rural hukou, but they work and live in urban areas far
from their hometowns.9 They are usually enrolled in low-skilled labour sectors such
as construction and manufacturing in urban areas. In these sectors, employers are
usually less likely to provide insurance coverage during the roll-out period of the NCMS.
Working in big cities makes it difficult for them to participate in local welfare schemes,
and their rural hukous prevent them from enrolling in welfare schemes in urban areas
that are designed for urban hukou residents. The third type (Type 3) of rural-to-urban
migrants are similar to Type 2, but Type 3 migrants have higher education levels and
are mostly employed by companies that provide welfare benefits in urban areas. The
NCMS implementations in rural areas do not affect Type 3 migrants because these
migrants’ social insurance is already provided by their employers in urban areas. Type
3 migrants are more likely to be classified as rural-to-urban employees rather than
rural-to-urban migrants.
According to the Report of Chinese Migrants in 2012, there are 208 million rural-
8All information about migrants in Section 2.1 are from this report and similar reports from other
years.
9This category of migrants is non-seasonal because of the long distance between their workplace
and their hometown. It is expensive and difficult for them to go back in the harvest season.
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to-urban migrants working outside their hometown, and 83% of them still cannot
benefit directly from any health insurance scheme (NBS report, 2012). 94% of rural
migrants do not have a college degree, and 80% of them do not even have a high school
diploma. Moreover, around 75% of them are not employed by companies providing
welfare benefits in urban areas (NBS, 2012). Giles et al. (2013) found that no more
than 20% of rural-to-urban migrants are covered by employment-based insurance. The
rural-to-urban migrants have much less health insurance coverage compared to urban
residents, rural residents who are not working outside their hometowns, and rural-to-
urban employees. Despite the group’s young average age (around 30), this group of
migrants is vulnerable to serious health problems including lower immunization rates,
higher rates of infectious diseases, and maternal mortality (Barber and Yao, 2010).
The occupational health risks that migrants face are higher than for those with higher
socioeconomic status and/or “white collar” jobs (Herd et al., 2010). Rural-to-urban
migrants usually have relatively poor health because their workloads are higher while
their incomes are comparatively lower than others (Chen et al., 2014). They can
easily be dragged back below the poverty line if they fall ill and cannot afford health
expenditures for illness because of the difficulty of enrolling in most of the health
insurance schemes available in urban areas.
There was a decrease in the number of rural-to-urban migrants and also in the
growth of rural-to-urban migration in 2009 due to the 2008 financial crisis; however,
the number of migrants returning to their hometowns (return migrants) was relatively
low compared to the total migration population. According to Xiwen Chen, one of
the officials in the Rural Working Leading Group from the central government, there
were about 20 million return migrants in 2009 due to the financial crisis.10 The total
number of inter-county rural migrants was 145.33 million, and the total number of
rural migrants was 229.78 million (NBS, 2009). These return migrants account for
less than 10% of the total migrants and 14% of the inter-county migrants. The total
number of migrants actually increased by 1.9% in 2009, and the total number of inter-
county migrants increased by 3.5% (NBS, 2009). From the different growth rates for
total migrants and inter-county migrants, it seems that the financial crisis affected
more intra-county migrants compared to the inter-county group. The corresponding
growth rates for the total migrants and the inter-county migrants were 6% and 5.4%
in 2010, 3.4% and 4.4% in 2011, and 3.0% and 3.9% in 2012 (NBS, 2009-2012). The
different growth rates of the total migrants and the inter-county migrants indicates
that the financial crisis might only have had one-year negative effects on the increase
of rural migrants, especially the inter-county ones. The return migrants represent a
relatively small percentage in terms of the total number of rural-to-urban migrants.
These growth rates also indicate the trend of increasing rural-to-urban migrants might
not be concave, which helps the later interpretation of my empirical results.
10Website: http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49154/49369/8738602.html, contents in Chinese.
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The county-level data in the government report does not identify the new migrants
and the return migrants. According to a longitudinal survey on Rural-Urban Migration
in China (RUMiC),11 there were 522 new migrants who had just migrated to cities in
2008, compared to 407 new migrants in 2007.12 The trend of an increasing number of
new migrants is evident in Figure 3.2. I might not be able to eliminate all impacts
of the 2008 financial crisis on the number of migrants, but as the evidence from the
RUMiC shows, the effects might not be large enough to affect my main results in an
extensive way, at least in 2008 and 2009. However, given that the RUMiC is limited to
the 2008 and 2009 sample, I cannot say more about what might have happened for the
rural-to-urban migrants after 2009. The financial crisis might have had lagged effects
on rural-to-urban migrants, but interpreting this information together with the figures
of the growth rates from the NBS migration report, it seems that 2009 should be the
year that the financial crisis had the largest effect on rural-to-urban migrants.13
3.3 Evidence from the county-level data
The theoretical mechanism behind the negative effects of the NCMS is a simple com-
pensating differential model by Gruber (2000) based on Rosen’s model (1986). A
modified form of the Gruber model applied to the rural-to-urban migration context is
in Appendix C.1. The migration decision under the compensating differential model
is very simple. For those who have already migrated, if the NCMS were to narrow the
urban-rural income gap after decreasing the medical expenses in rural areas, then the
number of migrants who want to move back to their hometown would increase. For
these people in rural areas, the number of people who want to become rural-to-urban
migrants would also decrease. So if the NCMS were more generous, then there would
be fewer rural residents who are rural-to-urban migrants. The important condition for
these changes is that the implementation of the NCMS does not affect the probability
of people getting sick, which is likely to be true. I provide two sets of empirical ev-
idence for the effects of the NCMS implementation on the number of rural residents
who are rural-to-urban migrants in two different perspectives: the county-level results
and the individual level results. I focus on the county-level results in this section first,
using the county-level data collected from the statistical yearbook. The results provide
11The Longitudinal Survey on Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) consists of three parts:
the Urban Household Survey, the Rural Household Survey and the Migrant Household Survey. It was
initiated by a group of researchers at the Australian National University, the University of Queensland
and Beijing Normal University and was supported by the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA),
which provided the Scientific Use Files. The financial support for RUMiC was obtained from the
Australian Research Council, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the
Ford Foundation, IZA and the Chinese Foundation of Social Sciences.
12RUMiC only contains two waves, one in 2008 and one in 2009. In the 2009 data, it cannot capture
all the new migrants who migrated in 2009 in the sample, so I use the number of new migrants up to
the year 2008 in the 2009 dataset.
13The effect of the financial crisis on the counties with the NCMS implementation close to 2008 is
discussed in Appendix C.4.2.
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insight into the extent to which rural-to-urban migrants respond at an aggregate-level
to a policy change that should not affect the labour market in China.
3.3.1 County-level dataset and main variables
To examine the effects of the NCMS on the percentage of rural residents who are
rural-to-urban migrants working outside their county at the county level, I obtained
the corresponding data from different provincial statistical yearbooks and compiled a
novel self-collected dataset. The dataset consists of county-level data collected from
yearbooks from different provinces from 1998 to 2011. Only five provinces, Jiangsu,
Gansu, Ningxia, Hubei and Shanxi, provide data on the number of rural-to-urban
migrants at the county-level in their provincial yearbooks or provincial rural yearbooks.
These provinces are important for economic and also migration-related activities in
China. Gansu, Hubei and Shanxi are in the top-ten list of migrant-exporting provinces
(Chan, 2013),14 and Jiangsu is the province with the second largest GDP in China.15
The main variables collected are the total number of the rural population and the
total number of the rural labour force who are rural-to-urban migrants and working
outside their county at the county level. I call the percentage of rural residents who are
rural-to-urban migrants in urban areas the migration propensity, and the percentage
is the number of rural residents who are rural-to-urban migrants divided by the total
rural population. Because the data collected is at the county-level, this sample only
consists of inter-county rural-to-urban migrants, and 85% of the migrants are aged
between 16-45 (NBS, 2009). The intra-county rural-to-urban migrants are counted as
being in the labour force in other sectors (manufacturing or service etc.) within the
total county labour force. For all provincial yearbooks, in most years, I also collected
GDP, disposable income per capita for rural residents, total irrigated farmland, and
the total number of the rural labour force at the county-level. The format of the
provincial statistical yearbooks is not completely consistent over a long period, thus
in certain years, for one or two provinces, the total number of migrants in rural areas
is missing. Some imputations based on the dataset are needed in order to fill in the
missing values.16
Another important variable is the exact starting year of the implementation of the
NCMS for different counties. To get the exact date of the initial implementation of
the NCMS for each county, I extracted these dates from the official county government
websites and government-owned newspapers. I collected the information from various
county/prefecture/province-level newspapers and government documents and formed
a dataset for 6 years and 178 counties. Suburban areas that belong to prefecture-level
14In the list, Chongqing needs to be included in Sichuan province because it is more a city than a
province in terms of the land area.
15Source: http://www.economist.com/content/chinese equivalents
16The detailed information about imputation methods is in Appendix C.2. The estimations depend
on different provincial statistical yearbooks.
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cities were excluded from the regressions. Each suburban area is classified adminis-
tratively as a county, but in practice, they are more similar to the urban areas in
prefecture-level cities rather than counties that are far from prefecture-level cities.
Rural-to-urban migrants from these suburban areas usually work in the prefecture city
close to their hukou residence place, so it is easier for them to benefit from the NCMS
than migrants from other counties. The migrants in rural areas in this county-level
dataset are inter-county or inter-province migrants. As they cannot easily benefit from
the NCMS due to the commuting difficulties, this is the group on which the NCMS
might exert a negative effect.
3.3.2 Empirical methods and results
The implementation of the NCMS was gradually rolled-out in different counties in
different years from 2003 to 2008. I first use a simple difference-in-differences method
to empirically test the effects of the implementation of the NCMS on the county-
level migration propensity. The treatment group and control group are time-variant.
The treatment group includes those counties with the NCMS, and the control group
comprises those counties without the NCMS. The counties in these two groups vary
every year until all counties are in the treatment group.
To observe the basic results of the NCMS’s impacts on the migration propensity
for different counties, the regression equation using the simple DID method is:
prop(migrants)i,t =α + βNCMSi,t +X
′
i,tθ +
∑
k
γk × I[k = t]×
∑
l
ρl × I[l = p]
+ yeart + µi × yeart + υt + εi,t,
(3.1)
where i is the index for county and t stands for time. prop(migrants)i,t is the propen-
sity of rural residents in county i working outside their home county (county i) at
year t, which is the migration propensity. It is used to analyse the aggregate level of
rural-to-urban migration from a county. The definition for this variable is the number
of rural-to-urban migrants from a county divided by the total rural population in the
county. NCMSi,t is an indicator set to 1 when county i provides the NCMS in year
t.17 υt is the year fixed effect. yeart is the linear year trend and µi × yeart is the
county fixed effect times the linear year trend. I[k = t] represents the year dummies
from 1998-2011, and I[l = p] indicates the province (p) dummies for five provinces in
total. The fixed-effect error term εi,t is clustered at the county level. The choice of the
cluster-level in the regressions is based on the discussion of the cluster-level by Abadie
et al. (2017). They suggest that when using fixed-effects regressions, the cluster-level
17For example, if a county was chosen to be the pilot area for the NCMS from 2005, then the
NCMSi,t for this county will be 0 before 2005 and 1 for 2005 and the years afterwards.
100
should be adjusted to the level of corresponding policy treatments. The NCMS pol-
icy is implemented at the county level. It would be suitable to use the cluster at the
county-level in all fixed-effects regressions in this chapter. Xi,t are the control variables,
which include GDP per capita, disposable income per capita for rural residents, irri-
gated farmland per capita, and total rural labour force for each county at each year.18
The result of this regression is in Table 3.2, and it shows an insignificant coefficient for
the implementation of the NCMS on migration propensity.
The NCMS might take years to come into effect, but the variable NCMSi,t only
represents the aggregate average effect from the year of implementation onwards. For
the difference-in-differences, one of the key assumptions for the results to be valid is
the parallel-trend assumption, which means before the implementation of the NCMS,
the trend of outcome variables for the treatment and control groups should be similar.
It is difficult to assess this pre-trend using NCMSi,t in the regression equation, given
the fact the NCMS implementation is time-varying. To test the yearly effects of the
NCMS after its implementation and to verify the parallel pre-trend assumption, I use
the event study approach. The event is the initial implementation of the NCMS at the
county level, which is different in different counties. The new regression equation for
the event study is:
prop(migrants)i,t =α +
4∑
n=−4
βnI[FirstNCMSi,t = n] +X
′
i,tθ +
∑
k
γk × I[k = t]
×
∑
l
ρl × I[l = p] + yeart + µi × yeart + υt + εi,t,
(3.2)
while the definition of other variables remains the same. I[FirstNCMSi,t = n] is a
dummy variable and equals 1 for the nth years before or after the initial implementation
of the NCMS for each county i at year t. The choice of the cluster-level is still at the
county-level for the event study approach. The argument for the choice of the cluster-
level is similar to the one for Equation (3.1).
The results are shown in the first and the second column of Table 3.3, and the
plot for the coefficients is presented in the left graph in Figure 3.3. The regression
results are similar with or without controls. After controlling for county fixed-effects,
year fixed-effects, year times province fixed-effects, and other county-level control vari-
ables, each of the coefficients βn represents the yearly effects of n
th year before or after
implementing the NCMS. The trend before the implementation of the NCMS is not
violated since in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3, the coefficients representing the years before
implementation are insignificant and close to zero. The coefficients representing the
18Results for the correlation between controls and the implementation dates of the NCMS are in
Appendix C.4.3 Table C.7. The detailed explanations are also in Appendix C.4.3.
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years after the implementation of the NCMS are still insignificant but the magnitudes
are larger than those before implementation. However, it is still difficult to draw any
conclusion about the effects of the new insurance policy here. The effects of the first
and the second year of the initial NCMS implementation are even positive. I find no
strong evidence of the NCMS having negative effects on the migration propensity at
the county-level.
One explanation for not finding the expected negative effects of the NCMS im-
plementation on the prop(migrants)i,t could be the economic background during the
examined time period in the data. The dataset is from 1998 to 2011. During this
period, China experienced rapid development and urbanisation. The urban-to-rural
income ratio from 1998 increased from 2.5 to 3 and has been stagnating at a high level
since 2007 (Sicular, 2013). Due to the income differences, there was a large increase in
rural-urban migration during this time (Shi, 2008). It is reasonable to believe that the
NCMS might not have strong effects on the propensity of rural migrants for each county
directly, but it might be able to slow its growing trend. To test this effect, I change
the dependent variables from prop(migrants)i,t to the growth rate of the migration
propensity in a county, so the two regressions become:
growthratei,t =α + βNCMSi,t +X
′
i,tθ +
∑
k
γk × I[k = t]×
∑
l
ρl × I[l = p]
+ yeart + µi × yeart + υt + εi,t,
(3.3)
and
growthratei,t =α +
4∑
n=−4
βnI[FirstNCMSi,t = n] +X
′
i,tθ +
∑
k
γk × I[k = t]
×
∑
l
ρl × I[l = p] + yeart + µi × yeart + υt + εi,t,
(3.4)
The results are again presented in the second column of Table 3.2 and the third and
fourth columns of Table 3.3. The regression results are similar with or without controls.
The graph on the right in Figure 3.3 plots the coefficients from Equation (3.4).
Table 3.2 shows that the aggregate effect of the NCMS on the growth rate is still
insignificant, whereas there are significant negative effects of the NCMS for the 1st, 3rd
and 4th year after its initial implementation, shown in Table 3.3. These results indicate
that the NCMS slows down the growing trend of rural-urban migration in most of the
years following implementation. The insignificant aggregate effect in Table 3.2 might
be due to the fact that the NCMS takes time to come into effect. The rural residents
who are working in urban areas may require time to quit their jobs and settle in their
hometowns if they want to benefit from the NCMS. The implementation of the NCMS
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could unintentionally decrease the growth rate of migrants by as much as 1.43% on
average in the first year after the initial implementation. The effect counts around 40%
of the growth rate for the number of inter-county migrants, which was 3.5% in 2009,
and also the corresponding growth rate of the rural-to-urban migrants in 2004, which
was also 3.5%.19 The third-year effect of the NCMS is the largest amongst the yearly
effects. It decreases the growth rate of the migration propensity by 1.65%.
One possible explanation for the growth rate of the migration propensity is the pos-
sible diminishing growth rate of the rural-to-urban migrants. To address this concern,
I control for the county fixed effect times a linear year trend in all the regressions in
this chapter. Apart from the empirical method, the statistical figures about the growth
rate from 2009-2011 stated in Section 3.2.2 shows that the growth rate is around 3%.
There is no general decreasing trend for the growth rate of the migrant. A report from
Asian Development Bank also shows the increasing trend of the migration share of the
total population is not diminishing.20 These numbers might also help to alleviate the
concern of the possible diminishing growth rate of the rural-to-urban migrants that
might be driven the results.
Generalising the results to the whole country, and, given the actual number of
inter-county migrants in 2008 was 140.41 million (NBS, 2012), if the NCMS decreased
the growth rate in 2009 by 1.65%, this would mean that 2.31 million rural residents
were affected by the NCMS.21 This number is calculated based on the number of rural
residents who are already rural-to-urban migrants, which does not include potential
rural-to-urban migrants, so the actual size of the affected population could be larger.
The decrement in the migrants in just one year would be more than two-thirds of the
total labour force of Singapore, Hong Kong or Massachusetts.22 The large absolute
numbers arise from the large population base, not to mention the migrants-to-be who
might be affected. However, there are many restrictive assumptions that need to be
born in mind when interpreting the generalised effect.
The results under different cluster-levels are presented in Table C.1. When the error
term is just robust but not clustered, the results are similar to the results in Table 3.3.
When the error term is clustered at the prefecture-level, the significance level dropped
and only the effect of the NCMS implementation on growthratei,t after the fourth
year of its implementation is significant at 90%. The results are insignificant when the
error term is clustered at the province-level. However, since I am only able to collect 5
provinces for the county-level dataset, it might be too few clusters used when choosing
19https://clb.org.hk/schi/content/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%86%9C%E6%B0%91%E5%B7
%A5%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6%E6%80%BB%E6%8A%A5%E5%91%8A.
Content in Chinese
20Lu and Xia (2016). Migration in the Peoples Republic of China.
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/191876/adbi-wp593.pdf
21Assume all counties implemented the NCMS in 2006.
22Sources: http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/so30.jsp (HKG),
http://stats.mom.gov.sg/Pages/Labour-Force-In-Singapore-2013.aspx (SGP) and
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/laus.t03.htm (USA).
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the province as the cluster-level. Also, within a province or even a prefecture city, the
differences between different counties are quite large in terms of GDP, population, and
especially the NCMS implementation. It is reasonable to use the county level as the
cluster-level of my stander errors in the regressions, together with the argument by
Abadie et al. (2017).
The takeaway from the results is that the implementation of the NCMS has a nega-
tive second-order effect on the number of the rural-to-urban migrants. The robustness
checks for different numbers of years before and/or after the implementation of the
NCMS are presented in Appendix C.4.1. The results from these checks show signif-
icant negative effects for different numbers of leads and lags on the growth rate of
the migration propensity. These results also suggest that the NCMS has a long-term
lagged effect on migration rather than an immediate effect. When interpreting the
results, I need to consider the increasing generosity of the NCMS since the early years
of its implementation. The increase in the NCMS generosity level would amplify the
negative effects of the implementation. However, the county-level governments set the
reimbursement rates based on the guidelines provided by the provincial governments.
The year times province fixed effects that I controlled for in the regression would help
to address this concern. Apart from this, the interpretation of the results and the con-
clusions also rely on a set of identification assumptions for the event study approach.
Checking the identification assumptions
The first and most important assumption in the event study approach is that the NCMS
implementation is not determined by the outcome variable. The NCMS was empha-
sised mainly as a welfare benefit for rural residents rather than the central government
targeting the rural migrants (Yi et al., 2009). From a policy point of view, imple-
menting the NCMS and the rural-to-urban migrants from different counties should
be exogenous. In addition, the plots of coefficients in Figure 3.3 both support this
assumption: the migration propensity and its growth rate do not vary much before
the implementation of the NCMS. To further confirm this assumption, I conduct a
placebo-test on the implementation of the NCMS. If the NCMS is not implemented,
the migration propensity and the corresponding growth rate should not decrease. Data
from Guangdong province is a good fit to test this scenario. This province implemented
an early version of the NCMS in 1999 (Zheng, 2011). The implementation of the NCMS
in 2003 in Guangdong province was merely a name change from the previous health
insurance system. So if there were no actual NCMS implementation in Guangdong,
then the advertising of the NCMS would be unlikely to have affected the migration
propensity. The results from the placebo test show that the advertising of the NCMS
might not affect the migration trend negatively. The details of this placebo test are in
Appendix C.3, and the results are in the first two columns of Table C.2. The large co-
efficients and stander errors might be due to the sample size limitation for the placebo
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province.
One province results might not be a convincing piece of evidence for the assumption.
So I also conduct a traditional placebo test. I assume hypothetically that the NCMS
initial implementation starts two years early than the actual starting date for each
county. I run Equations (3.2) and (3.4) with the same specification and the hypothetical
early NCMS implementation date, and the results are in the third and fourth column
of Table C.2. The results show that, for the migration propensity and its growth rate,
the hypothetical early NCMS implementation does have effects at least until the third
year of the implementation, which are consistent with the results when running the
actual NCMS implementation timing in Table 3.3. The results from this placebo test
make the assumption of the migration propensity and its growth rate do not vary much
before the implementation of the NCMS as a valid one.
Another key assumption for the results to hold is that the timing of the NCMS im-
plementation also needs to be exogenously assigned to each county in theory. However,
the detailed official requirements for the timing of the implementation of the NCMS
in each county were not publicly revealed. Some news reports discussed the require-
ments for being a “pilot” county, yet the requirements were quite vague, and there
is no detailed information on the timing of the implementation.23 The main concern
arising from the vague requirements is that the timing of the first implementation of
the NCMS was related to GDP per capita or other characteristics that are controlled
at the county level. For example, counties with higher GDP per capita might have
implemented the NCMS earlier than counties with lower GDP per capita. Also, GDP
per capita and other controls might lower the migration propensity and/or its growth,
which might affect the interpretation of the results.
To check whether GDP per capita and other controls correlate with the timing of the
counties’ initial NCMS implementation. I first classify counties into two groups based
on the date of the NCMS implementation: an early-treated group and a late-treated
group. The early-treated group includes counties that implemented the NCMS in 2003,
2004 and 2005, and the late-treated group includes those counties that implemented
it after 2005. I test the correlations between GDP per capita, rural residents’ income
per capita, the number of the total rural labour force, and whether a county is in the
early treated group. The results are in Table C.7 in the Appendix, and the correlations
between whether a county is in the early-treated group and different controls at the
county level are insignificant. However, there are other unobservables that might affect
the interpretation of the result in the same way as the GDP per capita and other
controls. It would have been desirable to have the information related to medical
and health services provided in the rural areas at county-level. I could have used the
23Website: http://www.jxsrwsj.gov.cn/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=174 (The content is in
Chinese). The requirements are such that the county has sufficient ability to manage health care
resources or the county needs to have sufficient subsidies to help the implementation of the NCMS,
but they did not define what “sufficient” is in their requirements.
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information as an instrument for the timing of the NCMS implementation. However,
not all statistical yearbooks offer this information from five provinces. This possible
selection bias should be borne in mind when interpreting the results.
In the event study approach, I show that the coefficients for the years before the
NCMS implementation are insignificant and have smaller magnitudes than the yearly
effects after the implementation. However, it would be reassuring if the difference be-
tween the average of the prop(migrant) and growthrate for the early-treated counties
and late-treated counties are small or insignificant. In Figure 3.4, I show the average
of the prop(migrant) and growthrate for early-treated and late-treated counties for
three periods: before the NCMS implementation (1998-2003), during the roll-out of the
NCMS (2003-2008), after roll-out of the NCMS (2009-2011). The early-treated coun-
ties are counties with the NCMS implemented from 2003 to 2005, and the late-treated
counties are those implemented the NCMS on or after 2006. The figure shows the
prop(migrant) for early and late-treated counties are similar before and even during
the NCMS implementation. For the growth rate of prop(migrant), it seems like the
late-treated group has a higher average for the period before and during the NCMS
implementation. However, the differences seem not large enough given the 95% confi-
dence intervals for the early-treated and late-treated groups. The figure shows for the
growth rate of prop(migrant) after roll-out of the NCMS, the early-treated counties
have a higher average than the late-treated counties, which could explain the results
of early-treated counties with insignificant NCMS impacts in Table C.6. The statistics
for pre-NCMS implementation period and the period during the NCMS roll-out seems
to be consistent with the pre-event results from the main regressions.
Apart from testing the validity of the identifying assumptions, during the time pe-
riod examined in this section, there might have been other reforms in China that might
also have affected the percentage of rural-to-urban migrants from counties. Large-scale
agricultural reforms could be one of these. For example, the central government offi-
cially abolished the agricultural tax on January 1st, 2006.24 This reform was nation-
wide, so the abolition of agricultural taxation was implemented provincially from 2004
to 2006 (Chen, 2017). Another change that might have affected the results could be
the change in provincial leaders. From 1998 to 2011, the provincial leaders changed
at least five times. Different provincial leaders also affected policy implementations
in their provinces differently, depending on the closeness of their relationship with
the central government (Chung, 1995). The year-times-province fixed effect controlled
in the regressions could capture the tax reform effect and hopefully captures other
provincial-level changes.
However, there are two other flaws in the county-level dataset that might have
weakened the credibility of the results: under-reporting on the number of migrants
at the county level and limited provincial coverage of the dataset. Regarding the
24Website: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-10/13/content 12220598.htm
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first weakness, a county’s government has an incentive to under-report the number of
migrants in order to “look good” in comparison to other counties in provincial statistical
yearbooks (Cai, 2014). According to Koch-Weser (2013), the under-reporting might
also be due to unregistered migrants. The second problem is that the dataset only
covers 5 out of 32 provinces in China. The results represent an upper-bound of the
actual effects of the NCMS on the internal migration labour market if the counties start
to under-report after the NCMS implementation. I have to bear these two main flaws of
the county-level dataset, as well as the possible selection bias, in mind when interpreting
the results. Using individual-level datasets collected by non-governmental research
organisations helps avoid the under-reporting problem. Therefore, I use the individual-
level data to verify the county-level results and also try to analyse the question from a
micro/individual perspective.
3.4 Evidence from the China Health and Nutrition
Survey
Because the interpretation of the county-level data results might suffer from the misre-
porting problem and the geographical limitation, I use an individual dataset, the China
Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), to verify the effect of the NCMS implementa-
tion on rural-to-urban migrants at the individual level. The CHNS is a comprehensive
survey panel dataset covering information regarding income, healthcare, medical ex-
penditure, health insurance and other aspects. This unbalanced longitudinal dataset
contains comprehensive information about households from nine different provinces
from 1989-2011.25 Hence, the CHNS can be treated as a comprehensive representa-
tion of national data compared to the county-level data. Data are collected through
questionnaires filled out by households, and one household representative answers the
questionnaire for all the household members.26 The data are at the individual level. I
utilise the dataset in two ways. First, I use the individual-level data originally provided
by the CHNS to examine the effect of being enrolled in the NCMS on the probability
of an individual being a migrant, providing supporting evidence for the effect of the
NCMS on rural-urban migrants at the individual level. The second method of utilising
the CHNS is to construct a county-level CHNS dataset. The results from this method
provide new county-level results which are comparable to the analysis in Section 3.3.
This helps to verify the county-level results in Section 3.3.27
25Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou.
Guangdong is not included in this dataset. There are nine waves: 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000,
2004, 2006, 2009, 2011 and, recently 2015. The coverage map for CHNS is shown in Figure C.4.
26In survey wave on or before 2000 and for some questions on and after the wave 2004.
27In the CHNS, I still cannot distinguish the return migrants in the rural population; however, as
discussed in Section 3.2.2, the return migrants only accounts for around 10% of the total migrants.
Also, all the individual information is answered by the household respondents in the CHNS.
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3.4.1 Individual level evidence
When generating the individual-level evidence, what I want to test in the results was
whether being enrolled in the NCMS makes individuals less likely to be inter-county
rural-to-urban migrants. The outcome variable that indicates whether an individual
is seeking jobs somewhere else and has not been home for a certain period (labelled
here as migrant), and the key independent variable that shows whether an individual
is covered by the NCMS (labelled here as haveNCMS ). I use a sample that contains
individuals with rural hukou only, for it to be consistent with the results in Section
3.3. The CHNS does not show whether an individual is an inter-county migrant. It
only provides information on whether an individual is now a migrant and how long
this individual has been away from home. To identify the inter-county rural-to-urban
migrant, I set the variable migrant equal to 1 if individuals are seeking jobs somewhere
else and have been away from their hometown for more than six months. In the wave
1989, 1991, and 1993, there was no information about the migration behaviour in the
data, so I only use 6 waves of the CHNS from 1997 to 2011 (1997, 2000, 2004, 2006,
2009, and 2011) to match the time period covered by the county-level results. It is still
difficult to identify whether a person is a return migrant in the CHNS, just like the
county-level data.
Using the difference-in-differences method with panel data, the possible unobserv-
able time-invariant individual effects were eliminated from the individual-fixed effect.
For the time-variant variables, the wave (corresponding to year) times province fixed-
effect also helps to control for the trends partially. The regression for the individual-
level result is:
migrantd,t =α + βhaveNCMSd,t +X
′
d,tθ +
∑
k
γk × I[k = t]
×
∑
l
ρl × I[l = p] + µd + υt + εd,t,
(3.5)
where d is the index for individuals and t stands for time. µd is the individual fixed
effect and υt is the wave fixed effect. I[k = t] represents the six wave dummies from
1998-2011, and I[l = p] is the province (p) dummies for 9 provinces in total. migrantd,t
equals 1 if an individual has a rural hukou, is aged between 16 and 45,28 is seeking a
job somewhere else, and has been away from home for more than half a year in wave t.
Xd,t is an array of the demographic variables including deflated household income per
capita, age, marital status, occupation, and highest education level, and also county-
level average household income. All individuals in the sample have rural hukou. The
error term εd,t is robust. haveNCMSd,t equals 1 if an individual d covered by the
NCMS in wave t. The OLS results are presented in Panel A in Table 3.4.
28which is the main age range for rural-to-urban migrants (NBS, 2012)
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At the individual level, enrolment of the NCMS is voluntary (Wagstaff et al., 2009).
So, there are endogeneities between haveNCMSd,t, migrantd,t, the controls, and pos-
sible unobservable variables, even after controlling for the individual fixed effects. For
example, individual health affects decisions on both whether or not to become a rural-
to-urban migrant and the NCMS enrolment. In addition to the difference-in-differences
method, I adopt Lei and Lin’s (2009) method and use a variable related to the county-
level NCMS enrolment as the instrumental variable for the individual-level enrolment.
Lei and Lin argue that it is difficult for the individual-level factors to affect the county-
level implementation of the NCMS, which indicates the county-level policies are plau-
sibly exogenous to individual-level controls and unobservable demographic variables.
Also, the county-level NCMS implementation is strongly correlated with the individual-
level NCMS enrolment. Most of the counties implemented the NCMS cover for more
than 50% of the population even during the first year of the NCMS implementation
(Wagstaff et al., 2009).
However, the county-level NCMS implementation might still affect the individual
decision to be a rural-to-urban migrant. Hence, I modify the county-level NCMS
implementation variable to a variable indicating whether the county is an early pilot
county for the NCMS. Whether the county is an early pilot county affects the residents’
decision to be a rural-to-urban migrant in a relatively smaller way. The average county-
level NCMS implementation’s effects on the individual level decisions are alleviated by
using the differences between the early-treated and the late-treated counties as the
IV. Also, in Section 3.3, I show that, before the implementation of the NCMS, the
early-treated counties and the late-treated counties had a similar pre-trend in terms of
the percentage of rural-urban migrants at the county level. The early-treated counties
usually have higher NCMS coverage for their population than the late-treated counties
given their early implementation dates and advertising.
To identify which counties are the early-treated counties, I need the percentage of
NCMS coverage for different counties. An ideal scenario would be if I knew the exact
start date of the first implementation of the NCMS with the detailed county names.
However, the CHNS does not provide the exact name of counties that were surveyed in
the data, so I cannot use the information collected in the county-level dataset and also
could not search for the corresponding implementation date for these counties. Each
county is classified as belonging to one of two groups, the early-treated group or the
late-treated group. Those counties where there are sudden increases in the number of
people enrolled in the NCMS in the 2004 or 2006 wave are classified as the early-treated
group.29 This is because only the 2004 and 2006 waves of the CHNS are close to the
starting date of the initial implementation of the NCMS. In 2004, only a few counties
29In rare cases, if a county had less than 10 people in 2000/2004 and had at least a 50% increase
in 2004/2006, then I counted this as a sudden increase and treated this county as an early-treatment
county. The detailed number of counties that had a sudden increase in NCMS coverage for each year
are presented in Appendix Table C.8.
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were included in the first and the second round pilot, so it is likely that only a small
number of counties included in the CHNS 2004 wave started to implement the NCMS.
The year 2006 can be regarded as a suitable date to ensure that at least some of these
counties in the CHNS are included in the early-treated group.
I create a dummy variable earlycounty which sets to 1 all individuals from early-
treated counties for the waves on and after 2006, and 0 for other individuals and waves.
The time-variant feature of the IV makes it similar to the idea of the difference-in-
differences IV, which further alleviates the concern of the county-level implementation
affecting the individual migration decisions. Also, the results from Section 3.3 shows
that the trends exist before the NCMS implementation for both the early and the
late-treated county, which helps the validity assumption of my resembling difference-
in-differences IV. The insignificant effect of the NCMS implementation on the migration
propensity in Section 3.3 might imply the early-treated county implementation do not
directly affect the probability of one being a rural-to-urban migrant. Yet, there might
be some second-order effects that I need to bear in mind when interpreting the results.
Using this new instrumental variable in the regression, I test whether individual en-
rolment in the NCMS affects individuals’ choice to be a rural-urban migrant. The IV
results are reported in Panel B in Table 3.4, after controlling for individual demograph-
ics, and the wave times province fixed effects. The result is negative and significant
for haveNCMSd,t. The effects of the NCMS on individual choices test the stock of
migrants. This means that, on average, being enrolled in the NCMS reduces the prob-
ability of one being a migrant by 5.9%. The first-stage results for earlycountyd,t are
reported in Table 3.5, and the coefficients are positive and significant with large F -
statistics. The IV results show that being enrolled in the NCMS has negative effects
on the probability of one being a rural-urban migrant.
If I generalise this individual-level effect to a county-level effect, it corresponds to the
negative effects of the NCMS implementation on the percentage of rural-urban migrants
at the county-level. The individual-level results show that the effects of the NCMS
implementation are larger than the county-level evidence, which only shows that the
NCMS implementations have second-order negative effects on the migration propensity.
One of the possible explanations for the difference between the individual-level and
county-level results is the misreporting problem. The under-reporting problems in
the county-level dataset would give me the lower-bound of the effect of the NCMS
implementation on the migration propensity. The possible endogeneity from the timing
of the county-level implementation can be another possible reason that drives the larger
effect of the NCMS implementation found in the individual-level results than in the
county-level results. Although the difference-in-differences IV alleviates the effects of
the county-level NCMS implementation on the individual-level migration decisions,
there are still possibilities that these effects are difficult to be ruled out completely. I
should bear this in mind when interpreting the results in this section.
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The different effects of individual NCMS enrolment by gender are also presented
in the second and the third column of Table 3.4 for the OLS and the IV results. The
different effects of the NCMS enrolment on the choice to be rural-to-urban migrants
at the individual level could be driven by a specific gender group. The gender of
the rural-to-urban migrants could have two different impacts on insurance enrolment.
First, according to the literature, women are more risk-averse than men (Borghan et
al., 2009), so the strong insurance preference of female migrants might camouflage the
fact that healthy male migrants do not want to be enrolled in the insurance scheme.
Second, male rural-to-urban migrants are more likely to join the workforce in poorly
regulated sectors, such as private mining, construction, and manufacturing firms (NBS,
2009). The actual accident injury rate and the occupational injuries of males are higher
than that of the female migrants. So female migrants are more under-insured than male
migrants because of their lower occupational risk (Mou et al., 2013), and this makes
male migrants more likely to respond to the new health insurance in rural areas. The
results for different gender in Table 3.4 show that the effects of the NCMS on males
and females are both negative and insignificant, which implies the effects of the NCMS
enrolment are not driven by one specific gender group, yet the male group does have
lager coefficients compared to the female group.
There is also an age differences in terms of the enrolment of the NCMS. Theo-
retically, young migrants are less likely to be enrolled in health insurance than old
migrants. I divide the total sample into two different age groups: young migrants aged
between 16 to 29, and old migrants aged between 30 to 45. I run Equation (3.5) on
two different subgroups, and the results are in the last two columns of Table 3.4. The
results show that the effects of the NCMS implementation are larger on young migrants
than old migrants, yet both effects are insignificant. The results can be possibly inter-
preted as young migrants might on average have less saving than old migrants. They
also understand the idea and the function of the insurance, especially health insurance,
better than the old migrants. So, the results do not support the argument that the
effect of the NCMS enrolment is driven by the old-migrant group.
In the description of the mechanism, the reason why the NCMS decreases the
migration propensity or its growth rate is that the NCMS reduces medical expenditure.
It is also necessary to test whether the NCMS actually reduces healthcare expenditure
in the individual-level dataset. However, the quality of the information on medical
expenditures is not very good in the CHNS. Hence, I provide the evidence proving the
mechanism by quoting the results of the impact of the NCMS implementation on out-of-
pocket expenditures from previous literature. There are many papers in the literature
on the reduction in out-of-pocket expenditures by the NCMS. Sun et al. (2009) find
that the NCMS decreases the out-of-pocket payments and significantly decreases the
number of households below the poverty line after catastrophic illnesses, and they
draw a similar conclusion in their paper in 2010 (Sun et al., 2010). In their review of
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the NCMS, Wagstaff et al. (2009) show that the NCMS increases the outpatient and
inpatient utilisation and reduces the cost of deliveries.
Attrition bias
The difference-in-differences method tracks individual behaviours over time, so the
attrition of the sample in the CHNS might affect the results. The argument is as
follows. The sample attrition could be partly driven by the people who became rural-
to-urban migrants and moved to urban areas with their whole family members during
the period of the survey. With people leaving the sample and the data’s focus on
people remaining in the sample, the attrition bias amplifies the negative effects of the
NCMS implementation. I test the attrition bias by regressing the probability of one
not being present for the next wave t + 1 on the implementation of the NCMS, with
the same demographic variables controlled as in Equation (3.5) in the current wave t
(Zhang, 2012). If people enrol in the NCMS, they are then less likely to become rural-
to-urban migrants and have a lower possibility of leaving their place of residence. The
probability of people leaving the sample should decrease through the implementation of
the NCMS if there is an attrition bias affecting the results. The results are in Panel A
in Table 3.6. From the insignificant coefficients and quite low R2, the results indicate
the effects of the attrition bias might be small in the CHNS, and in the context of
rural-to-urban migration and the NCMS implementation.
I also simply examine the effect of the NCMS on those individuals who remained in
the dataset from 1997 to 2011. The number of individuals drops from 5,769 to 2,539,
so less than half of the sample remained. I apply the same regressions in this reduced
sample, and the results are in Panel B in Table 3.6. A comparison of the results
in Panel B in Table 3.4 and Table 3.6 shows the two results are similar. For other
attrition biases, the fixed effect approach helps to alleviate potential biases associated
with demographic factors (Ziliak and Kniesner, 1998). These two methods are naive
ways of dealing with the attrition bias problem; I cannot eliminate other possible
attrition biases.
3.4.2 County-level evidence
In addition to the individual-level evidence provided by the CHNS, I construct a county-
level CHNS dataset and provide supporting county-level evidence from this data source
other than the yearbook dataset. The county-level CHNS dataset has a limited sample
with 36 counties only. Using the individual-level variable migrant, I created a variable
measuring the total number of eligible rural-to-urban migrants working in other places
in different counties.30 Dividing the total number of eligible rural-urban migrants by the
total sample population for different counties, I obtain the migration propensity for each
30Eligible migrants mean those migrants included in the sample for regression 3.5 who are aged
between 16-45 and are away from their households for more than 6 months.
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county, and again I use prop(migrants)i,t to indicate the migration propensity, as in
Section 3.3. I also generate corresponding growth rate, growthratei,t. The constructed
average income per capita, irrigated farmland per capita, total rural-labour force, and
average education level for each county similarly matched the control variables included
in Equation (3.2) in Section 3.3.
Due to the data limitation, the CHNS county-level data only include 36 coun-
ties for the years 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011. A difference-in-differences
county-level regression is used to conduct the county-level CHNS analysis. The de-
tailed information of the name for the counties is not available in the CHNS, so I
cannot obtain specific NCMS implementation dates for the counties. I continue to use
earlycountyi used as the IV for the individual-level results, which equals 1 if a county
i is in the early-treated group and is covered by the NCMS at wave t, and 0 otherwise.
I use a simple fixed-effect difference-in-differences regression to conduct the analysis.
The regression for examining the impact of the NCMS implementation on the migrant
propensity at the county-level is:
prop(migrants)i,t =α + βearlycountyi,t +X
′
i,tθ +
∑
k
γk × I[k = t]
×
∑
l
ρl × I[l = p] + yeart + µi × yeart + υt + εi,t,
(3.6)
where i is the index for county and t stands for wave. prop(migrants)i,t is the
propensity of rural residents in county i working outside their home county (county
i) at wave t. yeart is the linear wave trend and µi × yeart is the county-fixed effect
times the linear wave trend. υt is the wave fixed effect. I[k = t] represents the six wave
dummies from 1997-2011, and I[k = p] is the province (p) dummies (nice provinces
in total). The fixed-effect error term εi,t is clustered at the county level. Xi,t are the
control variables: the constructed average income per capita, irrigated farmland per
capita, total rural-labour force, and the average education level at the county-level. To
examine the impact of the NCMS on the growth rate of the migration propensity for
each county, the regression is:
growthratei,t =α + βearlycountyi,t +X
′
i,tθ +
∑
k
γk × I[k = t]
×
∑
l
ρl × I[l = p] + yeart + µi × yeart + υt + εi,t.
(3.7)
All other variables have the same meaning as in Equation (3.6). Again, the identifying
assumption for the difference-in-differences method is that the migration propensity
and its growth rate for the early-treated counties and the late-treated counties show
similar trends before the NCMS implementation. The assumption is likely to be valid
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as discussed in the previous sections, and the results in Section 3.3 also show a parallel
trend using a county-level dataset with larger sample size.
The results of the two regressions are reported in Table 3.7. It shows that the NCMS
implementation does not have a significant negative effect on the migration propensity
but has a marginally significant negative impact on its growth rate. The negative effect
on the growth rate could enhance the hypothesis that the NCMS implementation has
negative effects on the number of rural residents who are rural-to-urban migrants at
the county level, although through a second-order effect. This aggregate-level result
from CHNS also implies that it is reasonable to believe that the county-level results
from the dataset collected from the yearbooks are more likely to be valid. However,
the magnitude of the coefficient for earlycountyi,t is around 0.9%, which is smaller
than most of the yearly effects of the NCMS initial implementation in Table 3.3. It
is also smaller than the average effect of the NCMS implementation in Table 3.2. I
cannot conclude the exact effects of the NCMS implementation on the growth rate
of the migration propensity, but it is plausible that there is a negative effect on the
growth rate of the migration propensity.
3.5 Conclusions
Providing health insurance coverage for residents improves social welfare states, yet
the restrictions imposed by health insurance schemes might create unintended mis-
allocations in the labour market. This chapter finds that implementing a new health
insurance scheme with geographical limitations on the entitled reimbursement rates has
negative effects on the rural-to-urban migration labour market from both the county-
level analysis and the individual-level analysis. The county-level results show that the
NCMS implementation has negative and lagged effects on the growth rate of the mi-
gration propensity at the county level, while the individual-level results find a larger
effect for NCMS: it decreases the migration propensity directly. It is difficult to draw
a precise conclusion on the exact effect of the NCMS on the rural-to-urban migration
labour market from the individual and the county-level results, but both results suggest
that the NCMS implementation is likely to hinder the job mobility of rural-to-urban
migrants in China. The mechanism is that the NCMS helps reduce individual medical
expenditure through a simple compensating differential model. Rural residents are
more likely to stay in their hometown so that they can benefit from NCMS, according
to the model.
There are a few limitations of the analysis that affect the interpretation of the
results. First, both of the datasets used are not comprehensive. Only twelve of China’s
23 provinces are covered, and there are missing entries in the CHNS. Also, data from
some years are missing in the county-level dataset collected from yearbooks due to the
long-time span covered. Second, the measurement error problems in both datasets
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are almost unavoidable when using survey data and yearbook data. Third, there
are potential problems with the empirical methods used in the chapter due to the
data limitation. Both the county-level and the individual-level results support possible
negative effects of the NCMS on rural-to-urban migration. This makes the misreporting
and the low-coverage less of a problem to some extent, although the magnitude of the
NCMS effects does not match these results from the two datasets. The problems caused
by the limitations have not been completely eliminated, and this still needs to be borne
in mind when interpreting the results. If there were a more complete and larger dataset
for migrant information in China, this would permit a structural analysis of individual
willingness to pay for the NCMS in rural areas and also the propensity-score matching
method to better identify the empirical results.
Given the large population in China, even a small change in the growth rate of
the migration propensity can affect millions of people’s labour market behaviours.
The NCMS was implemented with the aim of meeting the welfare needs of residents
in rural areas and providing universal health insurance coverage for all residents in
China. But, its restriction on the reimbursement rate due to the method of financing
the NCMS creates unexpected adverse effects on rural residents who are rural-to-urban
migrants. Even after 2008, when all the counties in China implemented the NCMS,
this cheap manual labour is still in high demand in urban areas, but the pool of workers
is shrinking. If the NCMS continues to tether migrants and potential migrants to their
birthplace, it might hinder any further urbanisation process.31 It would be optimal if
the government provided a specific health insurance scheme for rural-to-urban migrants
who work in urban areas. From 2010 onwards, the government has made the enrolment
of rural-to-urban migrants in Urban Resident Health Care Insurance easier for rural-
to-urban migrants.32 This is a useful step forward, but the ultimate goal of this policy
might be difficult to achieve. It is likely that there will continue to be unregistered
migrants working in urban areas, especially in middle-sized or small cities. It is also
difficult to enforce the policy in small cities because, for these cities, local financial
support might not be enough for the policy implementation.33 The government merged
the NCMS and the Urban Resident Insurance Scheme from 2016 onwards, making it
easier for rural residents to claim their expenses and get a higher reimbursement rate
if they visit hospitals outside their own town or village (Pan et al., 2016). This is a
practical policy for the government to enhance the health insurance provision for rural-
to-urban migrants and should be encouraged in order to improve the consolidation
of these two health insurance schemes. But it still requires collaborations between
different administrative-level governments, and it might be challenging in practice due
to the way that the NCMS is financed.
31There are news articles reporting the difficulties of hiring rural-to-urban migrants in 2012.
http://jingji.cntv.cn/20120206/116278.shtml
32Source: http://www.sz.gov.cn/sbjjblj/zcfggfxwj/sbzy/201311/t20131130 2258714.htm (in Chi-
nese).
33Source: http://news.cb.com.cn/html/economy 9 26010 1.html (in Chinese).
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From the above description of the constraints on the NCMS, it is clear that the
hukou system is one of the main factors preventing rural-to-urban migrants from par-
ticipating in the health insurance programme provided in urban areas. If the hukou
system were abolished, and urban and rural people had an identical household registra-
tion type, the geographical limitations of the NCSM would have smaller negative effects
on individual migration decisions. Without the hukou, migrants could be enrolled in
any type of health insurance schemes in China. The central government in China is
trying to abolish, or at least relax, the restrictions of hukou.34 However, it is difficult
for the government to do this quickly because the design of many existing policies is
based on the hukou system, and the urban-rural differences in China are quite large.
It is easier for the central government to introduce a health insurance scheme only for
rural-to-urban migrants and to use the new scheme to address the immediate health
care needs of this large group of migrants. Apart from the health insurance policy, it
would also be more relevant if the government in future could set policies that were
not based on the hukou system given the large migrant population in China.
The low geographical mobility of the rural-to-urban migrants might hinder the ur-
banisation process and economic developments in China. But it might not be inefficient
given other restrictions in other markets, especially in the public pension market. Ac-
cording to Chapter 1, the public pension provision is not sufficient for the old-age care
in China even with its expansion. So, if people stay in their hometown and stay close
to their elderly parents, it is likely that they would spend more time taking care of their
parents and provide more non-financial old-age support. This would help alleviate the
public old-age care provision burden.
34Source: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2187689/could-be-end-chinas-
notorious-household-registration-system
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Figure 3.1: The distribution of “pilot” counties: 2003-2008
Note: This distribution is based only on data collected from provincial statistical yearbooks. y-axis is the number of
new “pilot” counties for each year. x-axis is the year of the NCMS initial implementation. The figure only includes
counties from the five provinces covered in this chapter. There is also one county starting in 2002 and one county
starting in 2009.
Figure 3.2: The number of new migrants (1990 to 2008, RUMiC)
Note: The number of new migrants is the number of people who first migrates out as a rural-to-urban migrant. y-axis is
the number of new migrants. x-axis is the year that respondents answered for the question “When did you first migrate
out for work”. The time span similar to the datasets used in this chapter, I only show the number of new migrants
from 1990 to 2008.
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Table 3.1: Different health insurance schemes and their coverage in China
Group Heath insurance coverage
Urban residents URHI
Urban employees UEHI
Rural-to-urban employees UEHI
Rural residents NCMS
Intra-county migrants NCMS
Rural-to-urban migrants NCSM, difficult to benefit
Table 3.2: The average effects of NCMS on prop(migrants)i,t and growthratei,t
VARIABLES prop(migrants)i,t growthratei,t
NCMS 0.000 -0.685
(0.041) (1.172)
year × province FE Yes Yes
year trend Yes Yes
county FE × year trend Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes
Observations 1,814 1,813
Number of counties 178 178
R-squared 0.229 0.154
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;***
significant at 1%. The stand errors are clustered at county-level. prop(migrants)i,t is the
migration propensity for each county i at time t and growthratei,t is the corresponding
growth rate. Key regressor NCMS is the treatment and time interaction term in the
difference-in-differences method. The control variables include GDP per capita, disposable
income per capita for rural residents, irrigated farmland per capita, and total rural labour
force for each county at each year. Three counties were merged with other counties and
hence the growth rate data are missing.
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Table 3.3: The event study results on prop(migrants)i,t and growthratei,t
VARIABLES prop(migrants)i,t growthratei,t
Event time
-4 -0.0161 -0.0152 -0.400 -0.383
(0.0138) (0.0139) (0.400) (0.403)
-3 -0.00747 -0.00752 -0.230 -0.247
(0.00945) (0.00998) (0.592) (0.584)
-2 0.00517 0.00465 -0.0829 -0.102
(0.0196) (0.0197) (1.375) (1.371)
-1 0.00162 0.00203 1.474 1.461
(0.0361) (0.0363) (1.574) (1.577)
0 -0.0356 -0.0358 -0.156 -0.164
(0.0315) (0.0315) (0.932) (0.931)
1 0.0331 0.0343 -1.453** -1.426*
(0.0757) (0.0755) (0.729) (0.730)
2 0.0696 0.0701 -0.464 -0.413
(0.0544) (0.0538) (1.119) (1.129)
3 -0.0615 -0.0627 -1.724** -1.653**
(0.0554) (0.0581) (0.777) (0.778)
4 -0.0900 -0.0914 -1.282** -1.272**
(0.0578) (0.0579) (0.591) (0.596)
year × province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
county FE × year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,813 1,813 1,812 1,812
R-squared 0.236 0.237 0.158 0.158
Number of county 178 178 178 178
Autocorrelation test 0.0183 0.0183 0.5583 0.5583
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. The stand errors are clustered at county-level. prop(migrants)i,t is the
migration propensity for each county i at time t and growthratei,t is the corresponding growth
rate. Key regressor Event time equals 0 indicates the first year a county starting to implement
NCMS. The control variables include GDP per capita, disposable income per capita for rural
residents, irrigated farmland per capita, and total rural labour force for each county at each year.
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Table 3.4: The effect of the NCMS enrolment on one’s decision to be a migrant
VARIABLES migrantd,t
Panel A: OLS
Total Male Female Young Old
haveNCMS 0.001 -0.003 0.006 -0.0131 0.005
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.0238) (0.004)
Observations 12,092 6,255 5,837 4,151 7,941
Number of individuals 5,769 2,844 2,925 2,895 3,750
R-squared 0.052 0.017 0.008 0.042 0.004
Panel B: IV
Total Male Female Young Old
haveNCMS -0.060** -0.077 -0.035 -0.101 -0.0125
(0.027) (0.047) (0.027) (0.106) (0.025)
Observations 12,092 6,255 5,837 4,151 7,941
Number of individuals 5,769 2,844 2,925 2,895 3,750
R-squared 0.068 0.013 0.005 0.047 0.004
individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
county control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year × province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%. The stand errors are clustered at county-level. migrantd,t is a dummy variable equals 1 if individual
d is a migrant and 0 otherwise. Key regressor haveNCMS is the individual decision variable of NCMS
participation. This table also shows the effect of haveNCMS by gender and age. Males and females are
nearly equally sampled in the dataset. Young migrants age from 16 to 29 and old migrants age from 30 to
45. The instrumental variable for haveNCMS is earlycounty, which sets to 1 for all individuals from
early-treated counties for the waves 2006, 2009 and 2011 and 0 for other individuals and waves. The
control variables are deflated household income per capita, age, marital status, occupation, and highest
education level, and also county-level average household income.
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Table 3.5: The first stage for the early county NCMS implementation IV
VARIABLES haveNCMSd,t
Total Male Female Young Old
earlycounty 0.278*** 0.237*** 0.336*** 0.350*** 0.291***
(0.020) (0.027) (0.029) (0.060) (0.026)
individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
county control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year × province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,092 6,255 5,837 4,151 7,941
Number of individuals 5,769 2,844 2,925 2,895 3,750
R-squared 0.002 0.003 0.115 0.283 0.027
F -statistic 226.09 141.63 104.12 21.76 141.53
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%. The stand errors are clustered at county-level. Key regressor haveNCMS in the main regression is
the individual decision variable of NCMS participation is the main outcome variable here. This table also
shows the effect of haveNCMS by gender and age. Males and females are nearly equally sampled in the
dataset. Young migrants age from 16 to 29 and old migrants age from 30 to 45. The instrumental variable
earlycounty is the key regressor, which sets to 1 for all individuals from early-treated counties for the
waves 2006, 2009 and 2011 and 0 for other individuals and waves. The control variables are deflated
household income per capita, age, marital status, occupation, and highest education level, and also
county-level average household income. F -statistic is larger than 10.
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Table 3.6: Attrition bias check and attrition-bias-free CHNS data
Panel A: attrition bias check
pr(attrition)d,t
VARIABLES Total Male Female Young Old
haveNCMS -0.030 -0.020 -0.042 -0.040 0.002
(0.050) (0.080) (0.061) (0.096) (0.062)
Observations 12,092 6,255 5,837 4,151 7,941
Number of individuals 5,769 2,844 2,925 2,895 3,750
R-squared 0.0004 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Panel B: attrition-bias-free sample
migrantd,t: IV
VARIABLES Total Male Female Young Old
haveNCMS -0.064** -0.080 -0.040 -0.111 -0.009
(0.017) (0.050) (0.035) (0.133) (0.026)
Observations 6,419 3,644 2,775 2,099 4,320
Number of individuals 2,539 1,132 1,494 1,272 1,755
R-squared 0.101 0.006 0.035 0.003 0.005
individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year × province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. The stand errors are clustered at county-level. Key variable haveNCMS is the
individual decision variable of NCMS participation. In Panel A, outcome variable pr(attrition)d,t
is the probability of respondents leaving the sample in year t+ 1. In Panel B, outcome variable
migrantd,t is a dummy variable equals 1 if individual d is a migrant and 0 otherwise. This table
also shows the effect of haveNCMS by gender and age. Males and females are nearly equally
sampled in the dataset. Young migrants age from 16 to 29 and old migrants age from 30 to 45.
The control variables are deflated household income per capita, age, marital status, occupation,
and highest education level, and county-level average household income. The instrumental variable
for haveNCMS is earlycounty, which sets to 1 for all individuals from early-treated counties for
the waves 2006, 2009 and 2011 and 0 for other individuals and waves. In this attrition-bias-free
CHNS dataset, the sample size drops from around 5,769 to 2,539 observations.
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Table 3.7: Results from the county-level CHNS data
VARIABLES prop(migrants)i,t growthratei,t
earlycountyi,t -0.009 -0.902*
(0.011) (0.446)
county FE × year trend Yes Yes
year trend Yes Yes
year × province FE Yes Yes
control Yes Yes
Observations 212 172
Number of counties 36 36
R-squared 0.026 0.0512
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%. The stand errors are clustered at county-level. prop(migrants)i,t
is the county-level migration propensity and growthratei,t is the growth rate of the
migration propensity. The control variable is the average household income per capita
adjusted by CPI for each county. earlycounty is the county-level decision variable of
NCMS participation. There are only 36 counties in this sample because of CHNS data
limitations. The number of observations drops in the third column because for the
growth rate of the migration propensity, it loses one-year of data due to the calculation.
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Appendix A
Appendix of “The Role of Social
Norms in Old-age Support:
Evidence from China”
A.1 Gender differences of P in old-age support
The OLS results from in the first three columns in Table A.3 show that, in the
CHARLS, there is no significant gender difference between the parents in the proba-
bility of providing any kinds of transfer and the total amount of the transfer provided.
But males visit their parents more. Also for male P , with the increase in their house-
hold size, they provide more old-age support and visit their parents more. To sum up,
males still provide more support than females, especially when it comes to transfers
and visits paid to elderly parents recorded in the CHARLS. However, the OLS results
from the CHFS in Table A.3 seem to show fewer gender differences. The coefficients of
maleP for the probability of providing any kind of transfer and for the total amount
of any transfer are both negative, although the coefficient for the total amount of any
transfer is insignificant. The only positive and significant coefficient for maleP is the
one for the days spent visiting their ageing parents. From the CHFS results, it seems
that at least regarding the probability of providing pecuniary transfer, female P are
more likely to provide than males. The greatest difference between the two datasets
arise from the composition of samples living in urban and rural areas, as shown in
the summary statistics (see Table 1.2) and discussed in the subsample section. The
discrepancy between the OLS results from the CHARLS and the CHFS for maleP
may suggest that there is a difference in the gender norm for providing support for
the elderly in urban and rural areas in China. Combining the results in the CHARLS
and the CHFS, it is reasonable to assume that males still provide more in the rural
areas and urban females may have more important roles in terms of providing old-age
support, supported by the empirical finding in Xie and Zhu (2009).
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A.2 Different representations of outcome variables
In the previous regression equations, the outcome variable regarding the amount of the
transfer is the actual amount of the transfer. The results when using the actual amount
of the transfer might be affected by the outliers in the sample, so I capped the amount
of the transfer used, and this might create bias in the results. Using the logarithms of
the amount of transfer and also the corresponding income or expenditure percentage
help to reduce the sensitivity of the results caused by the outliers, which are common in
survey datasets. For both datasets, I run Equation (1.1) on the new outcome variables
for the amount of the transfer: the logarithms of the amount of the transfer and the
amount of the transfer as a percentage of total income. The results are shown in Table
A.7 in the Appendix. For the CHARLS results, the father demonstration effect for
the outcome variable, the percentage of income, appears to be consistent with the
results in Table 1.4, although with an 88% significance level. The log amount of the
transfer has a marginally significant father demonstration effect that is consistent with
the main results using the CHARLS dataset. The father demonstration effects for
the transfer percentage in the CHARLS are both positive and insignificant. With the
CHFS, the results show the insignificant but negative mother demonstration effect for
the percentage outcome and the log amount of any transfer provided by the parents.
Furthermore, the transfers from the elderly are not included in the construction
of the outcome variables used in the main regressions. I change the transfer outcome
variables to net transfer variables. If any transfer equals 1 and the parents receive
the transfers from or are living together with their elderly parents, I change the corre-
sponding value to 0. For the amount of the monetary transfer, I use the net transfer
provided by the parents, which is the amount of transfer provided to the parents minus
the amount of the transfer received by them from their elderly parents. The change is
made for both datasets. The results for the net transfers are also included in Table A.7.
They are consistent with the main results, except for the negative father demonstration
effect for any transfer in the CHFS. The magnitudes of the demonstration effect for
the probability of providing any transfer also increase beyond the main results.
A.3 Additional Notes
Data and IV construction in CHARLS: I have had to make certain assumptions
when constructing the gender of the first child IV in CHARLS. As discussed above,
I have restructured the original dataset from a dataset where the main respondents
are the O generation in my setting to a dataset in which the main observations are
the children of the main respondents. In the regression setting, the children of the
respondents are the P generation. The original dataset gives no information on the
birth year but gives the gender composition and number of the K generation. The
year of birth is available only if grandchildren are living with the first generation.
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Moreover, many observations are missing for P and K that are not living together
with O. Apart from this information, the dataset does provide information on the
gender composition and number of the third generation if she or he is above the age
of 16. For most households, I can use this information to work out the gender of the
first child. But some estimations are still needed in this process; they are based on the
parents’ age, especially the average age of female parents when their children are born,
in order of birth, in both urban and rural areas.
For households affected by the policy ban after 2003 As discussed, using
a subsample includes only households affected by the policy ban after 2003 might
not provide well-identified results when the gender of the first child is kept as the
instrumental variable. This is because, even with the policy ban, the gender ratio in
some provinces is still high. I use a subsample check to provide relevant evidence.
I divide the sample that includes only households affected by the policy ban after
2003 into two subsamples, one showing a high gender-ratio and the other showing a
low gender-ratio. A province is classified as a high gender-ratio province 1 if in the
2010 Population Census gender ratio there is above the national gender ratio, and 0
otherwise. Table A.22 shows the results of this simple subsample check. The father
demonstration effects are positive for the amount of the transfer and the visits paid for
the high gender-ratio provinces. The father effect is only significant for the visits paid
in the low gender-ratio province subsample. The results from the CHFS are also in
Table A.22, which shows that the only significant mother demonstration effect is the
effect on the amount of the transfer provided in low gender-ratio provinces. The results
from this simple sample check add a piece of suggestive evidence that depending on the
gender ratio level, different provinces might lead to the demonstration effect differently.
A.4 Figures and Tables
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Figure A.1: Distribution of CHARLS sample counties and districts
Data source: Official report by CCER. Website: http://charls.pku.edu.cn/uploads/
document/public documents/application/Challenges-of-Population-Aging-in-China-final.pdf
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Table A.1: Summary statistics for CHARLS: Females and males subsamples
CHARLS (mostly rural)
Females Males
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
whether P provides
any transfers 0.254 0.264 0.314 0.341
regular transfer 0.045 0.166 0.164 0.336
non-regular transfer 0.222 0.262 0.265 0.346
amount of
regular transfer 209.9 3036.5 475.4 4450.2
non-regular transfer 412.1 2330.1 531.7 3564.7
visit days 61.67 104.6 166.4 157.6
more sons in K 0.679 0.467 0.688 0.464
No. of Y 1.648 0.781 1.637 0.766
age of P 38.11 8.956 38.81 8.737
income level of P 5.085 1.417 5.076 1.419
education of P 0.814 0.531 0.960 0.444
whether P has a rural hukou 0.766 0.423 0.767 0.423
whether P is married 0.999 0.031 0.998 0.0462
P living in rural areas 0.351 0.477 0.345 0.476
No. of siblings of P 3.875 1.598 3.645 1.617
P ’s ranking in siblings 2.827 1.445 1.978 1.210
professional title of P 0.077 0.481 0.130 0.600
distance from O 3.874 1.332 2.703 2.048
household head of O 0.433 0.496 0.431 0.495
average age of O 65.25 9.622 66.04 9.552
average working status of O 0.550 0.455 0.536 0.456
average pension of O 0.180 0.384 0.182 0.385
average education level of O 2.735 1.564 2.690 1.556
who should support O 1.592 1.024 1.567 1.003
have O retired 1.874 0.302 1.870 0.305
whether O have deposit 0.124 0.330 0.129 0.336
household income of O 103669 3454041 129728 3796947
hours of O taking care of grandchildren 217.61 1124 827.9 2248
any transfers from O 0.034 0.182 0.041 0.197
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Table A.2: Summary statistics for CHFS: Females and males subsamples
CHFS (mostly urban)
Females Males
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
whether P provides any transfers 0.301 0.459 0.228 0.420
amount of total transfer 650.0 1670.0 548.4 1627.8
visit days 69.05 126.2 114.4 159.2
gender ratio of K 0.559 0.426 0.575 0.407
No. of K 1.585 0.833 1.740 0.936
age of P 46.91 10.35 49.44 9.822
income of P 22510 43919 21049 43347
education of P 0.801 0.652 0.864 0.638
whether P has a rural hukou 0.493 0.500 0.597 0.491
marital status of P 0.763 0.425 0 1
P living in rural areas 0.268 0.443 0.395 489
No. of siblings of P 3.189 1.821 3.248 1.890
whether P is working 0.576 0.494 0.801 0.400
occupation of P 0.789 1.597 1.014 1.822
whether P has loan 0.096 0.295 0.934 0.291
No. of O alive 1.279 0.948 1.181 0.904
average education level of O 1.974 1.137 1.813 1.064
whether O are party members 2.722 0.546 2.736 0.555
hukou status of O 1.372 0.504 1.283 0.904
any transfers from O 0.144 0.351 0.118 0.323
Table A.3: The gender of the adult child on the provision of old-age support
OLS: CHARLS (mostly rural) OLS: CHFS(mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
maleP 0.00313 85.61 21.48*** -0.0264** -73.99 27.56***
(0.0223) (223.1) (4.754) (0.0124) (56.59) (5.792)
hh-size -0.00937 -16.81 -4.125** -0.00463 -18.53 -7.966***
(0.0126) (87.83) (1.835) (0.00531) (18.48) (1.296)
maleP× hh-size 0.000158 309.0** 11.54*** -0.00339 28.64 14.46***
(0.0117) (151.0) (2.858) (0.00667) (24.01) (2.876)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232 19,509 19,509 19,509
R-squared 0.205 0.050 0.628 0.282 0.203 0.168
Mean 0.401 831.2 118.7 0.303 489.1 91.66
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. maleP
is the gender of P . The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to
their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided (amount), and the number of days spent on visits
paid to their elderly parents per year (visit days). The key controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education,
hukou status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age,
education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care of P ’s
K, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the
prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS.
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Table A.5: First stage for two constructed instrumental variables
VARIABLES sex ratioK
CHARLS CHFS
sex ratioK 1 2003 0.263*** 0.430***
(0.007) (0.007)
prefectural index -0.039** -
(0.009) -
P demographics Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 19,509
F -test 199.88 512.63
Under-identification test
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 65.17 25.715
Weak identification test
Cragg-Donald Wald F -stat. 678.83 2100.56
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F test 199.88 512.63
Over-identification test
Hansen J statistic 0.858 -
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The coefficient presented here for first stage
coefficients for the IV regression. sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the
household of P . sex ratioK 1 2003 is the gender of the first-born child in the
family after 2003 together and prefectural index is the index that indicating how
strict the cities on the gender selection behaviours at prefecture-level. The key
controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status,
whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O,
and O’s transfer to P , age, education, working status, retirement status, any
deposit, hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K,
depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS.
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Table A.6: The demonstration effect on the provision of old-age support: Dummy
gender ratio
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS (mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
maleP -0.0774 -230.3 -31.03** -0.0497 -230.8 -1.524
(0.0491) (308.0) (12.27) (0.0432) (165.2) (16.01)
more sons -0.0387 -254.6 -3.464 -0.0695** -89.49 -44.25***
(0.0406) (368.1) (7.092) (0.0321) (126.1) (10.14)
maleP ×more sons 0.120** 467.7 78.72*** 0.0397 242.9 46.80**
(0.0566) (419.3) (14.75) (0.0606) (271.0) (22.87)
hh-size -0.00835 -18.43 -2.253 -0.00467 -14.67 -7.549***
(0.0131) (81.63) (1.865) (0.00498) (18.17) (1.227)
maleP× hh-size -0.000595 307.2** 10.72*** -0.00509 26.01 13.32***
(0.0119) (149.2) (2.888) (0.00624) (23.66) (2.734)
more sons+ 0.081*** 213.1 75.25*** -0.030 153.4 2.551
maleP ×more sons (0.029) (207.1) (12.36) (0.043) (190.1) (16.83)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232 19,509 19,509 19,509
R-squared 0.200 0.049 0.602 0.280 0.202 0.158
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
maleP is the gender of P . more sonsK is a dummy representing whether the gender ratio of K in the household of P
is larger or equal to 0.5, and it is the mother demonstration effect. more sons+maleP × sex ratioK shows the father
demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial
transfer to their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided (amount), and the number of
days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (visit days). The key controls are P ’s household-size,
gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation,
distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status,
household income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K, depending on the availability of the information in the
CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the
cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child born on or after 2003 and the
prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child born on or after 2003 for the CHFS.
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Figure A.2: Trend assumption for the instrumental variable (DDIV)
Note: x-axis is the year of birth for the last child in households and y-axis shows the average probability
of providing net old-age support for people who have their last child born in the same year. The graph
is generated from the CHFS only.
Table A.8: Son preference in China
Urban areas Rural areas
CHFS No. Percentage No. Percentage
Prefer sons 1,159 8.43% 621 9.25%
Prefer daughters 2,904 21.12% 672 10.01%
Indifferent 9,685 70.45% 5,423 80.75%
Notes: The question asked in the 2013 CHFS wave is ”Do you think it is better to
have a son or it is better to have a daughter?”. I separate the sample into people
who live in urban areas and those who live in rural areas.
137
Table A.9: The demonstration effect: no cohabitation sample only
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS (mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
maleP -6.097 -1,452 -1,229 -0.0966** -354.1* -15.63
(16.87) (25,990) (2,917) (0.0486) (195.1) (13.24)
sex ratioK -0.114 -246.0 -21.28 -0.0816** -190.7 -41.03***
(0.341) (687.8) (65.42) (0.0338) (140.1) (9.957)
maleP × sex ratioK 8.995 2,098 1,837 0.0827 514.2 41.74**
(24.97) (38,537) (4,311) (0.0692) (323.9) (21.24)
sexratioK+ 8.881 1,851 1,815 0.001 323.5 0.715
maleP × sex ratioK (24.65) (37,960) (4,249) (0.050) (247.0) (16.16)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,488 10,488 10,489 17,786 17,786 17,786
R-squared -24.100 0.048 -18.517 0.230 0.220 0.072
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
maleP is the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother
demonstration effect. sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome
variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents
(any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided (amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their
elderly parents per year (visit days). The key controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou
status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age,
education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care
of P ’s K, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is
clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs
are the gender of the first child born on or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the
gender of the first child born on or after 2003 for the CHFS.
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Table A.10: Heterogeneity Check: Household income level
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS(mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
maleP -0.104 -780.7** -17.08 -0.0448 -354.0* -29.87
(0.0654) (369.9) (14.29) (0.0592) (199.6) (18.96)
sex ratioK -0.0214 -153.4 8.847 -0.0789 -470.0** -67.30***
(Low income mother (0.0628) (339.8) (10.93) (0.0514) (212.2) (14.98)
demonstrate effects)
high income 0.0553 -600.1 24.80*** 0.00333 -587.2*** -19.90*
(0.0567) (426.7) (9.306) (0.0400) (186.2) (11.44)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.198** 1,136** 69.74*** 0.0326 500.9 105.2***
(0.0870) (484.7) (19.72) (0.0904) (335.2) (29.20)
sex ratioK× high income -0.0451 -256.4 -22.31 0.0121 778.4** 41.26**
(Differences in mother (0.0930) (625.2) (16.06) (0.0728) (361.8) (19.03)
demonstrate effects)
maleP× high income 0.130 1,202** -42.42*** -0.0141 229.5 50.48**
(0.0856) (593.2) (14.58) (0.0721) (254.8) (22.78)
maleP × sex ratioK -0.276* -1,676* 39.33* 0.0183 -513.5 -112.3***
×high income (0.142) (857.1) (23.61) (0.130) (466.6) (38.19)
High income father -0.145** -949.1* 95.61*** -0.016 295.8 -33.14
demonstrate effects (0.068) (502.8) (16.47) (0.062) (289.8) (26.55)
Low income father 0.176*** 983.0*** 78.58*** -0.046 30.91 37.92*
demonstrate effects (0.043) (311.8) (15.94) (0.063) (265.1) (22.25)
Differences in father -0.321*** -1932.2*** 17.02 0.030 264.9 -71.06**
demonstrate effects (0.093) (702.0) (16.95) (0.088) (382.1) (32.02)
High income mother -0.066*** -409.7 -13.46 -0.067 308.4 -26.03*
demonstrate effects (0.065) (635.4) (11.10) (0.048) (239.7) (13.29)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232 19,509 19,509 19,509
R-squared 0.195 0.047 0.600 0.280 0.199 0.154
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly
parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided (amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to
their elderly parents per year (visit days). The key controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou
status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age,
education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care of
P ’s K, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at
the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender
of the first child born on or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first
child born on or after 2003 for the CHFS. maleP is the gender of P . high income is a dummy representing P ’s
income-level, and it interacts with key regressors. sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and the
mother demonstration effect for P with high-level income. sex ratioK× high income represents the difference between
the mother demonstration effects for P with high-level income and the mother demonstration effects for P with low-level
income, which should be negative and significant if the mother demonstration effects for P with high-level income are
larger than the mother demonstration effects for P with low-level income.
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Table A.11: Heterogeneity Check: Single child family
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS(mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
maleP -0.0623 1,069 -15.65 0.00656 -394.9 -28.71
(0.104) (998.0) (20.78) (0.0829) (317.8) (37.09)
sex ratioK 0.0160 -209.2 -4.973 0.0329 -854.0*** -100.4***
(non-singleK HH mother (0.115) (777.9) (17.51) (0.0835) (264.2) (38.34)
demonstrate effects)
singleK 0.0346 16.06 0.577 0.0822* -472.6*** -23.44
(0.0635) (456.5) (10.84) (0.0441) (160.4) (22.81)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.112 -605.5 118.8*** -0.0838 769.1 177.9**
(0.198) (1,706) (38.17) (0.161) (634.6) (70.41)
sex ratioK× singleK -0.0830 50.71 5.181 -0.141 1,020*** 68.50
(Differences in mother (0.125) (766.7) (19.55) (0.0872) (305.3) (43.22)
demonstrate effects)
maleP× singleK -0.00938 -1,004 1.102 -0.0794 286.8 61.52*
(0.128) (1,170) (20.48) (0.0780) (279.8) (37.03)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.0281 1,192 -44.64 0.162 -684.1 -166.7**
×singleK (0.232) (1,991) (36.89) (0.154) (543.5) (69.94)
singleK HH father 0.073 428.5 74.32*** -0.031 250.7* -20.66
demonstrate effects (0.049) (409.4) (11.42) (0.036) (146.2) (15.62)
Non-singleK HH father 0.128 -814.6 113.7*** -0.051 -84.88 77.49
demonstrate effects (0.129) (1,053) (30.72) (0.119) (567.3) (63.71)
Differences in father -0.055 1,243 -39.46 0.020 335.6 -98.16
demonstrate effects (0.167) (1,399) (28.09) (0.108) (507.1) (64.70)
singleK HH mother 0.029 -554.7 123.9** -0.108*** 165.7 -31.86***
demonstrate effects (0.300) (2,371) (51.88) (0.034) (158.6) (11.10)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232 19,509 19,509 19,509
R-squared 0.200 0.047 0.597 0.278 0.198 0.151
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly
parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided (amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to
their elderly parents per year (visit days). The key controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou
status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age,
education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care of
P ’s K, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at
the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender
of the first child born on or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first
child born on or after 2003 for the CHFS. maleP is the gender of P . singleK is a dummy representing whether P have
only one child, and it interacts with key regressors. sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and the
mother demonstration effect for P with only one child. sex ratioK × singleK represents the difference between the
mother demonstration effects for P with only one child and the mother demonstration effects for P with more than one
child, which should be negative and significant if the mother demonstration effects for P with only one child are larger
than the mother demonstration effects for P with more than one child.
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Table A.12: Heterogeneity Check: Urban-rural differences
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS(mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
maleP -0.108* -773.6* -39.24** 0.0675 118.6 -95.96*
(0.0618) (406.0) (15.80) (0.131) (314.6) (51.21)
sex ratioK -0.0640 -495.6 -4.914 0.00835 -522.6* -16.54
(Rural mother (0.0605) (423.5) (8.866) (0.127) (275.8) (39.53)
demonstrate effects)
urban -0.0904 -320.3 12.19 0.0987 -131.6 23.86
(0.0615) (494.2) (11.21) (0.0852) (178.5) (24.47)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.133 1,234** 99.33*** -0.154 -251.1 259.7***
(0.0828) (622.2) (20.21) (0.196) (482.3) (75.87)
sex ratioK × urban 0.0489 674.6 17.13 -0.0905 526.2 -46.43
(Differences in mother (0.103) (858.2) (18.51) (0.150) (336.5) (40.78)
demonstrate effects)
maleP × urban 0.0511 1,358* 15.15 -0.125 -391.4 92.35*
(0.0751) (765.2) (13.60) (0.116) (336.2) (48.16)
maleP × sex ratioK -0.0125 -2,108* -50.96** 0.219 604.9 -233.3***
×urban (0.131) (1,219) (21.06) (0.196) (580.7) (77.24)
Urban father 0.104* -694.7 60.59*** -0.017 357.3 -36.54*
demonstrate effects (0.062) (519.9) (14.63) (0.042) (251.1) (21.54)
Rural father 0.068* 738.5** 94.41*** -0.145 -773.7* 243.1***
demonstrate effects (0.041) (308.1) (17.54) (0.133) (408.0) (66.24)
Differences in father 0.036 -1,433** -33.82* 0.128 1,131** -279.7***
demonstrate effects (0.088) (703.3) (18.08) (0.132) (533.4) (73.37)
Urban mother 0.181 1,908 116.5*** -0.082* 3.561 -62.98***
demonstrate effects (0.163) (1,199) (28.88) (0.044) (154.7) (11.19)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232 19,509 19,509 19,509
R-squared 0.201 0.047 0.601 0.279 0.194 0.094
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly
parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided (amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to
their elderly parents per year (visit days). The key controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou
status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age,
education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care of
P ’s K. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS. The IVs are the gender of the first
child born on or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS. maleP is the gender of P . urban is a
dummy representing whether P live in urban areas, and it interacts with key regressors. sex ratioK is the gender ratio of
K in the household of P and the mother demonstration effect for P with any older brothers. sex ratioK × urban
represents the difference between the mother demonstration effects for P live in urban areas and the mother
demonstration effects for P live in rural areas, which should be negative and significant if the mother demonstration
effects for P live in urban areas are larger than the mother demonstration effects for P live in rural areas.
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Table A.13: Subsample analysis: Urban-singleton households
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS (mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
Urban-singleton
maleP -0.00299 -592.9 8.020 -0.0816** -180.6 8.082
(0.0568) (722.7) (12.85) (0.0328) (131.2) (13.64)
sex ratioK -0.0157 -244.4 7.033 -0.0896*** -13.23 -24.11**
(0.0670) (911.7) (15.49) (0.0343) (158.8) (10.14)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.00379 877.1 19.02 0.0921 173.6 26.14
(0.0830) (1,215) (18.31) (0.0580) (255.3) (22.34)
sex ratioK+ -0.012 632.7 26.04** 0.002 160.3 2.028
maleP × sex ratioK (0.045) (622.6) (12.56) (0.039) (157.7) (17.27)
Observations 2,466 2,466 2,466 9,364 9,364 9,364
R-squared 0.230 0.085 0.612 0.254 0.206 0.128
Others
maleP -0.142** 55.45 -29.65** 0.0655 -301.6 -6.517
(0.0593) (346.3) (14.86) (0.103) (369.0) (38.15)
sex ratioK -0.0634 -279.4 -3.850 -0.0101 -258.5 -122.7***
(0.0526) (430.1) (8.439) (0.0650) (181.0) (29.26)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.184*** 391.7 92.12*** -0.149 477.7 127.6**
(0.0681) (504.5) (17.89) (0.140) (538.1) (53.40)
sex ratioK+ 0.121*** 112.2 88.26*** -0.158 219.1 4.876
maleP × sex ratioK (0.030) (179.7) (14.27) (0.099) (436.5) (40.35)
Observations 9,766 9,766 9,766 10,145 10,145 10,145
R-squared 0.195 0.043 0.610 0.293 0.136 0.196
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. maleP is
the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration effect.
sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating
whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided
(amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (visit days). The key controls are P ’s
household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation,
distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household
income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The
standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS.
The IVs are the gender of the first child born on or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the
gender of the first child born on or after 2003 for the CHFS. The sample is split based on whether P live in urban areas and have
only one child.
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Table A.14: Heterogeneity Check: Family compositions of P
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days
maleP -0.138** -483.6 -30.12**
(0.0549) (421.6) (13.41)
sex ratioK -0.0851 -662.8 4.674
(Without older brothers (0.0578) (473.8) (9.214)
mother demonstrate)
older bro -0.0370 -559.4 17.30
(0.0564) (437.7) (10.88)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.239*** 851.1 73.15***
(0.0729) (604.3) (18.52)
sex ratioK× older bro 0.104 1,013 -17.87
(Differences in mother (0.0980) (718.1) (17.44)
demonstrate effects)
maleP× older bro 0.212*** 519.7 -24.12
(0.0736) (725.1) (15.26)
maleP × sex ratioK -0.358*** -721.7 97.87***
×older bro (0.125) (1,183) (16.26)
With older brothers -0.101 479.5 97.87***
father demonstrate (0.063) (754.3) (16.26)
Without older brothers 0.154*** 188.3 77.82***
father demonstrate (0.035) (256.5) (14.61)
Differences in father -0.255*** 291.2 20.05
demonstrate effects (0.078) (909.5) (14.35)
With older brothers 0.343** 1,864 55.27*
mother demonstrate (0.151) (1,142) (30.70)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232
R-squared 0.196 0.049 0.599
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents
provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer
provided (amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year
(visit days). The key controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status,
whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer
to P , age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household
income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city
level for the CHARLS. The IVs are the gender of the first child born on or after 2003 and the
prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS. maleP is the gender of P . older bro is a dummy
representing whether P have any older brothers, and it interacts with key regressors. sex ratioK is
the gender ratio of K in the household of P and the mother demonstration effect for P with any
older brothers. sex ratioK × old bro represents the difference between the mother demonstration
effects for P with any older brothers and the mother demonstration effects for P without any older
brothers, which should be negative and significant if the mother demonstration effects for P with
any older brothers are larger than the mother demonstration effects for P without any older
brothers.
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Table A.15: Heterogeneity Check: Living in a community with minority ethnic groups
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days
maleP -0.0591 -174.0 -49.90***
(0.0725) (494.5) (17.56)
sex ratioK -0.0141 -559.5 -5.602
(Non-Mino. mother (0.0780) (535.2) (10.25)
demonstration effects)
minority -0.0300 -412.2 -0.749
(0.0677) (411.8) (9.165)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.0469 540.2 104.3***
(0.114) (585.2) (22.49)
sex ratioK ×Minority -0.0760 695.4 6.357
(Difference in mother (0.114) (699.5) (13.90)
demonstration effects)
maleP ×Minority -0.0624 -1.668 20.78
(0.0920) (575.3) (15.57)
sex ratioK ×Minority 0.183 -239.6 -35.77
×maleP (0.163) (864.3) (22.90)
Mino. father 0.140*** 436.4 69.29***
demonstration effects (0.050) (361.1) (13.63)
Non-Mino. father 0.033 -19.33 98.70***
demonstration effects (0.065) (453.5) (18.73)
Difference in father 0.107 455.8 -29.40
demonstration effects (0.102) (720.7) (18.36)
Mino. mother -0.029 1,235 110.6***
demonstration effects (0.208) (1,121) (31.12)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232
R-squared 0.201 0.050 0.601
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to
their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided (amount), and the number of days spent
on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (visit days). The key controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age,
income education, hukou status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from
O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household
income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the
CHARLS. The IVs are the gender of the first child born on or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for
the CHARLS. maleP is the gender of P . minority is a dummy representing whether P live in communities with
any minority ethnic groups, and it interacts with key regressors. sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the
household of P and the mother demonstration effect for P living in communities with any minority ethnic groups.
sex ratioK ×minority represents the difference between the mother demonstration effects for P living in
communities with any minority ethnic groups and the mother demonstration effects for P living in Han-only
communities, which should be negative and significant if the mother demonstration effects for P living in
communities with any minority ethnic groups are larger than the mother demonstration effects for P living in
Han-only communities.
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Table A.16: Heterogeneity Check: Ethnic groups
IV: CHFS (mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days
maleP -0.0558 -212.6 15.15
(0.135) (537.3) (36.25)
sex ratioK -0.184 -93.91 -5.164
(Non-Han mother (0.161) (558.5) (45.56)
demonstration effects)
Han -0.0462 -23.79 30.46
(0.0677) (411.8) (9.165)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.0618 253.8 16.61
(0.226) (935.7) (66.02)
sex ratioK ×Han 0.126 7.621 -47.45
(Difference in mother (0.166) (556.6) (46.18)
demonstration effects)
maleP ×Han 0.0133 -10.09 -24.61
(0.136) (506.5) (38.11)
sex ratioK ×Han -0.0355 -20.43 42.04
×maleP (0.241) (889.5) (72.12)
Han father -0.031 147.0 6.036
demonstration effects (0.047) (189.5) (20.19)
Non-Han father -0.122 159.8 11.44
demonstration effects (0.191) (690.2) (46.56)
Difference in father 0.091 -12.81 -5.408
demonstration effects (0.199) (650.6) (56.40)
Han mother -0.058* -86.28 -52.61***
demonstration effects (0.034) (130.7) (11.19)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,509 19,509 19,509
R-squared 0.280 0.203 0.160
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents
provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer
provided (amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year
(visit days). The key controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status,
whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer
to P , age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household
income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K. The standard error is clustered at the province level
for the CHFS. The IV is the gender of the first child born on or after 2003 for the CHFS. maleP is
the gender of P . Han is a dummy representing whether P ’s ethnicity is Han, and it interacts with
key regressors. sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and the mother
demonstration effect for P as Han. sex ratioK×Han represents the difference between the mother
demonstration effects for P as Han and the mother demonstration effects for P as other minority
ethnic groups, which should be negative and significant if the mother demonstration effects for P
as Han are larger than the mother demonstration effects for P as other minority ethnic groups.
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Table A.17: The demonstration effect: migrants only
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS (mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
maleP 0.126 -22,246 -32.62 -0.164* -717.8*** 11.31
(1.017) (31,166) (107.4) (0.0876) (261.5) (32.29)
sex ratioK 0.116 -712.8 -4.559 -0.185*** -791.9*** -41.70***
(0.123) (2,849) (9.792) (0.0717) (180.8) (15.18)
maleP × sex ratioK -0.184 30,706 50.17 0.266** 1,117*** 22.89
(1.460) (45,032) (153.2) (0.125) (389.9) (40.71)
sexratioK+ -0.068 29,993 45.61 0.080 325.4 -18.81
maleP × sex ratioK (1.401) (42,530) (146.7) (0.080) (358.8) (34.91)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,581 1,581 1,581 4,471 4,471 4,471
R-squared 0.177 -1.644 0.076 0.240 0.135 0.144
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
maleP is the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother
demonstration effect. sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome
variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents
(any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided (amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their
elderly parents per year (visit days). The key controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou
status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age,
education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care
of P ’s K, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is
clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs
are the gender of the first child born on or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the
gender of the first child born on or after 2003 for the CHFS. The sample contains only migrants.
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Table A.18: The demonstration effect: migrants living with/out K and O
IV: CHFS (mostly urban)
subsample live together with K, without O live together without K and O
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
maleP -0.190** -571.1** 12.49 -0.164* -717.8*** 48.58358
(0.0908) (275.9) (29.25) (0.0876) (261.5) (52.61)
sex ratioK -0.174*** -663.9*** -48.76*** -0.185*** -791.9*** -13.725
(0.0676) (174.2) (15.24) (0.0717) (180.8) (58.52)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.267** 836.5** -4.591 0.266** 1,117*** -50.84252
(0.125) (404.5) (42.95) (0.125) (389.9) (74.11)
sexratioK+ 0.093 172.5 -53.35 0.260 1,810 -64.56
maleP × sex ratioK (0.084) (401.4) (37.96) (0.310) (1,306) (47.70)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,820 2,820 2,820 1,305 1,305 1,305
R-squared 0.190 0.171 0.069 0.016 0.120 0.0845
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
maleP is the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother
demonstration effect. sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome
variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents
(any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided (amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their
elderly parents per year (visit days). The key controls are P ’s household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou
status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age,
education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care
of P ’s K. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS. The IVs are the gender of the
first child born on or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS. Two migrant subsamples: P
live together with K but without O, and P live without K and O.
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Table A.19: The demonstration effect and the education investment in generation K
IV: CHFS (mostly urban)
the amount of the any education percentage of edu.
VARIABLES education investment investment in K investment in total expense
maleP -29.39 -0.0879** -0.0342**
(1,071) (0.0422) (0.0169)
sex ratioK -3,360*** 0.0914** -0.0838***
(959.8) (0.0416) (0.0190)
maleP × sex ratioK 791.2 0.143** 0.0437*
(1,275) (0.0669) (0.0254)
maleP× hh-size -323.0* -0.00354 -0.00103
(185.8) (0.00952) (0.00412)
hh-size 491.8*** 0.0280*** 0.00443
(144.5) (0.00688) (0.00382)
amount of old-age support -0.539 - -
(0.483) - -
any old-age support - 0.0452*** -0.0299***
provided - (0.00997) (0.00443)
sex ratioK + -2,568** 0.235*** -0.040*
maleP × sex ratioK (1,024) (0.066) (0.023)
(Male with sons-males with daughters)
maleP + 761.7 0.055* 0.010
maleP × sex ratioK (478.2) (0.031) (0.011)
(Male with sons-females with sons)
P demographics Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,509 19,509 19,509
R-squared 0.308 0.144 0.051
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. maleP
is the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration effect.
sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the amount of the
education investment on K fromP, the probability of P providing any education investment for K, and the percentage of the
education expenditure on K in the total household expenses. The key controls are P ’s household-size, whether provide any
old-age support to O and the corresponding amount, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in urban
areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education, working status, retirement
status, any deposit, hukou status, household income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K. The standard error is clustered at
the province level for the CHFS. The IV is the gender of the first child born on or after 2003 for the CHFS.
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Table A.20: The demonstration effect without controlling for the transfers from gen-
eration O
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS(mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
maleP -0.121** -325.3 -10.26 -0.0533 -240.2 -3.723
(0.0595) (312.8) (9.130) (0.0521) (185.3) (16.79)
sex ratioK -0.116** -302.3 -2.654 -0.0127 5.500 -37.15***
(0.0494) (403.7) (7.169) (0.0374) (135.3) (10.36)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.224*** 649.7 47.79*** 0.0422 261.0 50.83**
(0.0772) (448.7) (11.04) (0.0747) (309.2) (24.52)
hh-size -0.00751 -26.42 -3.820* -0.00589 -16.78 -10.09***
(0.0136) (74.95) (2.000) (0.00685) (19.78) (1.273)
maleP× hh-size 0.00385 355.5** 14.50*** -0.000755 41.74 17.12***
(0.0136) (145.8) (2.750) (0.00860) (27.53) (3.122)
sex ratioK+ 0.108*** 347.4* 45.13*** 0.030 266.4 13.67
maleP × sex ratioK (0.050) (181.4) (7.853) (0.055) (219.6) (18.58)
Transfer from O No No No No No No
O taking care for K No No No No No No
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232 12,232 12,232 12,232
R-squared 0.084 0.049 0.670 0.214 0.186 0.140
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. maleP is
the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration effect.
sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating
whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided
(amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (visit days). The key controls are P ’s
household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation,
distance from O, and O’s age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, and household income,
depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural
city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child born
on or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child born on or after 2003 for
the CHFS.
149
Table A.21: The direct downward transfer from generation O
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS(mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
maleP -0.0962* -283.6 -29.82*** -0.0518 -237.7 -3.363
(0.0505) (320.7) (11.18) (0.0448) (173.5) (16.57)
sex ratioK -0.0503 -291.0 -4.282 -0.0733** -96.20 -46.92***
(0.0434) (403.1) (7.485) (0.0343) (135.4) (10.82)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.138** 518.3 76.39*** 0.0412 259.2 49.37**
(0.0577) (450.1) (14.08) (0.0645) (291.9) (24.53)
hh-size -0.0115 -34.99 -3.152 -0.00878 -21.63 -10.35***
(0.0135) (73.16) (2.005) (0.00599) (18.06) (1.259)
maleP× hh-size 0.00947 343.5** 16.65*** -0.00180 39.99 16.52***
(0.0133) (147.5) (2.907) (0.00789) (26.58) (3.048)
sex ratioK+ 0.088*** 227.3 72.11*** -0.032 163.0 2.455
maleP × sex ratioK (0.028) (190.6) (11.70) (0.045) (203.9) (17.92)
transfer from O to P -0.0491 -401.3 -3.679 0.357*** 598.4*** 62.91***
(0.0322) (267.9) (5.636) (0.0151) (49.66) (4.418)
O taking care for K 7.61e-06*** 0.0627*** 0.000929 - - -
(2.40e-06) (0.0240) (0.000614) - - -
transfer from O to K 0.173*** 568.7*** -0.273 - - -
(0.0178) (214.0) (2.715) - - -
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,232 12,232 12,232 19,509 19,509 19,509
R-squared 0.201 0.050 0.610 0.280 0.203 0.159
Mean 0.401 831.2 118.7 0.303 489.1 91.66
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. maleP is
the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration effect.
sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating
whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided
(amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (visit days). The key controls are P ’s
household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation,
distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , transfer to P ’s K, age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou
status, household income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS
and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the
province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child born on or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index
for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child born on or after 2003 for the CHFS.
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Table A.22: Subsample check: High and low gender-ratio provinces (after 2003 samples
only)
IV: CHARLS (mostly rural) IV: CHFS(mostly urban)
VARIABLES any-transfer amount visit days any-transfer amount visit days
Low gender-ratio provinces
maleP 0.0418 -30.36 -10.22 -0.00266 -421.3* 10.49
(0.0591) (385.4) (12.11) (0.0458) (231.0) (17.75)
sex ratioK -0.00135 -254.9 7.162 -0.0331 -228.8* -4.708
(0.0392) (220.0) (6.782) (0.0300) (138.7) (9.741)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.0292 228.6 36.96*** 0.0274 249.2 -15.74
(0.0507) (358.5) (13.74) (0.0477) (182.5) (13.99)
sex ratioK+ 0.028 -26.33 44.12*** -0.006 20.40 -20.45**
maleP × sex ratioK (0.025) (243.4) (11.26) (0.032) (151.6) (9.702)
Observations 3,373 3,373 3,373 2,672 2,672 2,672
R-squared 0.199 0.090 0.690 0.185 0.230 0.145
High gender-ratio provinces
maleP 0.0959* 109.4 -15.82 -0.0270 -52.15 24.94
(0.0499) (758.5) (19.98) (0.0453) (256.2) (30.53)
sex ratioK -0.0326 -103.9 -19.32** 0.00924 -114.6 -16.13
(0.0423) (674.4) (8.086) (0.0485) (178.1) (12.19)
maleP × sex ratioK 0.00560 630.6 83.06*** 0.0430 147.1 13.21
(0.0529) (852.2) (21.12) (0.0484) (280.7) (35.44)
sex ratioK+ -0.027 526.6* 63.74*** 0.052 32.46 -2.917
maleP × sex ratioK (0.027) (318.2) (16.47) (0.056) (170.3) (35.67)
Observations 2,489 2,489 2,490 1,454 1,454 1,454
R-squared 0.265 0.065 0.717 0.255 0.316 0.199
P demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. maleP is
the gender of P . sex ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration effect.
sex ratioK +maleP × sex ratioK shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating
whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (any-transfer), the amount of any transfer provided
(amount), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (visit days). The key controls are P ’s
household-size, gender, age, income education, hukou status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation,
distance from O, and O’s transfer to P , age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, hukou status, household
income and hours of O taking care of P ’s K, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The
standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS.
The IVs are the gender of the first child born on or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the
gender of the first child born on or after 2003 for the CHFS. The sample only contains P who have their first child on or after
2003. This sample is split based on the province-level of gender-ratios.
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Appendix B
Appendix of “The Role of Social
Norms in Old-age Support: a
Theoretical Approach”
B.1 The baseline model with saving
In this section, I illustrate only the model with saving in the baseline model and do not
include the intra-household bargaining assumption. The optimisation problem with
saving is:
max
τF1 ,τ
M
1 ,s1
U = u(c1) + δu(e1) + βu(c2)
s.t.
c1 +
c2
1 + r2
≤ Y1(2− τF1 − τM1 ) +
Y2
1 + r2
(τF2 φn+ τ
M
2 (1− φ)n);
e1 = Y1(τ
F
1 + τ
M
1 ).
Again, the father and the mother in generation P make unitary household-level deci-
sions. e1 is the old-age support provided by the whole household. δ is the discount
factor for the utility generated from altruism. If the function u(·) is specified as a log
or a CRRA function, and τF2 and τ
M
2 are concave function of τ
F
1 and τ
M
1 for the fathers
and mothers as stated in Equation (2.1), the FOCs regarding to τF1 , τ
M
1 , and s1 are:
U1 =
dU
dτF1
= 0;
U2 =
dU
dτM1
= 0;
U4 =
dU
ds1
= −u′(c1) + βu′′(c2)(1 + r2) = 0,
(B.1)
where c1 = Y1(2 − τF1 − τM1 ) − s1 and c2 = Y2(τF2 φn + τM2 (1 − φ)n) + (1 + r2)s1.
The expressions for U11, U12, U13, U21/U12, U22, and U23 similar to the SOCs listed
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in Equations (2.5), (2.6), and (2.7) the previous model without savings (Section 2.3).
With savings, the signs of these SOCs will not change with savings included in the
model. The expressions for U14/U14, U24/U42, U44, and U34 are:
d2U
ds21
= u′′(Y1(2− τF1 − τM1 )− s1) + βu′′(c2)(1 + r2)2 < 0;
d2U
dτF1 ds1
= u′′(Y1(2− τF1 − τM1 )− s1)(Y1) + βu′′(c2)Y2τF
′
2 φn(1 + r2) < 0;
d2U
dτM1 ds1
= u′′(Y1(2− τF1 − τM1 )− s1)(Y1) + βu′′(c2)Y2τM
′
2 (1− φ)n(1 + r2) < 0;
d2U
ds1dφ
= βu′′(c2)Y2(nτF2 − nτM2 ).
(B.2)
Again, I define
U11 =
d2U
dτF∗21
; U13 =
d2U
dτF∗1 dφ
, U22 =
d2U
dτM∗21
; U23 =
d2U
dτM∗1 dφ
; U12/21 =
d2U
dτF∗1 dτ
M∗
1
U44 =
d2U
ds∗21
; U14 = U41 =
d2U
dτF∗1 ds
∗
1
; U24 = U42 =
d2U
dτM∗1 ds
∗
1
; U34/43 =
d2U
ds∗1dφ
.
τF∗1 , τ
M∗
1 , and s
∗ are the optimal solution from the corresponding FOCs. The U ijs are
the SOCs listed above when τF1 and τ
M
1 at their optimal values.
1 A summary for the
signs of the SOCs is:
U11 < 0; U13 > 0; U22 < 0; U23 < 0; U12 = U21 < 0;
U44 < 0; U14 = U41 < 0; U24 = U42 =< 0;
and
U34 = U43 > 0 if τF2 − τM2 < 0; U34 = U43 < 0 if τF2 − τM2 > 0.
The total differentiation equations of the FOCs in Equation (B.1) with respect to τF∗1 ,
τM∗1 , and s
∗ are:
U11dτF∗1 + U
12dτM∗1 + U
13dφ+ U14ds∗1 = 0;
U21dτF∗1 + U
22dτM∗1 + U
23dφ+ U24ds∗1 = 0;
U41dτF∗1 + U
42dτM∗1 + U
34dφ+ U44ds∗1 = 0,
(B.3)
and from Equation (B.3), I get the expressions
1i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
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dτF∗1
dφ
=
bq − dp
bc− ad ;
dτM∗1
dφ
=
aq − cp
ad− bc .
The signs for these two comparative statics depends on the sign of U34. In the first
scenario, when τF∗2 − τM∗2 > 0, which means that U34 < 0, I obtain:
a = U11 − U
14U41
U44
< 0; b = U12 − U
24U14
U44
< 0;
c = U21 − U
14U42
U44
< 0; d = U22 − U
24U42
U44
< 0;
p =
U14U43
U44
− U13 < 0; q = U
24U43
U44
− U23.
(B.4)
From Equation B.4, I infer b = c because U12 = U21 and U24 = U42. Given the SOCs,
if τF∗
′
2 ≈ τM∗′2 ,
|d|> |b| and |a|> |c| ⇒ bc− ad < 0.
However the sign of the q is undetermined. If bq − dp < 0 and aq − cp < 0, so
q > 0.
Then
dτF∗1
dφ
> 0;
dτM∗1
dφ
< 0.
Recall that from Equation (B.4), q = U
24U43−U23U44
U44
. From the SOCs function for U23,
U24, U43, and U44 from Equations (2.6) and (B.2), I conclude
if Y1(1 + r2)− Y2τM∗′2 (1− φ)n < 0 ⇒ q > 0.
If not, q is also highly likely to be positive, especially when c2 is large enough.
The second case is when τF∗2 − τM∗2 < 0, which means U34 > 0. The signs for a, b,
c, and d do not change, and in this scenario, q is always larger than 0. However, I need
to show p < 0. If bq − dp < 0 and aq − cp < 0, then p < 0. The following statement
shows
if Y1(1 + r2)− Y2τF∗′2 φn < 0 ⇒ U14U34 − U13U44 > 0 ⇒ p < 0.
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Then I get the same conclusion:
dτF∗1
dφ
> 0;
dτM∗1
dφ
< 0.
This is consistent with the previous comparative statics in the baseline model in Section
2.3 under the assumption τF∗
′
2 ≈ τM∗′2 .
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Appendix C
Appendix of “Locked out? China’s
New Cooperative Medical Scheme
and Rural Labour Migration”
C.1 NCMS coverage and the compensating differ-
ential model
Todaros (1969) and Harris and Todaros (1971) migration models focus on market equi-
libria in rural and urban labour markets. Most general equilibrium models place more
emphasis on the importance of the unemployment rate in the urban labour market.
However, my analysis focuses on partial equilibrium: whether these rural migrants
want to come back to, or stay in, their hometown because of the NCMS, given the
fact that they can find a job in urban areas. The migrants are usually guaranteed
at least one job option in rural areas, which is farming. Gruber (2000) uses a model
of compensating differential based on Rosen (1986) when analysing health insurance
coverage and job mobility. A modified form of the Gruber model is applied to the
rural-to-urban migration context.
Focusing on individuals in rural areas, an individual i has preferences over the net
income in urban areas M iu, or in rural areas M ir, and the consumption-related job
indicator, Di. So the utility function for a rural-to-urban migrant in urban areas is
U iu = U(M iu, Di),
and in rural areas is
U ir = U(M ir, Di);
M ir and M iu can take positive or negative values. Di is a binary indicator for the
individual’s job type, Di = 1 (jobs in urban areas), and Di = 0 (jobs in rural areas).
The utility function is quasi-concave in Mi.
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The net income earned in urban or rural areas equals wages for the job in urban or
rural areas respectively, W iu or W ir, minus health care expenditure, Ci:
Miu = Wiu − Ciu,
and
Mir = Wir − Cir.
For simplicity, we assume for now that health care expenses are the same in both urban
and rural areas. So Ci = Ciu = Cir. This assumption will be changed after introducing
the NCMS into the model.
Wages in urban areas are usually higher than rural wages. The compensating
variation (Z) is the difference between M iu and M ir when the individual is indifferent
between working in rural or urban areas, U(M∗iu, 1) = U(M
∗
ir, 0), and
Z = M∗iu −M∗ir.
The wage difference for an individual, 4W i, in urban and rural areas is W iu −W ir
assuming identical urban and rural health care expenses, then
4M i = M iu −M ir = 4W i,
where 4Mi is the urban-rural income difference for individual i. The choice to work
in urban areas can be summarised as
Di = 0 if Z > 4M i; Di = 1 if Z ≤ 4M.
I use F (Z) for the cumulative distribution function of Z and f(Z) for the associated
probability density function. Aggregating from the individual level to the county level,
the fraction of the rural population who work in urban areas is
ND=1 =
4M∫
0
f(z)dz = F (4M) = P (Z ≤ 4M), (C.1)
and the fraction of the rural population who remain in rural areas is
ND=0 =
∞∫
4M
f(z)dz = 1− F (4M) = 1− P (Z ≤ 4M), (C.2)
assuming that demand in both urban and rural labour markets is exogenous. The
demand for rural migrant workers in urban areas, especially during the period of NCMS
implementation, grew fast (Shi, 2008). It is reasonable to assume that the labour
markets in cities were large enough that the changes in numbers of migrants in each
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county did not affect the urban labour market. From Equation (C.1), if4W decreases,
the fraction of the rural population who work in urban areas decreases.
If a rural migrant joins the NCMS, he/she can get reimbursements, Bi, from health
care expenses generated when visiting hospitals or clinics in his/her own county. The
rural-urban income difference for this migrant after joining the NCMS becomes:
4M ′i = 4Wi +Bi = M iu −M ir +Bi.
As the income difference decreases, the NCMS implementation should lead to a decrease
in the fraction of rural residents who work in urban areas according to Equation (C.1).
At the beginning of this section, I assumed Ci = Ciu = Cir. However, in reality,
urban health care expenses are usually higher than rural expenses (Chen et al., 2014).
This further reduces the income difference:
4M ′′i = W iu − Ciu −W ir + Cir +Bi < 4M
′
i ,
where Ciu > Cir. It decreases the fraction of rural-urban migrants in the total rural
population compared to the case where health care expenses are the same in both rural
and urban areas. The simple model here shows how health insurance affects migration
behaviours through changes in income differences.
C.2 Data imputation
Missing data for a specific year During the long time span of the data collected
from provincial yearbooks or provincial rural yearbooks, there are missing entries for
the key variables for different years and different provinces. I needed to impute the
missing entries based on the information available. For example, if, for the year 2000,
the total number of migrants in rural areas was missing, but I had data for this variable
and the total labour force and other sectors’ labour force for 1999 and 2001, I would
use the 1999 to 2001 data’s growth rate of the total labour force and other sectors’
labour force to calculate 2000’s data. These imputed missing years are the year 2007
for Hubei, the year 2011 for Ningxia and the years 2005, 2007, 2011 for Shanxi.
Missing data on the exact number of migrants If, in the yearbooks, there was
no data for the total number of migrants in rural areas, but they provided all other
sectors’ labour force data, I approximated the total number of migrants in rural areas
using the total number of labour force in rural areas minus the total number of all
other labour forces. The imputed province is Jiangsu. Other provinces all have the
rural-to-urban migrant data from provincial yearbooks or provincial rural yearbooks.
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C.3 Placebo test
Guangdong province has had an early version of the NCMS since 1999 (Zheng, 2011).
The early version in Guangdong operated in a similar way to the NCMS before 2003.
In 2003 and 2004, the province redistributed documents in its counties about the
implementation of the NCMS, and the NCMS replaced its early version in 2003 and
2004. Compared to other provinces, Guangdong was a highly-treated group around
2003. The NCMS implementation should not have effects on the county level migration
propensity trend showing up just right after 2003, nor on its growth rate. Although
Guangdong province is one of the provinces that receive a lot of migrants from other
provinces and has a lot of intra-province migrants, the inter-province migrants also
account for around 40% of the total migrants in Guangdong. After factoring out the
suburban or urban areas in Guangdong, other under-developed rural areas in counties
should behave similarly to other counties in other provinces in terms of rural-to-urban
migrants if they experienced the same NCMS implementation timeline.
The same regression equations (3.2) and (3.4) for prop(migrants)i,t and growthratei,t
are applied to the Guangdong data. The date of NCMS implementation is the time
that the NCMS replaced its early version. All variables have the same definitions as
before. The results are in Table C.2. The regression results for prop(migrants)i,t and
growthratei,t show that there is no negative and significant effect of NCMS on migra-
tion trends on or after 2003. For growthratei,t, the effects for the third and fourth year
after the NCMS implementation are even positive.
The increasing trends in rural-to-urban migration might be due to the fact that
Guangdong province allows rural-to-urban migrants and rural residents to visit hospi-
tals in Guangzhou and get their reimbursements in their hometown.1 Therefore, many
inter-county but intra-province migrants in Guangdong province are no longer “locked”
by the NCMS. Hence, intra-province rural-to-urban migration in Guangdong might be
positively affected after the implementation of the NCMS. Also, Guangdong is one of
the provinces that receive a large number of rural-to-urban migrants. The provincial
government has more incentives to implement policies that are beneficial for migrants
to maintain social stability in urban areas in Guangdong.
C.4 Robustness Checks
C.4.1 Different lengths of leads and lags
The regression results in Table 3.3 can be valid only for four years before and after the
first implementation of the NCMS. In this section, I tried different numbers of years
before and after the NCMS first implementation. The results for three, five, and seven
years before and after the implementation are shown in Table C.3 and C.4. I also
1Website: http://www.gd.gov.cn/gdgk/gdyw/200711/t20071128 35482.htm (In Chinese)
159
present the results with four lags only and four leads only in Table C.5. The results are
consistent with the main regression with four leads and lags: NCMS implementations
have lagged negative effects on the growth rate of migration in a county. These results
show that the main results are robust in terms of the number of years before and after
the implementation used.
C.4.2 Comparison between the early-treated group and the
late-treated groups
To further check whether all of the negative effects of the NCMS were fully driven
by the early-treated group, I run the same regressions separately on the early-treated
group and the late-treated group and compared the results. Table C.6 shows the results
for these two groups. The main dependent variable is the migration propensity and its
growth rate at the county level.
The results surprisingly show that the late-treated group contributes more to the
significant negative effects in the whole sample. This implies that the NCMS has more
effects on the late-treated group after controlling for year trends, county fixed effects,
and their interactions. However, this might lead to another possibility, which is that
the financial crisis in 2008 caused the decrease in rural-to-urban migrations rather than
the implementation of the NCMS. After controlling for the year and the year times
province fixed effects, the concern might be less worrying in the context. Also, the
financial crisis had effects on both the early-treated and late-treated groups, yet the
results do not reflect this for the 4th-year lag after the NCMS implementation for the
early-treated group. I also ran regressions with 7 years before and after the NCMS
implementation for both groups, which show the negative effects of the NCMS still
show up after the fifth and seventh year of the initial NCMS implementation.
C.4.3 Possible determiners of the NCMS implementation date
The results for the regression analysing the correlations between county GDP per
capita, the migration propensity, rural income per capita, total rural labour force, and
the NCMS implementation dates are presented in Table C.7. The results show that
none of the controls or the migration propensity is significantly correlated with whether
counties are selected as early “pilot” counties. The results might help to relieve worries
about the selection of the “pilot counties” depending on the outcome and the controls.
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Figure C.1: NCMS coverage from 2003 to 2008
Note: The distribution of counties for different implementation years. Only five provinces are shown in this figure and
it indicates the gradual expansion of NCMS in the five provinces from 2003 to 2008.
C.5 Figures and Tables
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Figure C.3: Coefficients plot for the effects of FirstNCMS on growthratei,t: Seven
leads and lags
Note: The graph is a coefficient plot for growthratei,t coefficients in Table C.4. The confidence
intervals are 95% confidence interval. y-axis is the effect of the NCMS implementation on the
growth rate of the the migration propensity. x-axis indicates the event time t. t = 0 means
the year that a county first starts to implement the NCMS.
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Figure C.4: Map of survey regions in the CHARLS
Note: The map is taken from the CHNS website. It shows the geographical coverage of CHNS. Website:
https://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china.
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Table C.2: The placebo tests for the effects of the NCMS
Guangdong province simulated early NCMS
only implementation
VARIABLES prop(migrants)i,t growthratei,t prop(migrants)i,t growthratei,t
Event time
-4 1.821 1.379 0.0230 -0.295
(3.144) (4.658) (0.0478) (0.819)
-3 2.925 5.604 -0.0158 -0.795
(4.671) (6.617) (0.0358) (0.817)
-2 3.730 8.063 -0.0276 -0.600
(5.826) (8.336) (0.0219) (0.594)
-1 4.482 10.06 -0.00914 -0.302
(6.864) (10.02) (0.0139) (0.678)
0 5.520 12.36 0.00673 -0.107
(8.111) (12.18) (0.0230) (1.450)
1 6.704 9.943 0.0111 1.638
(9.943) (15.27) (0.0362) (1.590)
2 9.104 11.06 -0.0189 0.185
(12.19) (17.72) (0.0269) (0.937)
3 27.35 46.98** 0.0473 -1.171*
(17.40) (22.47) (0.0766) (0.701)
4 13.40*** 21.93** 0.0945 0.159
(5.060) (9.103) (0.0593) (1.162)
county FE × year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
year × province FE - - Yes Yes
year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 475 474 1,813 1,812
R-squared 0.269 0.180 0.234 0.157
Number of counties 47 48 178 178
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The stand errors are
clustered at county-level. prop(migrants)i,t is the migration propensity for each county i at time t and growthratei,t is the
corresponding growth rate. Key regressor Event time equals 0 indicates the first year a county starting to implement NCMS. The
control variables include GDP per capita, disposable income per capita for rural residents, irrigated farmland per capita, and
total rural labour force for each county at each year. The first and the second column table is only run on counties in Guangdong.
The third and fourth column are the results for the placebo test for hypothetical early NCMS implementation.
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Table C.3: The effects of FirstNCMS on prop(migrants)i,t and growthratei,t: with
different lengths of leads and lags
VARIABLES prop(migrants)i,t growthratei,t prop(migrants)i,t growthratei,t
Event time
-5 - - -0.0230 -0.740
- - (0.0256) (0.656)
-4 - - -0.0257 -0.730
- - (0.0266) (0.695)
-3 -6.57e-05 -0.0853 -0.0126 -0.413
(0.00739) (0.460) (0.0141) (0.707)
-2 0.0103 -0.00235 0.000620 -0.234
(0.0189) (1.318) (0.0214) (1.465)
-1 0.0101 1.582 3.06e-05 1.410
(0.0349) (1.556) (0.0367) (1.587)
0 -0.0214 0.0492 -0.0394 -0.247
(0.0288) (0.886) (0.0318) (0.952)
1 0.0453 -1.266* 0.0304 -1.504**
(0.0775) (0.722) (0.0760) (0.744)
2 0.0860 -0.188 0.0626 -0.560
(0.0529) (1.091) (0.0583) (1.199)
3 -0.0299 -1.192* -0.0703 -1.797**
(0.0514) (0.693) (0.0612) (0.818)
4 - - -0.103 -1.489**
- - (0.0683) (0.752)
5 - - -0.0355 -0.656
- - (0.0422) (0.633)
year × province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
county FE × year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,812
R-squared 0.234 0.157 0.237 0.159
Number of county 178 178 178 178
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The stand errors are
clustered at county-level. prop(migrants)i,t is the migration propensity for each county i at time t and growthratei,t is the
corresponding growth rate. Key regressor Event time equals 0 indicates the first year a county starting to implement NCMS. The control
variables include GDP per capita, disposable income per capita for rural residents, irrigated farmland per capita, and total rural labour
force for each county at each year.
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Table C.4: The effects of FirstNCMS on prop(migrants)i,t and growthratei,t: Seven
leads and lags
VARIABLES prop(migrants)i,t growthratei,t prop(migrants)i,t growthratei,t
Event time Event time
-7 0.022 -0.789 1 0.0222 -1.640**
(0.0357) (0.572) (0.0771) (0.746)
-6 0.0319 -0.145 2 0.0297 -1.122
(0.0502) (0.841) (0.0634) (1.210)
-5 -0.0147 -0.146 3 -0.114 -2.553***
(0.0328) (0.572) (0.0812) (1.012)
-4 -0.0207 -0.485 4 -0.141* -2.146**
(0.0243) (0.604) (0.0849) (0.941)
-3 -0.00970 -0.337 5 -0.0746 -1.309*
(0.0140) (0.694) (0.0591) (0.790)
-2 0.00464 -0.228 6 -0.0779 -1.277
(0.0226) (1.490) (0.0589) (0.788)
-1 9.74e-05 1.402 7 -0.173* -3.035**
(0.0368) (1.589) (0.0901) (1.259)
0 -0.0462 -0.360
(0.0330) (0.961)
year × province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
county FE × year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 0.499 4.528 0.499 4.528
R-squared 0.241 0.161 0.241 0.161
Observations 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,812
Number of counties 178 178 178 178
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The stand errors are
clustered at county-level. prop(migrants)i,t is the migration propensity for each county i at time t and growthratei,t is the
corresponding growth rate. Key regressor Event time equals 0 indicates the first year a county starting to implement NCMS. The
control variables include GDP per capita, disposable income per capita for rural residents, irrigated farmland per capita, and
total rural labour force for each county at each year.
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Table C.5: The effects of FirstNCMS on prop(migrants)i,t and growthratei,t: Four
leads only and four lags only
4 years before 4 years after
VARIABLES prop(migrants)i,t growthratei,t prop(migrants)i,t growthratei,t
Event time Event time
-4 -0.0180 -0.257 0 -0.0350 -0.300
(0.0167) (0.388) (0.0303) (0.723)
-3 -0.0104 -0.105 1 0.0343 -1.552*
(0.0119) (0.556) (0.0773) (0.836)
-2 -0.00215 0.0679 2 0.0698 -0.506
(0.0199) (1.316) (0.0531) (1.070)
-1 0.00255 1.761 3 -0.0629 -1.778**
(0.0386) (1.612) (0.0581) (0.801)
0 -0.0310 0.382 4 -0.0916 -1.378**
(0.0311) (0.985) (0.0570) (0.569)
year × province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
county FE × year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.230 0.155 0.237 0.157
Observations 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,812
Number of counties 178 178 178 178
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The stand errors are
clustered at county-level. prop(migrants)i,t is the migration propensity for each county i at time t and growthratei,t is the
corresponding growth rate. Key regressor Event time equals 0 indicates the first year a county starting to implement NCMS. The
control variables include GDP per capita, disposable income per capita for rural residents, irrigated farmland per capita, and total
rural labour force for each county at each year.
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Table C.6: The effects of the NCMS on the early-treated and late-treated group
early-treated late-treated
VARIABLES prop(migrant)i,t growthratei,t prop(migrant)i,t growthratei,t
Event time
-4 -0.00187 -0.303 -0.00318 -0.0750
(0.00667) (0.234) (0.0294) (1.500)
3 -0.00253 -0.235 -0.0110 -0.136
(0.00740) (0.152) (0.0466) (2.541)
2 -0.00444 -0.137 -0.0213 -1.028
(0.00694) (0.0843) (0.0618) (3.982)
1 0.0722* 0.360 -0.0367 1.967
(0.0420) (0.365) (0.0589) (2.688)
0 0.00426 -0.0376 -0.0789 -0.374
(0.0125) (0.0848) (0.0533) (1.480)
1 0.0151 -0.177 0.0516 -1.850*
(0.0200) (0.274) (0.125) (0.951)
2 0.00829 -0.0411 0.137* 0.0446
(0.00737) (0.0817) (0.0809) (1.219)
3 0.00988 -0.0379 -0.0687 -2.894*
(0.00789) (0.0846) (0.121) (1.664)
4 0.00884 -0.0416 -0.0563 -1.707**
(0.00744) (0.116) (0.0688) (0.854)
year × province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
county FE × year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 848 848 965 964
R-squared 0.289 0.272 0.244 0.161
Number of county 69 69 109 109
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The stand errors are
clustered at county-level. prop(migrants)i,t is the migration propensity for each county i at time t and growthratei,t is the
corresponding growth rate. Key regressor Event time equals 0 indicates the first year a county starting to implement NCMS. The
control variables include GDP per capita, disposable income per capita for rural residents, irrigated farmland per capita, and
total rural labour force for each county at each year. The early-treated group includes counties that implemented the NCMS in
2003, 2004 and 2005, and the late-treated group includes those counties with the implementation after 2005.
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Table C.7: The correlations between NCMS implementation and possible determiners
VARIABLES prop(migrants) GDP per capita ln(rural income) rural labour
early-treated 2.555 -0.400 3.571 204,148
(28.88) (0.0.427) (3.950) (655,553)
year × province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
county FE × year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,813 1,813 1,813 1,813
Number of counties 178 178 178 178
R-squared 0.229 0.761 0.869 0.893
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The stand errors
are clustered at county-level. earlycounty indicates if a county is in the early-treated group. The early-treated group includes
counties that had NCMS implementation in 2003, 2004 and 2005 and the late-treated group includes those counties with the
implementation after 2005. The four outcome variables are the migration propensity, GDP per capita, log of the rural income per
capita, and the total number of the rural labour force.
Table C.8: Number of counties implimented the NCMS in the CHNS dataset overtime
CHNS wave
2000 2004 2006 2009
Number of pilot counties 0 7 24 36
New pilot counties 0 7 17 12
Total number of counties 36 36 36 36
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